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Executive summary  
This report summarises the key implications of the current operational environment for 
the international human rights system. The temporal reference point was the latest 
Government of Finland human rights report, which was published in 2014. The aim of 
the project was to analyse the continuities and disruptions in the development of the 
operational environment for Finland up to the spring of 2019. The main themes of Fin-
land’s current human rights policy were also reflected as points of comparison in the 
analysis. The research was part of the Finnish Government's analysis, assessment 
and research activities. The Prime minister’s office funded the project, while the Minis-
try for Foreign Affairs of Finland was responsible for its coordination. Ann-Marie Ny-
roos (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland) chaired the steering group until April 2019 
and Janne Jokinen (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland) after that. The members of 
steering group included Janina Hasenson (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland), Eero 
Koskenniemi (Ministry of the Interior), Henriikka Leppo (Prime minister’s office), and 
Kaisa Tiusanen (Ministry of Justice) (final standing).  
The approach in the project was thematic, focusing particularly on four global trends 
(environmental change, migration, new technologies and the changing security para-
digm), which were selected in agreement with the steering group. The project also as-
sessed the current political power shifts and movements that influence the interna-
tional human rights system and related actors. The scope of the study developed in 
discussions with the steering group and the context of the analysis was agreed upon 
to include the United Nations (mainly the UN Human Rights Council) and the Euro-
pean Union. Other forums, such as the Council of Europe and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, are referred to in particular cases. The main 
questions were grouped under three key perspectives:  
● What are the main human rights impacts of the named global trends?  
● How is the current international human rights system capable of responding to 
the positive and negative human rights impacts of these trends in the contem-
porary political climate?  
● How should Finland shape its human rights policy under these circum-
stances?  
Since the operational context for the ruling world order has changed because of 
global trends and political power shifts, the multilateral institutions are not necessarily 
equipped to respond to new human rights issues. As the operational context changes, 
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it is necessary to critically evaluate the potential of the international human rights sys-
tem to adapt to this change. The findings of the project show that there are several 
promising lines of development for updating the international human rights framework 
in response to the implications of environmental change, migration, new technologies 
and the changing security paradigm. Examples of these include:  
● The concretisation of the right to a safe, clean and healthy environment and 
the growing realisation of the importance of the environment to full enjoyment 
of human rights, 
● the attempts to increase the global coordination of migration with the new 
Global Compacts for migration and on refugees, even if there are great politi-
cal disputes to overcome, 
● the active role taken by the European Union and the Council of Europe on 
linking the human rights perspective with the development of new technolo-
gies by discussing state-led regulation and increasing cooperation with busi-
ness actors on human rights issues, and 
● the growing understanding and emphasis of human security and the potential 
of this concept, and the concept of resilience, to address the negative human 
rights impacts of the global and political trends.  
The contemporary political climate emphasises state sovereignty over multilateralism, 
and the multipolarity and multivocality makes it more difficult to reach agreements on 
international forums. The highly politicised - and currently some of the most controver-
sial - themes include climate change, immigration and gender equality, which turn into 
obstacles to effective cooperation in both global and regional human rights forums. 
The strong anti-gender movements and the opposition to gender equality are affecting 
the promotion of the rights of women and girls, and the rights of the LGBTI people. 
The denial of the remarkable environmental change caused by human activity is mak-
ing ambitious goals for its mitigation and reversal difficult, and the attitudes towards 
immigration are continuously polarised. The constellation of human rights actors is 
also shifting, as civil society actors are facing increasing threats and a reduction of op-
erating space and the role of business actors is on the rise. At the same time, various 
human rights actors are searching for new ways to talk about human rights as rights 
for all, not for only a few, in order to increase the legitimacy of the international human 
rights system for the general public.  
As a result of these findings, the report introduces recommendations for Finland as it 
shapes its human rights policy in the future (see chapter 9). The recommendations 
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are means to achieve eight goals, which the report suggests Finland should address 
in its human rights policy:  
Goal 1. Develop the link between human rights and environmental change on all 
levels of governance. 
Goal 2: Human rights of migrants should be promoted through international co-
ordination.  
Goal 3. Keep a human rights based approach to new technologies on the 
agenda. 
Goal 4. When new elements emerge in security agendas, include a human rights 
approach in the discussions. 
Goal 5. Promote gender equality actively at the time of resistance and anti-gen-
derisms.  
Goal 6. Utilise and create new possibilities of cooperation across professional 
and political silos. 
Goal 7. Support the states’ commitment to multilateralism by promoting activi-
ties that increase its legitimacy. 
Goal 8. Promote a broad concept of participation and the right to education to 
mitigate the negative impacts of global trends.  
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Introduction 
This report introduces the main findings and policy recommendations of a project enti-
tled the Current state and development trends of the international human rights sys-
tem. This project was launched in March 2018 as a part of the Government’s analysis, 
assessment and research activities. The project was assigned a steering group, con-
sisting of staff members from the several Finnish ministries: Ministry for Foreign Af-
fairs, the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Jus-
tice.  
The research group included researchers from Oxford Research (D.Soc.Sci Anna 
Björk, B.Soc.Sci Juho-Matti Paavola, L.Sc (econ.) Arttu Vainio), Opinio Juris 
(LL.D.Merja Pentikäinen expert on international law and human rights), Radboud Uni-
versity Nijmegen (PhD Docent Tineke Strik), and WoM World of Management (MBA, 
MSSc Inkeri Tanhua). Oxford Research was responsible for the coordination of the 
project, organisation of the final report and the writing process. The role of the invited 
external experts was to provide Oxford Research with material, guidance, expert 
views and insights and comment the report’s draft versions from their respective fields 
of expertise: Merja Pentikäinen on the core knowledge of the international human 
rights system and international law; Tineke Strik on migration, and Inkeri Tanhua on 
gender equality. Anna Björk and Juho-Matti Paavola were mainly responsible for com-
posing and drafting the policy analysis. Gender equality in work life (chapter 3.3.2), 
the anti-gender movements (7.4) and goal 5 (chapter 9) were mainly composed by 
Inkeri Tanhua. Key parts of migration (chapter 2) were composed by Tineke Strik. The 
final decisions on the incorporation of expert views into the report were made by Ox-
ford Research.  
The role of the steering group was to discuss the focus and included elements of the 
research and comment on the interim reports, which displayed the progress of the 
project. In January 2019, a group of 12 stakeholders with backgrounds in NGOs, re-
search institutes and universities, and business actors participated in a workshop and 
presented their views on the preliminary findings of the project. The research group is 
grateful for the helpful comments and insights stemming from these encounters. 
The research team asked for comments on the early draft of the final report from three 
experts. The research team thanks dr. Emma Hakala, professor Rinna Kullaa, and 
professor Elina Pirjatanniemi for their valuable comments. A draft of recommenda-
tions and parts of the report were also discussed with additional experts before finalis-
ing the manuscript. The main authors of this report are responsible for the incorpora-
tion of the comments into the report. 
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The Aim and Scope of the Project 
Since the last Government of Finland Human Rights Report (2014), the operational 
environment for the international human rights system has changed. For Finland, the 
most important implications concern the political discrepancies among the member 
states of the European Union, and the growing multipolarity in world politics. The 
shifts in world politics, in both a global and regional sense, influence partnerships, the 
conditions for promoting particular human rights themes and the anticipation of future 
developments. Political trends - emphasising sovereignty over multilateral cooperation 
and polarising populist strategies over solidarity and clearly expressed claims – chal-
lenge the public and popular legitimation of multilateral institutions and force advo-
cates of the contemporary global system to adopt a defensive position. These trends 
also provide the opportunity for non-state actors to step up and fill in the power vacu-
ums. Previous analyses suggest that the challenges of the international order, the 
stated universality of its norms and institutions and stressing sovereignty over solidar-
ity are likely to shift the balance towards an order of strong regions1. As a small state, 
Finland has benefitted from the US-led and system-based order in the past, and, as 
the balance shifts, its interests remain in the supporting of a norm-based international 
system2. 
While both state actors and non-state actors are readjusting to the power shifts and 
strategising to the best of their abilities, the actors in the international human rights 
system encounter new questions which need to be contextualised into the framework. 
The questions stem from global trends and introduce new issues to the human rights 
agenda, such as those relating to environmental change and developing technologies. 
These new issues challenge the human rights system and require interpretation of the 
current norms and potentially the need to introduce new regulatory tools. While most 
trends are well recognised and their impacts on human beings increasingly docu-
mented, their incorporation into the international human rights system is still at the 
state of emergence and not firmly established. One reason for this is that the trends 
have both positive and negative impacts, which makes it difficult to find balance in 
regulation.  
The aim of this project has been to map the key consequences of the selected global 
trends and the current political shifts for the international human rights system. As the 
conclusive aim to this task, the report is set to provide recommendations on how to 
                                                     
 
1 For a recent research dealing with the global order and its implications to Finland, see Creutz 
et al. 2019: The changing global order and its implications for the EU. Available at https://tie-
tokayttoon.fi/julkaisut/raportti?pubid=URN:ISBN:978-952-287-697-3.  
2 Creutz et al. 2019, p. 53–54. 
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address these consequences. The main questions can be grouped under three key 
perspectives:  
1. What are the main human rights impacts of the named global trends?  
2. How is the current international human rights system capable of responding to 
the positive and negative human rights impacts of these trends in the contem-
porary political climate?  
3. How should Finland shape its human rights policy under these circum-
stances? 
To add feasibility and adjust the topic to the time limits of the research process, at the 
early stages of the project the research group and the steering group agreed to limit 
the scope of the project to two main contexts. As a result, the forums focused on this 
report are the United Nations and the European Union.  
Another early decision concerned the choice of global trends: based on the recogni-
tion of emerging and developing agendas with global relevance, the research group 
and the steering group pinned the trends down to environmental change, migration, 
new technologies and the changing security paradigm. Each global trend is also ad-
dressed from the perspective of gender equality. Moreover, the resistance to the pro-
motion of gender equality and women’s rights and the polarising impacts of populism 
are discussed as political movements that impede cooperation within the international 
human rights system. Examples of these movements are discussed mainly in the Eu-
ropean context, albeit both have global reach. 
On sources and methods  
The main sources in this project are background interviews of experts of the interna-
tional human rights system, official documents and reports, including those of the 
United Nations human rights bodies, the European Union, and the Finnish Govern-
ment, as well as secondary literature on academic research. As the topic of the pro-
ject was very timely, selected popular addresses, such as newspaper articles, web-
sites and blogs, were also used as examples of ongoing developments and debates.  
The semi-structured theme interviews with experts are in the report used anony-
mously without direct quotations. The interviews were carried out as confidential dis-
cussions and used as a compass for probing in depth to developments and current 
themes in the field of human rights. The 19 experts represented different professional 
groups and institutions, including academic researchers, NGOs, civil servants and 
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multilateral organisations. Out of the topics highlighted, their insights raised the issues 
of populism, anti-gender movements and the question of human rights communication 
to be specifically included in the agenda for this project. In addition to these central is-
sues, their contribution has been vital for recognising key debates and elements un-
der the umbrellas of global trends and political shifts.  
The report is composed into a form of an analytical overview on recent and ongoing 
developments, main topics of the debates and the dynamics between key human 
rights actors. In some cases, developments and topics include conceptual struggles 
and also potential conceptual shifts, most notably in regard to the concepts of secu-
ritisation, resilience and the case of anti-gender movements. In these parts of the re-
port, the style of presentation is resorting to explicating academic debates and 
sources, which differs from the style of presentation in other parts. The objective of 
these parts is to clarify a shift of a paradigm or a political development by indicating a 
conceptual tension behind these shifts. 
Structure of the report: Parts and guiding questions 
The report has three main parts:  
Part I The capacity and flexibility of the international human rights system is currently 
being contested with novel questions. These questions rise from global trends that 
shape political, economic and social developments locally, regionally and globally. 
The report focuses on four global trends: environmental change, migration, new tech-
nologies and the changing security paradigm. Discussion over the consequences of 
global trends has been taken up by heads of states, international organisations and 
non-state actors alike. Some of the questions, such as the consequences of environ-
mental change or use of new technologies for communities and individuals, need to 
be addressed urgently. These interlinked trends affect different parts of the world and 
different groups unevenly. Some of them also have positive effects in addition to the 
negative ones, as commentators have been pointing out3. The main research ques-
tions addressing the effects of global trends include:  
● What kinds of diverse challenges and threats to human rights are caused by 
the named global trends?  
                                                     
 
3 A fair share of research discussing these trends has been published, e.g. Aburdene 2005: 
Megatrends 2010: the rise of conscious capitalism.; Hordeski, 2011: Megatrends for energy ef-
ficiency and renewable energy; Gaub and Laban 2015: Arab Futures: Three Scenarios for 2025. 
European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2015; Goldstone 2010. "The New Popu-
lation Bomb: The Four Megatrends That Will Change the World." 
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● What kinds of challenges are associated with the realisation of civil and politi-
cal rights, on one hand, and the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights on the other?  
Part II At the same time, the dynamics between actors contributing to the international 
human rights system are affected by power shifts, such as the rise of China and the 
United States withdrawing from multilateral governance. Meanwhile, the European 
Union has its own internal disputes prompted especially by Hungary and Poland and 
the questioning of the rule of law. Russia continues its disruptive politics, specifically 
by utilising the digital communication environment and refusing to pay its membership 
fees to international organisations (e.g. the Council of Europe). Also, the rise of popu-
list parties and the activation of anti-gender movements cause tensions between ac-
tors. An example of this is the way that the system, its underlying values and the foun-
dations of international human rights, has been challenged both globally and in Eu-
rope4. Human rights and the international human rights system provide means for 
groups and individuals to challenge the established power structures and elites, who 
wish to retain privileges. Retaliations by states towards human rights defenders and 
their supporters on the one hand, and obstructing the functions of the international hu-
man rights system on the other are means to maintain power. 
The sense of urgency for sufficiently conceptualising and finding possible answers to 
the new questions posed by global trends is complicated by the need to overcome in-
tensified political disputes and, possibly, by the need to form new alliances. One out-
come of this changed operational environment resulting from global trends and politi-
cal shifts is the growing number of efforts to find new ways to make a case for the pro-
motion of human rights in the face of their opposition. In Europe, for example, the Eu-
ropean Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) has invested in debating and develop-
ing more effective ways of communicating human rights to the general public. The 
main research questions addressing the effects of political shifts on the interna-
tional human rights system include:  
                                                     
 
4 See, for example OHCHR 2017b: A speech by Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, delivered at Johns Hopkins Centre for Public Health and Human Rights.  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21499&LangID=E; 
Amnesty International 2018: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2018/02/annual-
report-201718/ 
Muiznieks 2017: Human Rights in Europe: From Crisis to Renewal? CoE. Available at 
https://rm.coe.int/human-rights-in-europe-from-crisis-to-renewal-/168077fb04  
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● What kinds of diverse challenges and threats to human rights are caused by 
the contemporary political climate?  
● What kinds of challenges are directed specifically against the UN Human 
Rights Council (HRC)?  
● What kinds of reform pressures can be expected in the near future and from 
which directions?  
● Which areas are facing the biggest challenges?  
Part III In the changing operational environment, one concern is how to strengthen 
the international human rights system in the face of these challenges. Tackling the 
consequences of these challenges requires a recontextualisation of the international 
human rights system to better suit the challenge and to reinforce its legitimacy. The 
consequences of the global trends and political shifts for the international human 
rights system are discussed from the perspective of Finland as a human rights actor. 
Research questions include:  
● Which factors of change are particularly relevant for Europe, the European 
Union and Finland?  
● How are the sustainable development goals visible in international human 
rights forums or how should they be visible there?  
● How can Finland’s activities in the UN (incl. its membership in the HRC) best 
promote positive development trends?  
● How should gender equality and women’s rights be promoted in human rights 
forums?  
During the project, the initial research questions were used for guiding the interviews, 
desk research and policy analysis. While they are all tackled in the report, they are not 
individually addressed here. Due to the original extent of the project, the scope and 
focus of the report was partly reformulated in accordance with the steering group. The 
conclusions in chapter 9 cover the three perspectives stated above. As a result of 
these conclusions, the report suggests eight goals to be considered in policymaking 
and issue recommendations on how to reach these goals.  
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Part I: Global trends and human 
rights in the current UN and EU 
frameworks 
Summary  
Part one focuses on the role of environmental change, migration, new technologies 
and the changing security paradigm in the international human rights system. The 
scope of the task is to introduce the key impacts these trends have on human rights, 
in addition to their current status in the global and regional human rights agendas. 
They are politically tuned in different ways and vary in their relationship to the existing 
human rights norms. The context of each debate is the United Nations (mainly the Hu-
man Rights Council) and the European Union. Either of them may be emphasised, de-
pending on the relevance of the debates for the objectives of this report.  
1. The link between environmental change and human rights was established 
decades ago, but its momentum as an urgent concern of the human rights 
framework has intensified considerably over the past few years.  
● Protection of the environment and human rights can be understood as 
mutually reinforcing activities. On the other hand, drastic actions for 
environmental protection affect groups and communities in different 
ways, which needs to be taken into account in policymaking. Women 
are more effected by environmental degradation and climate change 
than men, for example.  
● To cope with the human rights impacts of environmental change, the 
concretisation of the right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
environment has been raised, especially in the UN. Meanwhile, tack-
ling environmental issues through the human rights framework has 
been gaining ground in Europe.  
● Urbanisation puts pressure on infrastructure and the security of indi-
viduals in cities, increasing the need for adequate services to guaran-
tee economic, social and cultural rights and possibilities of participa-
tion. Demography, including migration, also challenges the capacity of 
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urban environments to guarantee the inclusion and integration of mi-
norities and the ability to provide housing, healthcare, personal secu-
rity and education.  
2. The human rights implications of internal and international migration include 
the frameworks of regular and irregular migrants and the rights of labour mi-
grants. Irregular migration has been one of the migration trends of recent 
years.  
● Addressing the human rights implications of irregular migration has 
been a topic of recent debates in both the UN and the EU. The de-
bates seek to increase international cooperation and to find common 
human rights goals for migrants.  
● Irregular migrants are most commonly vulnerable to human rights vio-
lations. Among other things they face discrimination, exploitation and 
marginalisation, and they often live and work without any official sta-
tus. 
● Environmental change, including urbanisation (chapter 1.2) and the 
changing world of work (chapter 3.3), are major factors, as migration 
is expected to rise in the forthcoming years.  
3. New technologies have become tightly incorporated in human rights dis-
course as the source of quite a few new questions lacking comprehensive an-
swers.  
● The issues of dual use, a human rights based development process 
of technologies and leaning heavily on the expertise of business ac-
tors are the key points addressed. It has shown, for example, that al-
gorithms reproduce gendered and racialised stereotypes, compromis-
ing the principle of non-discrimination while appearing neutral. 
● The issue of digital rights is increasingly addressed in human rights 
discussions. Rights to privacy and the freedom of expression are the 
most frequently quoted norms when new technologies are discussed, 
but there is a growing interest toward impacts on the right to health, 
non-discrimination and participation rights.  
● The world of work is heavily influenced by new technologies, which 
stresses the impacts of human rights related to economic, social and 
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cultural rights especially. As work continues to be one of the main 
causes of migration, the rights of labour migrants / migrant workers 
are also highlighted.  
4. Protecting individuals from the arbitrary rule of the state is at the heart of hu-
man rights, creating tension between state-centered national security and in-
dividual-centered human security. The changing security paradigm has 
widened the scope of security from national security to human security.  
● This is in response to new kinds of security threats to individuals 
posed by global trends, which do not fit into the traditional concepts of 
security. Threats to individuals, notably also gendered violence, can 
also be effectively addressed through this paradigm shift from na-
tional security to human security. 
● Securitisation has challenged the overly frequent use of national se-
curity arguments to limit the rights of individuals, emphasising the tra-
ditional tension between human rights and national security.  
● One of the attempts to reconcile this tension, at least in part, is the 
concept of comprehensive resilience.  
Taking these human rights implications into account will support the state’s responsi-
bility to respect, protect and fulfill their human rights obligations in the current opera-
tional environment. They also help in updating the scope of the international human 
rights system in response to contemporary challenges that are common globally with 
highly context-bound effects.  
Introduction  
In the report, the problems and challenges of the international human rights system 
are framed within four global trends: environmental change, migration, rapid advances 
in technology, including digitalisation, and the changing security paradigm. These are 
the perspectives taken in order to assess the human rights issues of the contempo-
rary operational context.  
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Megatrend, an analytical concept dating back to the 1980s, refers to macro-level de-
velopments5. Megatrends consist of coexisting, interlinked and sometimes even con-
trasting trends. Therefore the identification of a megatrend depends on the perspec-
tive. For example, the UN Secretary General (UNSG) António Guterres has pointed to 
the global megatrends as “multiple, evolving and mutually-reinforcing shifts of geopo-
litical, demographic, climatic, technological, social and economic nature that have ad-
vanced at an unprecedented pace, creating, on one hand, unparalleled conditions for 
progress but, on the other upending the established order, generating tensions, and 
changing the nature of threats”6. At the heart of these megatrends is the fact that the 
trend can be historically traced and estimated to develop further in the (near) future. 
The difference between a (global) trend and a megatrend is not always clear-cut. In 
the report, the concept of choice is a “global trend”, which is used in reference to envi-
ronmental change, migration, new technologies, and the changing security framework.  
The selected four global trends differ in scope, but overlap in their development. They 
share the quality of being phenomena, whose effects require a high level of global in-
terconnectedness. This is due to the fact that their root causes, development and con-
sequences are difficult, if not impossible, to only govern locally. Each trend is contex-
tualised here in the most recent debates and on two levels: the UN and the EU.  
  
                                                     
 
5 Concerning the origins, see Naisbitt 1982: Megatrends and Naisbitt & Aburdene 1990: Mega-
trends 2000: ten new directions for the 1990s. 
6 Referred by the UN High-Level Committee on Programmes in UN High-Level Committee on 
Programmes 2017 https://www.unsystem.org/content/action-megatrends in April 2017. See 
also Secretary-General’s vision, Guterres, Antonio 2016: https://www.antoniogu-
terres.gov.pt/vision-statement/ (4 April 2016). 
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1 Environmental change  
The grasp of environmental change in research includes such areas as the use of en-
ergy, the loss of biodiversity, urbanisation and climate change. Population growth im-
pacts the environment through the increase of the consumption of food and water and 
also puts pressure on housing and infrastructure. Urbanisation, resulting from both in-
ternal migration to cities as well as urban population growth, affects the environment 
through expanding urban areas that leave less space for natural environments.  
Some effects of environmental change are more easily detected than others. The rea-
sons for, and the effects of, climate change and urbanisation can be concretised more 
easily than the loss of biodiversity, for example, which tends to be more incremental 
and is often truly understood only once it is too late to react. The links between the full 
enjoyment of human rights and the various dimensions of environmental change have 
been increasingly recognised in the UN Human Rights Council in recent years. For 
example, biodiversity is noted to contribute to the support of the realisation of the 
rights to life and health, the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to 
non-discrimination in the enjoyment of rights7.  
While it is clear that there will be notable human rights implications, it is less clear 
what these implications will be, exactly, and how to best evaluate and prepare for 
them. An additional question is to what extent the existing human rights framework is 
useful for combating the implications. Due to the nature of the issue – i.e. that it is dif-
ficult to predict the speed and severity of ecological changes – the challenge is not 
only present in trying to imagine solutions to the problem, but also in asking the right 
questions.  
In 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) released its report 
Special Report: Global Warming of 1,5℃ on the impacts of global warming of 1,5°C 
above the pre-industrial levels8. In the report, IPCC estimates that human activities 
have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels. 
Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to in-
crease at the current rate. Populations suffering from a disproportionately high risk of 
                                                     
 
7 UNHRC 2017: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations re-
lating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment (biodiversity). 
Available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN-
DOC/GEN/G17/009/97/PDF/G1700997.pdf?OpenElement.  
8 IPCC 2018: Global Warming of 1.5 ºC. Available at  http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/ 
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adverse consequences with global warming of 1.5°C and beyond include disadvan-
taged and vulnerable populations, some indigenous peoples and local communities 
dependent on agricultural or coastal livelihoods.  
It remains to be seen how administrations respond to IPCC’s report in practice. It is 
likewise still unclear if public concern over its results will translate into a wider support 
for greener politics. Whatever the responses, it is clear that the environment needs to 
be taken seriously as a context for human rights issues. Importantly, the radical na-
ture of the political actions required by environmental change has diverse implications 
that affect different groups of people in different ways as, for example, security ques-
tions9. As examples of the link between environmental change and human rights, this 
chapter introduces a framework for concretisising the right to a safe, clean and 
healthy environment in the UN context and the growing trend of tackling environmen-
tal issues through the human rights framework in Europe. Subchapter 1.2 briefly dis-
cusses the implications of demography and urbanisation as features of environmental 
change in a broad sense because these trends are both implications of and causes to 
environmental change The growing importance of cities as human rights actors is dis-
cussed in part II of the report (chapter 7.1).  
1.1 Strengthening the relationship between 
the environment and human rights in the 
UN and the EU 
Climate change is a result of human activity and influences different groups of people 
in different ways in different regions. Business actors, which may also involve states 
(see chapter 7.2) have had, and continue to have, a significant impact on environmen-
tal degradation due to issues, such as pollution. This has been made possible in part 
by the inadequate actions of states, who have failed to produce national laws that are 
stringent enough. States have also taken part in producing negative environmental 
impacts themselves. Hence, business actors have been able to outsource the mitiga-
tion of the negative environmental impacts of their actions to communities and the 
public sector. Nowadays - due to the growing significance of corporate (social) re-
sponsibility - business actors are under increasing pressure to show that they mini-
mise and prevent their negative impacts on the environment and people. 
                                                     
 
9 Hakala et al. 2019: Northern Warning Lights: Ambiguities of Environmental Security in Fin-
land and Sweden. Sustainability 2019, 11(8), 2228; available at 
https://doi.org/10.3390/su11082228.  
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Environmental degradation, a result of global warming, has implications to the wellbe-
ing of humans through the effects it has on declining natural resources, the increase 
in the cost of water and the escalating damage caused by invasive species to sectors 
like agriculture, fishing, food and beverages, pharmaceuticals and tourism. Agricul-
ture, for example, is affected by the decrease of irrigated land and clean water 
sources. Climate-related risks to health, livelihoods, food security, water supplies, hu-
man security, and economic growth are projected to increase with a global warming of 
1.5°C and will increase further with 2°C. Limiting global warming to 1,5°C in compari-
son to 2°C, a goal adopted by many countries before the IPCC report, would require 
all-encompassing, far-reaching and immediate changes in all aspects of society, but it 
would contribute to making societies more sustainable, equitable and resilient.10 
Women in general are often more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than 
men since the majority of the world’s poor are women. Also, they are often partly or 
completely denied the possibilities and resources necessary to achieve full political, 
economic and social participation to help influence their situation through official and 
institutional channels, in addition to grassroots activities. Women are likewise more 
commonly dependent on natural resources in terms of livelihood and placed in rural 
areas affected by climate change11. Climate change also causes compromises on the 
rights of girls, especially in developing countries, where they bear the consequences 
of gender inequality and multiple forms of discrimination made more severe by envi-
ronmental degradation12.  
The loss of biodiversity resulting in the decrease of pollinators and other insects has a 
negative impact on agricultural varieties. This affects food production and the living 
conditions of farmers, causing a potential security threat for communities when con-
flicts over irrigated land and food become more frequent. Other explicit links between 
environmental change and security include the discourses of food security, energy se-
curity and environmental security. The concept of environmental security has already 
gained ground as part of the changing security paradigm (elaborated in chapter 4). 
Depending on the context, environmental security can include the relationship of 
threats between environmental change and human society, it can refer to the conse-
quences of environmental threats, like pollution and climate change, and can entail 
the potential of the environment to serve as a basis for cooperation13. The roots of the 
concept stem from the end of the Cold War, with an increasing number of literature on 
                                                     
 
10 IPCC 2018: Global Warming of 1.5 ºC 
11 For a summary, see the UN Women Watch, available at https://www.un.org/women-
watch/feature/climate_change/downloads/Women_and_Climate_Change_Factsheet.pdf 
12 For a recent report (in Finnish), see Plan International 2019: https://plan.fi/sites/de-
fault/files/plan_images/ilmastonmuutos-uhkaa-tyttojen-oikeuksia.pdf 
13 Hakala 2018, esp. 23–49. 
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the subject emerging in reference to such security issues as the effects of pollution 
and disaster risk reduction.14 In 2003, the UN created a platform that is joint coopera-
tion between the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), the Organisa-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Regional Environment 
Center for Central Asia and Eastern Europe (REC), which formed the Environmental 
Security Initiative (ENVSEC)15. The aim of the joint platform was to provide education 
on the issues of environmental security, to identify risks and potentials and to provide 
analytical assistance, such as bringing together different mandates. 
In the UN context, the relationship between human rights and the environment has 
been addressed since UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm 
in 1972 and the ensuing the Stockholm Declaration. The UN Environmental Pro-
gramme (UNEP) works to combat environmental issues globally16. The Stockholm 
Declaration, and to a lesser extent the Rio Declaration, adopted in 1992 and reaffirm-
ing global engagement toward sustainable development17, show how the link between 
human rights and dignity and the environment was prominent in the early stages of 
United Nations efforts to address environmental problems. To some extent, that focus 
has faded away during the ensuing efforts by the international community to tackle 
specific environmental problems, with more focus being placed on developing policy 
and legal instruments, on both international and national levels. Although the founda-
tion of developing such mechanisms relied on considerations made at the time of the 
Stockholm Conference, the human rights dimension is not explicitly expressed in most 
of these instruments18. The link between human rights and climate change is further 
explicated in the Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 at the Conference of the Parties to 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.19 and the 2030 Agenda for Sus-
tainable Development20, adopted in 2015, has since become a prominent framework 
for linking environmental change and human rights. These documents form the back-
ground for the link between human rights and the environment in the international law 
framework. As an exploratory document, in resolution 28/11, issued in 2018, the Hu-
man Rights Council accepted the Report of Special Rapporteur on the issue of human 
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable 
                                                     
 
14 Hakala 2018, 40 
15 ENVSEC website, see http://www.envsec.org/index.php?lang=en  
16 UNEP 2019: http://web.unep.org/divisions/delc/human-rights-and-environment 
17 The Declaration is available from http://www.unesco.org/education/pdf/RIO_E.PDF 
18 For a summary, see OHCHR webpage: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environ-
ment/HREnvironment/Pages/HRandEnvironmentIndex.aspx 
19 UN 2015: The Paris Agreement, p. 4. Available at https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/eng-
lish_paris_agreement.pdf. 
20 For general introduction, see https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transform-
ingourworld 
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environment21. It establishes 16 Framework Principles for human rights and the envi-
ronment.  
The work of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating 
to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment included rec-
ommendations for considering climate change and environmental degradation within 
the UN framework22. At the core of the Framework Principles is the claim that the en-
joyment of human rights and protection of the environment constitutes a two-way 
street: “A safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment is necessary for the full 
enjoyment of a vast range of human rights, including the rights to life, health, food, 
water and development. At the same time, the exercise of human rights, including the 
rights to information, participation and remedy, is vital to the protection of the environ-
ment”23. 
The document utilises the existing human rights obligations by applying them in the 
environmental context, without intentions to create new ones. The report points out 
that the human right to a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment has not 
been the primary point of reference in developing human rights norms in the context 
of the environment24. It is therefore the explicit recommendation of the Special Rap-
porteur that “the Human Rights Council consider supporting the recognition of the 
right in a global instrument. A model could be the rights to water and sanitation, 
which, like the right to a healthy environment, are not explicitly recognised in United 
Nations human rights treaties but are clearly necessary to the full enjoyment of human 
rights”25. 
So far, environmental rights and responsibilities have been recognised in regional 
treaties and some national constitutions. In Finland, for example, Section 20 - Re-
sponsibility for the environment claims that everyone is responsible for “nature and its 
biodiversity, the environment and the national heritage” and that “[T]he public authori-
ties shall endeavor to guarantee for everyone the right to a healthy environment and 
for everyone the possibility to influence the decisions that concern their own living en-
vironment”26. The Special Rapporteur suggests that the General Assembly could 
                                                     
 
21 OHCHR 2018: Framework Principles on Human Rights and the Environment. 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/SREnvironment/Pages/FrameworkPrinci-
plesReport.aspx= 
22 OHCHR 2018b 
23 OHCHR 2018b.  
24 OHCHR 2018b: p. 4 
25 UNGA 2018: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UN-
DOC/GEN/G18/017/42/PDF/G1801742.pdf?OpenElement, p. 4 (11) 
26 The Constitution of Finland, English translation provided by the Ministry of Justice in Fin-
land. Available at https://oikeusministerio.fi/en/constitution-of-finland 
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adopt a resolution that recognises this right as an essential one for the full enjoyment 
of the human rights to life, health, food, water and housing, for example27.  
The sources from which the Framework Principles are drawn include statements of 
human rights bodies that have the authority interpret human rights law, but not neces-
sarily to issue binding decisions28. Even so, the Framework Principles are a resource 
and a potential basis for a UN level debate on the further development of human 
rights law relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environ-
ment. The stated recommendation of the Special Rapporteur is for the states to “ac-
cept the framework principles as a reflection of actual or emerging international hu-
man rights law”29.  
The Framework Principles encompass aspects of representation, participation in deci-
sion-making, access to information, recognition of vulnerable groups and also the 
recognition that taking action in environmental policy must be sustainable and fair to-
ward all individuals. It is, however, also recognised that there are open questions and 
a need for further clarification on how to apply this framework into issues of gender 
and discrimination, the responsibilities of businesses or the effects of armed conflict 
on human rights and the environment, to cite a few examples. In order to reach these 
goals, the Special Rapporteur calls for close interaction between UNEP and OHCHR.  
As the report of the Special Rapporteur shows, environmental change is not out of 
scope for the international human rights system, but a lack of consistency in forming 
an explicit agenda for addressing the issue has been evident. Recently, national level 
legal processes and international procedures for human rights complaints have be-
come methods used to put pressure on environmental policies locally. This concerns 
state responsibility under international law and, more specifically, the so-called due 
diligence responsibility of states for the acts of non-state actors30. While the debates 
on the benefits and hindrances of fragmentation in (international) law are ongoing, in 
the case of environmental law and human rights, European legal instruments seem to 
be developing towards a relatively harmonious state. The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has taken on environmental issues through the human rights frame-
work in “close to a hundred cases”31 and the result seems to be that the ECtHR is 
                                                     
 
27 Ibid. 
28 OHCHR 2017d: Independent Expert on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment (A/HRC/25/53), available at 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/hrc/regularsessions/session25/pages/listreports.aspx 
29 UNHRC 2018: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations re-
lating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment 
30 Heiskanen 2018: https://politiikasta.fi/euroopan-ihmisoikeustuomioistuin-ja-valtion-ympa-
ristovastuu/  
31 Heiskanen 2018: pp. 7–19. 
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also carefully considering parallel institutions and instruments, such as EU directives 
on environmental matters or UN documentation32.  
One revealing facet of the importance of acknowledging the link between the human 
rights framework and environmental change is the fact that environmental issues 
translate into many things, depending on the cultural, political and economic context. 
By way of example, urbanisation and projects directed at developing urban surround-
ings have implications for land ownership, the price of land and subsequent socio-
economic polarisation. There is no “right to land” as such, but land ownership is a cru-
cial human rights question with links to several rights, including housing, an adequate 
standard of living, the freedom of religion, and the freedom of movement and resi-
dence33. From the perspective of indigenous peoples, the questions of land ownership 
and the usage of that land are deeply rooted in questions of culture and the way of 
life. From the perspective of women’s independence from their husbands and rela-
tives, land ownership is rooted in questions of economic and legal empowerment34.  
1.2 Demography and urbanisation  
As human rights mechanisms and environmental challenges are being tied together 
more firmly both globally and regionally, it is also important to recognise the impacts 
of changing demography and urbanisation. Environmental change is closely linked to 
the development of demography, increasing the pressure to use natural resources 
through population growth and shaping the balance between rural and urban areas. 
Demographic change also includes the effects of migration (discussed in chapter 2) 
and raises the question of social integration and its meaning to the realisation of hu-
man rights. Traditionally, populations in rural areas have been the focal point of hu-
man rights discourses, but rapid urbanisation is now challenging this emphasis, as the 
importance of cities as actors and platforms for the realisation of human rights stand-
ards is on the rise (see chapter 7.1). The combination of demography including migra-
tion and urbanisation requires a well-planned infrastructure for societal necessities, 
such as education, health-care, democratic participation and sanitation. They also 
                                                     
 
32 Heiskanen 2018: 19 
33 Gilbert 2013: Land rights as human rights. The case of specific right to land. SUR Interna-
tional Journal for Human Rights (online). June 2013, https://sur.conectas.org/en/land-rights-
human-rights/. For an introductory overview on land and human rights, see OHCHR 2016: 
Land and Human Rights. Standards and applilcations, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Doc-
uments/Publications/Land_HR-StandardsApplications.pdf.  
34 Also, in Finland only 24% of the forestry is owned by women, see Hänninen, Karppinen & 
Leppänen 2011: Suomalainen metsänomistaja. Metlan työraportteja 208. 
http://www.metla.fi/julkaisut/workingpapers/2011/mwp208.pdf  
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have strong links to the changing world of work (see chapter 3.3), which is one of the 
major global shifts influenced strongly by environmental change and new technologies 
(chapter 3).  
1.2.1 Demography 
The global population grows unevenly. An example of this can be seen in the expan-
sion of Africa’s population and the declining population numbers of Europe35. The hu-
man rights impacts of demographic change include the realisation of the right to 
health, right to work and right to an adequate standard of living. Demography and 
population growth also have links to migration (see chapter 2) and influence urbanisa-
tion. Science and technological innovations (see chapter 3) may, however, help in uti-
lising resources with more efficacy. With this in mind, technology can also increase in-
equality in relation to the ability to use resources, making scarce resources more vul-
nerable to exploitation in areas governed by less stable regimes.  
In areas of intense population growth, pressures caused by the scarcity of natural re-
sources and energy increases. Scarcity of natural resources and energy is a result of 
the growing demand for food, water and energy. It creates an increasing demand for 
water-food-land resources and energy. Environmental changes in West and Central 
Africa, for example, are impacting human livelihoods and mobility. At the same time, 
rapid population growth has led to deforestation and overgrazing that has resulted in 
land degradation. In these circumstances, the majority of international migrants in 
West and Central Africa move within the subregion. The high number of people mov-
ing within West Africa is partly linked to the possibility of visa-free movement among 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) members, the small size 
of many countries in the region and the strong networks among the many ethnic 
groups scattered across the area.36 
In Asia, demographic and environmental changes present themselves in different 
ways in different parts of the region. Eastern Asia is in the midst of demographic 
change with several countries experiencing low fertility rates and ageing populations, 
leading to a reconsideration of immigration policies. Countries like Japan are already 
undergoing negative population growth, while the Republic of Korea has a very low 
birth rate and a rapidly ageing population. The Republic of Korea and Japan have in-
creased the promotion of temporary foreign labour immigration. By the end of 2015, 
                                                     
 
35 UN DESA 2017a: https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/world-popu-
lation-prospects-2017.html 
36 UN DESA 2015a; Flahaux & de Haas 2016. African migration: Trends, patterns, drivers; IOM 
2017: 49; Adepoju 2016: Available at https://academicimpact.un.org/content/migration-dy-
namicsrefugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-africa  
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the Republic of Korea employed over 500,000 foreign workers.37 On the other hand, 
the countries of Southern Asia are particularly vulnerable to natural disasters and cli-
mate change. Insufficient infrastructure and dense populations living in vulnerable ar-
eas often lead to human displacement in the context of disasters.38 
Economic and environmental challenges also influence demography in the form of 
emigration from Pacific Island countries. The total number of Pacific-born migrants, 
mainly from Fiji, Samoa and Tonga, living in other countries is now 420,000. Develop-
ment challenges, environmental change and degradation are among a multitude of 
factors prompting many to migrate, with half of the population in Kiribati and Tuvalu 
living in overcrowded urban areas on atolls with limited access to water and land. Sea 
level rise, saltwater intrusion and drought impact people’s decisions to migrate in the 
region, both internally and internationally. There is also a growing discussion around 
the need for a planned relocation of groups and communities.39 Forced migration re-
sulting from climate change is likely to increase in the broad perspective as well, as 
certain areas in the Northern parts of Africa and the Middle East, for example, be-
come too hot for populations40.  
From the perspective of the business world, the global increase of both young and ag-
ing populations affects the labour market and production, as does migration (see 
chapter 2.3), causing business power shifts from the west to the east. An aging popu-
lation also means more age-related illnesses, which links demography with the devel-
opment of new technologies (see chapter 3).  
1.2.2 Urbanisation  
Changing demography and open economic activity, which are closely linked to global-
isation, also impact the environment through urbanisation. Shifts in demography influ-
ence infrastructure, especially through internal and international migration, because 
cities are most often the main destination for migrants, causing pressure on govern-
ance41. The link between the implementation of SDGs (see chapter 5) and the Paris 
Agreement as well as the ability of different urban environments to respond to these 
                                                     
 
37 Moon 2015: Moon, K.S.H. South Korea’s Demographic Changes and Their Political Impact. 
Available at www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/South-Koreas-demographic-
changes-and-their-political-impact.pdf ; 
38 Oommen 2015: South Asia–Gulf migratory corridor: Emerging patterns, prospects and chal-
lenges. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2015.1010705 ; IOM 2017, p. 60 
39 International Organization for Migration 2017: World Migration Report 2018, p. 89. 
40 Lelieveld et al. 2016 Climatic Change Available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-016-1665-
6 
41 International Organization for Migration (2017). World Migration Report 2018. p. 227 
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was recognised in, for example, the 2016 UN Conference on Housing and Sustaina-
ble Urban Development42. In general, cities are becoming increasingly important as 
actors and sites of human rights implementation (see chapter 7.1).  
As people shift locations, environments also potentially change. For example, an in-
crease in population affects the ecosystems of rural communities, but, conversely, 
also results in a reorganisation of urban environments. Responding to the infrastruc-
tural challenges of including new groups of people and providing opportunities to par-
ticipate in the community requires resources and strategic planning. It also requires, 
and should include, a strong engagement with human rights based policymaking to 
ensure the early entry of the human rights perspective into the environment.  
For the first time in the history, more than half of the global population lives in cities 
both large and small. This trend is driven by rapid urbanisation in the most densely 
populated developing countries.43 Between 1950 and 2015, the total urban population 
in developing countries increased tenfold from about 300 million to 3 billion; the urban 
share tripled from about 17% to 50%.44  
In Europe, urbanisation began with the advent of the first industrial revolution. In 
1800, around 15 percent of the population lived in the cities, in 1910 the amount was 
already 40 percent. Developing countries are in many ways following the same path, 
but with some significant differences. In Africa and Asia, the big push for urbanisation 
started much later in the 20th century, but the growth rate of the urban population has 
been double compared to that of Europe. Both moved from 15% in 1950 to ∼40% in 
2010.45 In terms of urbanisation, Finland has been a relative latecomer compared to 
others with an urban growth that started as late as the 1950s.  
The level and pace of urbanisation and the underlying demographic drivers are deter-
mined by several factors and closely linked to economic transformation as well as the 
expansion of urban settlements through annexation and the reclassification of rural 
settlements as cities.46 In recent decades, urbanisation in Northern Africa, Western 
                                                     
 
42 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 2018: UN Habitat III Conference. Available 
at www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/habitat3/#prettyPhoto 
43 Beall, Guha-Khasnobis & Kanbur (eds.) (2010): Urbanization and Development: Multidiscipli-
nary Perspectives. 
44 United Nations 2013: Millenium Development Goals Indicators: The Official United Nations 
Site for the MDG Indicators. 
45 Jedwab, Christiansen & Gindelsky (2017): Demography, urbanization and development: Ru-
ral push, urban pull and…urban push?, Journal of Urban Economics, No. 98 (2017), pp. 6–16. 
46 United Nations 2018a: Population Facts, No. 2018/1, December 2018, United Nations, De-
partment of Economic and Social Affairs, 2018. 
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Asia and, to a lesser degree, Latin America and the Caribbean, has slowed down af-
ter a period of rapid increase in the decades after 1950.47 Some of the areas have 
reached a saturation point where urbanisation normally slows down. For example, in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (81 %) and Oceania (68%) most of the population is 
already living in urban areas.48  
Historically, urbanisation and income growth have been linked. No country has ever 
reached middle income status without a significant population shift into cities. Urbani-
sation has been seen as a necessity in order to sustain (though not necessarily drive) 
growth in developing countries49. Urban centers offer economies of scale, in terms of 
productive enterprise and public investment. Cities are social melting pots, centers of 
innovation and drivers of social change.50  
  
                                                     
 
47 United Nations 2018a: Population Facts. 
48 United Nations 2018b: World Urbanization Prospects 2018 - Key Facts. United Nations. 
49 Spence et al. 2009: Urbanization and Growth, Commission on Growth and Development, 
The World Bank, Washington 2009. 
50 Beall et al. 2010. 
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Figure 1. Share of population living in urban areas 1800–2016, 
percentage. 
 
Source: Our World in Data: https://ourworldindata.org/urbanization 
 In recent decades, this link between income growth and urbanisation has grown 
weaker. Higher levels of urbanisation are now also evidenced at low levels of income. 
This might be partly explained by the changing dynamics of the growth of urban popu-
lations. Standard models explain urban population growth through by rural-urban mi-
gration. They focus on rural push factors like the green revolution leading to agricul-
tural modernisation and a rise in food productivity and rural poverty as well as urban 
pull factors like industrialisation, urban wage increases and urban-biased policies. Yet 
recent studies suggest that a non-negligible part of developing countries’ rapid urban 
growth and urbanisation may also be linked to demographic factors, i.e. a rapid inter-
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has led to urban congestion that provides a partial explanation for the phenomenon of 
urbanisation without economic growth.51  
This change has made sustainable urbanisation increasingly difficult, especially in de-
veloping countries. Unguided and spontaneous urbanisation coupled with a lack of ur-
ban management policies has made many developing countries and the denizens of 
these cities experience limited opportunities from economic and social progress. The 
relationship between urbanisation, economic growth and social development in devel-
oping countries is often described as asynchronic, as urbanisation is demographically 
driven with limited or no economic and social growth.52 On the other hand, this exclu-
sionary urbanisation is also partly created by policies and strategies that privilege eco-
nomic growth and result in many people being left behind. More inclusive urban plan-
ning would enhance the situation of urban populations. It would require eliminating 
discriminatory exclusion, giving the disadvantaged a bigger voice within existing insti-
tutions and guaranteeing the human rights of the urban population.53 
One of the problems of “megacities”, caused by rapid population growth, is the for-
mation of slums. In his comprehensive human rights report concerning extreme pov-
erty in the US, Philip Alston showed how a severe neglect of poverty and inequality 
resulted in flagrant human rights issues, even in countries that are not immediately 
associated with them54. As the report notes, it is often women and children who are 
most affected by poverty; a fact that is worsened by policies that erode the health care 
system or social services. This is caused by the insecure living conditions of pregnant 
women, poor conditions during labour and post-pregnancy and inadequate facilities 
for ensuring an adequate level of hygiene for infants and small children in order to 
protect them from diseases. Hence infrastructure - ensuring that natural and urban 
environments are able to respond to the pressure that their users and residents put on 
them - is of paramount importance. Investments in well-functioning infrastructure are 
needed, as cities keep developing unevenly. The negative outcomes of insufficient in-
frastructure, housing and sanitation services include risks, such as disease, violence, 
a lack of education and other opportunities for human development and elevated 
harm from natural disasters55.  
                                                     
 
51 Jedwab et al. 2017. 
52 Brandful, Eridaw-Kwaise & Amoateng 2015: Rethinking sustainable development within the 
framework of poverty and urbanisation in developing countries. Environmental Development, 
no. 13 (2015), pp. 18–32.  
53 McGranahan, Schensul & Singh 2016: Inclusive urbanization: Can the 2030 Agenda be deliv-
ered without it? Enviroment and Urbanization. 
54 OHCHR 2017a: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Dis-
playNews.aspx?NewsID=22533 
55 International Organization for Migration (2017). World Migration Report 2018. p. 230 
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2 Migration  
From a legal perspective, notwithstanding of the situations of non-refoulement56, 
states are free to decide whether they grant entry to non-nationals57. The right to citi-
zenship connects individuals with specific state(s), whose laws apply accordingly 
within their territories. As for refusing the entry or residence of others, international 
law allows a notable amount of discretion for the states to decide for themselves. Alt-
hough states have the right to control their borders and return irregular migrants, their 
discretion is constrained by the fundamental rights of individuals, even if they lack the 
permission to enter or stay in the country.  
Immigration, emigration, naturalisation, loss of citizenship and the rights of non-citi-
zens have historically been prominent issues on the states’ policy agendas and linked 
with themes like security, sovereignty, ethnicity, culture and nationalism58. The states 
have been reluctant to ratify treaties that would legally limit their sovereign right and 
opportunity to decide on people’s rights to enter and stay within their borders59, but 
many states have de facto accepted international norms that limit these possibilities. 
Currently, the main limitations to this stem from international law through 1951 Refu-
gee Convention and the subsequent documents, and the non-refoulement principle. 
Different legal instruments are applied to asylum seekers and refugees, regular mi-
grants and labour migrants. Lately, a central issue in the politics involving migration 
has been the question of how to deal with irregular migration and its negative human 
rights impacts.  
In the 19th century, Europe was a region of emigration rather than immigration, but 
particularly the of Cold War, the curve has changed. In the post-war context, migration 
was one of the difficult outcomes of global disarray. Displacement, the status of ethnic 
and religious minorities and diasporas were a concern in Europe and elsewhere. This 
was a consequence of the war, during which people were relocated in great numbers. 
During the Cold War, the movement of individuals was controlled in various ways in 
the Soviet sphere of interest. Later on, in the 1990s, the European Union introduced 
                                                     
 
56 For an introduction of this principle in the international law, see 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrinci-
pleNon-RefoulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw.pdf 
57 International Commission of Jurists 2011, p. 43 
58 E.g. Fahrmeir 2007; Gosewinkel 2003; Joppke 2010. 
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an area of free movement to its citizens. In turn, workers have had a long history of 
establishing communities outside of their respective countries of origin.  
Migration to Europe, but also to other regions, is expected to rise. The primary reason 
for international migration is work-based and most of these migrants live in high-in-
come countries employed in the service sector. Most of them pursue a higher stand-
ard of living, better career opportunities or the availability of employment. There are 
also high-skilled migrants the states compete to attract with easier access to the 
country and other benefits. At the same time, global migration caused by conflicts and 
other factors is peaking. The rising number of migrants will have consequences on 
human rights, especially from the perspective of economic, social and cultural rights. 
At the heart of migration as a legal and political issue are the factors of national sover-
eignty, security and state borders, human security, and imbalance in the standards of 
living.  
Migration is one of the most prominent issues in security discourse. There are several 
dimensions included that also resonate with the changing security paradigm (see 
chapter 4). Firstly, conflicts and terrorism continue to result in extensive levels of inter-
nal and international displacement. In the Middle East for example, Syria, Iraq and 
Yemen are facing large-scale humanitarian crises and about 65 percent of Syrians 
are now displaced. Over 3 million Iraqis are displaced within the country and the politi-
cal and security situation in Yemen has continued to deteriorate.60 Reduction of envi-
ronmental resources (see chapter 1) also results in, and is increased by, armed con-
flicts, which have been reported to be the most commonly stated reason for applying 
asylum in Europe in recent years. Tensions between ethnic groups and gendered vio-
lence have also increased insecurity within the applicants’ home communities.61  
Secondly, migration has increasingly been associated with border security. Recently, 
so called securitisation of immigration (see chapter 4) and the way the issue of mi-
grants and asylum seekers has been approached from the viewpoint of security in-
stead of human rights has been criticised for producing a narrow and potentially hos-
tile view on migrants as a group62.  
Thirdly, immigration is linked to intra-state security - a dimension that has become 
emphasised in Europe, especially after the increase in terrorist attacks during the past 
                                                     
 
60 UNHCR 2017: Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016. UNHCR, Geneva. Available at 
www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34 
61 SaferGlobe 2018: EU:sta turvapaikkaa hakevien turvattomuuden syyt lähtömaissa ja mat-
kalla. Policy Brief 3/2018 
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20 years. The main questions surrounding intra-state security are how to find the best 
policies to ensure that immigrants are fully able to enjoy their human rights and how to 
strengthen the relationship between communities through supportive integration 
measures.  
Perspectives on the manifold reasons for migration often influence public discussion. 
The vocabularies employed bend in various differing directions, even among im-
portant global institutions: it is not clear how a migrant is defined in terms of time-span 
or their background, i.e. if migration is considered to include forced migration and ref-
ugees or if workers’ rights, family reunification or students should be discussed as 
part of a different framework. Thus public discussion on refugees and asylum seek-
ers, regular migrants, migrant workers or labour migrants, economic migrants and ir-
regular migrants, their situations and the implications of their legal status, is often 
muddled. Recent debates at the UN level concern questions, such as governing mi-
gration through better international coordination, whereas, debates over border con-
trol have been dominant at the regional level in Europe.  
This chapter emphasises the question of irregular migration. Even regular migrants 
face exploitation in many cases, but irregular migrants are even more vulnerable to 
human rights violations. They face discrimination, exploitation and marginalisastion, 
and they often live and work without any official status63. As a phenomenon, irregular 
migration has been one of the leading migration trends during this century64. Recent 
efforts in the UN aim at finding ways to increase international cooperation to control 
irregular migration and ensure a human rights based approach to migration govern-
ance (see chapter 2.1). The rights of migrant workers are discussed below, in the con-
text of the changing labour market in Europe (chapter 3.3).  
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as 
“movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and 
receiving countries”65. Irregular migration is combatted at the border and beyond. In-
ternational borders are not zones of exclusion or exception for human rights obliga-
tions. There is a clear tension between migration control and migrants’ human rights. 
The human rights of all persons at international borders must be respected in the pur-
suit of border control, law enforcement and other state objectives, regardless of which 
                                                     
 
63 OHCHR 2017c: https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/migration/pages/migrationandhuman-
rightsindex.aspx 
64 European Political Strategy Centre 2017: https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/epsc_-
_10_trends_shaping_migration_-_web.pdf  
65 International Organization for Migration 2017: World Migration Report 2018. 
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authorities perform border governance measures and where such measures take 
place.  
2.1 Migration and human rights in the UN: 
Global Compact for Migration 
The most notable UN-led development of 2018 is the negotiating of the Global Com-
pact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)66. The objective of the document 
has been to increase international coordination for global migration at the state level 
and to provide guidelines on how to include human rights principles in a consistent 
way in immigration policy. The GCM is not legally binding. The process was based on 
the New York Declaration and complemented with a separate Global Compact on 
Refugees. As a supporting document, IOM (which has been part of the UN framework 
since 2016) published a report called Global Migration Indicators (GMDAC/IOM 
201867).  
The background for the Global Migration Indicators is addressing the need to 
strengthen the data available on global migration, which will be necessary for the im-
plementation and follow-ups of the GCM. The report claims that, together with the 
Sustainable Development Goals (see chapter 5), “a strong momentum towards im-
proving the weak evidence base on international migration” has been created68. IOM 
has developed its Migration Governance Indicators69 within the group for Migration 
Governance Framework70, also in order to contribute to the debate on SDG Target 
10.7 concerning “well-governed migration”. There are six dimensions that Migration 
Governance Framework (MiGOF) suggests taking into account in governing migra-
tion: migrants rights, the whole of government approach, partnerships, the well-being 
of migrants, the mobility dimensions of crises and safe, orderly and dignified migra-
tion71.  
                                                     
 
66 UN 2018, available at https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/180711_fi-
nal_draft_0.pdf  
67 Global Migration Data Analysis Centre 2018: Global Migration Indicators, available at 
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/global_migration_indicators_2018.pdf  
68 Global Migration Data Analysis Centre 2018: 13. 
69 See International Organization for Migration 2018: Migration Governance Indicators 
http://gmdac.iom.int/migration-governance-indicators  
70 See brochure https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/about-iom/migof_bro-
chure_a4_en.pdf 
71 International Organization for Migration 2018: Migration Governance Indicators 
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A common denominator for the documents addressed here is that they aim at better 
documentation, coherence and cooperation on global migration. Regardless of how 
they acquired irregular status, irregular migrants are disproportionately exposed to hu-
man rights violations. States with weak human rights protection systems allow exploi-
tation of migrants, particularly those in irregular situations. The Special Rapporteur on 
the human rights of migrants takes the position that “irregular migration is not a crime. 
State authorities have increasingly had recourse to the language of crime when they 
speak of irregular migration, with some States resorting to criminalisation of irregular 
migration and/or of helping migrants in an irregular situation. Crossing borders may be 
in violation of the law, but it is an abstract violation of the law, since moving from one 
country to another does not per se endanger any person, nor affect any property.”72 
Apart from the tendency to criminalise irregular migrants, states frequently offer them 
limited or no access to basic social services required for an adequate standard of liv-
ing.  
The Global Compact for Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees include guid-
ing principles that should be addressed in order to ensure that migration is “safe, or-
derly and regular” for as many individuals as possible. The document claims to ex-
press “our common understanding, shared responsibilities and unity of purpose re-
garding migration” and states that the positive impacts of migration can be “optimised 
by improving migration governance”73. GCM also recognizes that the human rights of 
women, men, girls and boys are respected at all stages of migration. It mainstreams a 
gender perspective and promotes gender equality for all individuals in order to move 
away from the perspective of migrant women as victims. 
The politics over the GCM show, firstly, how the pitfalls of contemporary debates over 
immigration policy were recognised in the text by explicitly addressing commonplace 
issues. The document refers to the need to make it less desirable for people to leave 
their homes and calls for the respect of national sovereignty and security. The call for 
documentation, identification and data gathering, likewise, all have a part to play in 
anti-immigration agendas, as their objective is to reduce irregular and undocumented 
migration and to advance the ability of the states to identify who they allow to cross 
their borders. The document also gives primary importance to the respect of the hu-
man rights of migrants throughout their journey.  
The GCM is not a legally binding document introducing legal obligations for states to 
modify their immigration policies. Rather, it aims at formulating guidelines and princi-
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ples for the better coordination of international migration to ensure a more efficient ap-
plication of human rights principles into regional and national practices and clarifying 
standards. The emphasis is decidedly on national interest over the human rights of in-
dividuals, even though these are not explicitly opposed (i.e. protecting national secu-
rity does not exclude respect for human rights).  
Further objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees are to transform the way the 
international community provides protection to refugees as well as to support host 
countries. It comprises the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) 
and a Programme of Action.74 The CRRF is set out in the New York Declaration (An-
nex 1) and aspires to set up a comprehensive refugee response based on the princi-
ples of international cooperation and the sharing of burden and responsibility. It con-
tains improvements on elements, such as reception and admission, support for imme-
diate and ongoing needs, support for host countries and communities as well as dura-
ble solutions. The second part of the Global Compact is being set up to facilitate the 
application of the CRRF in support of countries affected by a large movement of refu-
gees. The Global Compact on Refugees will not be legally binding but has a stated 
objective of being “a powerful international agreement on how to respond better to 
large movements of refugees”.75 
2.2 Irregular migration and human rights in 
the EU context 
States try to control the movement of irregular migrants before they reach their bor-
ders by setting up visa requirements, carrier sanctions, readmission agreements, fi-
nancial incentives and financial penalties.76 For example, Australia is well known for 
its offshore processing. In 2016, Oceania hosted about 100,000 refugees and asylum 
seekers. Most of the refugees originated from Asia, such as Indonesians in Papua 
New Guinea or Afghans and Iranians in Australia. Both Australia and New Zealand 
participate in refugee resettlement. Australia’s refugee resettlement programme is the 
third largest in the world. Australia’s policy is to transfer those who arrive irregularly as 
asylum seekers to offshore processing centers on Manus Island in Papua New 
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Guinea and in Nauru.77 Asylum seekers that arrive in Australia without a valid visa are 
transported to offshore locations and detained.  
Confronted with increasing numbers of irregular migrants arriving on European 
shores, the EU has also ramped up its efforts to combat irregular migration78. In 2015 
and early 2016, there was a sharp increase in transit migration from and through Tur-
key and the Western Balkans, particularly via the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
Western Balkans routes, to reach countries in the EU. It brought the level of migration 
to record levels and increased the number of asylum seekers and vulnerable migrants 
in the region. Finally, the closure of the route through Turkey, Greece and the West-
ern Balkans left more than 70,000 people stranded.79 EU Member States have re-
cently shifted their focus to transit countries sharing a border with EU territory, trying 
to create a “buffer zone” around their territory.  
About 30 % of all international migrants (75 million) lived in Europe in 2015. More than 
half of them (40 million) were born in Europe, but are living elsewhere in the region. 
The number of non-European migrants in Europe reached over 35 million in 2015. Mi-
grants born in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean experienced similar 
growth patterns over the past 25 years. Most European-born migrants living outside of 
Europe were based in Northern America. Intraregional migration is particularly dy-
namic in Europe. There were 16 million people living in one European Union (EU) 
Member State that had the citizenship of another member state. The high degree of 
intraregional migration is due to free movement arrangements that enable citizens to 
cross internal borders easily.  
In response to the large influx of migrants in the last couple of years, the European 
Commission has released several communications aimed at making it more difficult 
for irregular migrants to stay in the EU.80 The balance between migration control and 
the rights of irregular migrants is shifting in the direction of control. This trend is exem-
plified in the attempts of countries like Italy and Hungary to make the NGO’s assisting 
irregular migrants look bad.81 The human rights provided for irregular migrants in the 
                                                     
 
77 International Organization for Migration, World Migration Report 2018 (2017), p. 91. 
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EU-acquis are mostly found in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights82 and in the Di-
rectives on migration. The majority of the rights enshrined in the Charter are granted 
to everyone, which means they are also afforded to third-country nationals, notwith-
standing their migration status.83 Conversely, the EU also has an (increasing) set of 
rules that have a negative impact on the rights of irregular migrants.84 For example, 
the Facilitation Directive requires states to punish those who intentionally assist irreg-
ular migrants in entering or residing in the EU for commercial purposes.85 This means 
that landlords who rent a flat to irregular migrants can be penalised, which makes it 
more difficult for irregular migrants to find shelter and increases the risk of ending up 
in exploitative housing conditions. 
The Schengen Border Code (most recent: Regulation 2016/399) created an area with-
out internal borders. Since 1995, it has grown gradually and now encompasses al-
most all EU States and a few associated non-EU countries. The abolishment of inter-
nal border controls reinforced the need for EU member states to create a common 
policy on asylum and migration. To protect its external borders, the EU and its mem-
ber states created a strict visa policy and a limited set of conditions for crossing the 
external borders of the EU. Attempts to better regulate state borders have led some 
states to pursue policies that seek to externalise migration control into the territory of 
third countries. In this way, the focus of migration control is shifted outside of the 
state’s territory.86 
Many countries east of Europe, such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Poland and 
Romania, have very large emigrant populations within the region. Portugal, Ireland as 
well as Bosnia and Herzegovina had large shares of their populations abroad. For 
most South-Eastern and Eastern European countries, the key feature during past dec-
ades has been emigration with fairly low levels of immigration. The most important tar-
get area for emigration has been Western Europe. Germany had the largest foreign-
born population in Europe in 2015. The largest foreign groups came from Poland, Tur-
key, the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, each exceeding one million.87 
Since the nineties, individual EU Member States have been developing comprehen-
sive ways to cooperate with countries of transit and origin.88 Readmission agreements 
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(RA’s) stated that the requested state must readmit any person who does not fulfill, or 
no longer fulfills, the entry or residence conditions applicable in the territory of the re-
questing state, on the condition that it can be proven or indicated by prima facie evi-
dence that the person in question is a national of the requested state.89 This approach 
was taken over by the EU. Since 2000, partnership and cooperation agreements be-
tween the European Union and third countries, notably the Cotonou Agreement and 
its Article 13, contain clauses that demand the parties readmit their own citizens. 
From a human rights standpoint, there are several problematic implications related to 
the use of RA’s. Firstly, they do not include any guarantee that the transit country has 
a sufficient protection regime in place for asylum seekers.90 The second human rights 
implication relates to the restricted border policy into the transit country from neighbor-
ing non-EU countries. As a consequence, migrants may face obstacles in fleeing per-
secution or violence in their own country and may thus end up devoid of protection. 
Thirdly, a readmission agreement obliges a transit country to readmit an undocu-
mented migrant from the EU, but not to grant him access to basic needs, such as the 
right to housing, health care, primary education, work and social welfare. This could 
mean that migrants may not be able to return to their home country and will end up in 
a legal limbo. 
Aside from this significantly widened scope of a safe third country concept, Member 
States are also given a large margin of appreciation with regard to the required con-
nection: it should be “reasonable” for the person to go to that country. This reason 
could exist “if he transited through that country which is geographically close to his 
country of origin”. As part of this new approach, the EU is contemplating setting up so 
called “joint platforms” or “disembarkation platforms” in African countries, such as Ni-
ger, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Egypt. These platforms could be used to en-
hance the screening of migrants for asylum eligibility and to discourage those fleeing 
to Europe from boarding smuggling boats. In this sense, it might save migrant lives 
lost as sea. However, there is no certainty that European leaders can come to terms 
on the quota for accepting recognised refugees on their territory. If they cannot, or if 
processing does not function accordingly, protection seekers risk becoming stranded 
in transit countries where living conditions are significantly below those in the EU. 
Hence, the human rights implications of the use of disembarkation platforms might be 
far reaching.  
In response to the large influx of migrants in the last couple of years, the European 
Commission released a communication in 2017, in which it calls on states to make re-
turns more effective when implementing the Return Directive. The communication 
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calls on states to systematically issue return decisions to third-country nationals who 
are staying in their territory illegally. The Commission also states that “detention can 
be an essential element for enhancing the effectiveness of the Union's return system, 
which should only be used if no other sufficient but less coercive measures can be ap-
plied.” States are called to increase the duration of detention where possible, as this 
would make returns more effective. It also mentions that the deadlines for lodging ap-
peals that are set too broadly can have a detrimental effect on return procedures. The 
proposals of the Commission shift the balance between immigration control and the 
human rights of migrants in the direction of immigration control. The question is to 
what extent will states actually increase their use of detention and whether or not in-
creased use of detention actually has a positive effect on return rates.91    
A report from the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU stated that several countries, 
such as France and the Netherlands, increased their use of detention in 2017.92 Other 
countries, such as Germany, Italy and Spain, ordered the construction of new deten-
tion facilities. The researchers also found that asylum seekers were living in inade-
quate conditions in detention facilities in Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy and Spain. In some cases, the Court deemed this treatment to 
be inhuman. The report also mentions inadequate facilities for vulnerable persons and 
children, specifically. As one of the positive developments, FRA noted that several 
Eastern European countries have now adopted alternatives to detention in their legis-
lation. The proposals of the Commission and ongoing practices in Member States 
show that detention remains an important human rights topic that demands continued 
attention in the coming years. Human rights safeguards are in place through UN, CoE 
and EU-legislation, but the EU and its Member States continue to push these bounda-
ries in an attempt to manage migration more efficiently.  
Additionally, the OHCHR has put together Recommended Principles and Guidelines 
in order to translate the international human rights framework into practical border 
governance measures.93 The primacy of human rights and the principle of non-dis-
crimination are among the first recommendations. Accordingly, states are asked to 
adopt binding codes of conduct for border authorities and to develop practical guide-
lines and standardised procedures for the identification of migrants. The OHCHR also 
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emphasises the need for holding border authorities accountable for human rights vio-
lations during rescue and interception operations, including for those that occur extra-
territorially.94 
2.3 Social integration 
Extensive immigration puts a degree of pressure on minority rights and forces the 
states to assess how their legislation responds to the needs of minority groups. With 
close links to globalisation, the shifting diversities in the composition of populations 
challenge democratic systems and influence social justice. In Europe, states need to 
reconsider their attitude towards societal diversity and the rights of minorities, includ-
ing the so called “old” and “new” minorities95. The application of minority policies and 
thinking in a situation where migration brings about new ethnic and cultural groups af-
fects both inter-state and intra-state relations. Furthermore, a potential security threat 
is present in the increased tension between communities that drift too far apart96. The 
insufficient realisation of the minority rights of new minority groups may also be prob-
lematic if the issue is difficult politically.  
In the political sense, the terminology of integration includes a variety of concepts and 
ideal goals for these measures and policy models, with links to nationalism and secu-
rity issues97. In the context of human rights, the concept of integration has entered the 
debates, especially since the 1990s, and has been discussed together with inclusion 
and, to a lesser extent, assimilation98. The importance of promoting integration for in-
creasingly diverse societies by respecting difference has been recognised for some 
time. However, it has been difficult to come to terms with the practical content and lim-
itations of the concept of integration in the context of international human rights 
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norms99, as well as in political debates on naturalisation100. The tension between inte-
gration and the negatively connotated concept of assimilation, specifically, has not 
been clear enough101, which has often meant a rather forcible process of denying the 
use of minority languages or cultural practices102. This has partly overshadowed the 
potential of the concept of integration, which could have the advantage of addressing 
difference and inclusive equality at the same time103. 
Importantly, integration should not be seen as a one-way street. Within continental 
Europe, there has been a tendency to shift the responsibility for active integration 
from the host state to the immigrants themselves (especially since the late 1990s and 
early 2000s)104. This overlooks the importance of providing secure spaces and meth-
ods for social, political and economic participation. Furthermore, there is the need to 
maintain a wide perspective on social and political integration with a sensitivity to-
wards different age groups, gender and income level.  
Well-designed and sufficiently resourced integration programmes yield opportunities 
to settle into society through employment, education or various forms of properly and 
adequately provided support. Also, from the point of view of second and third genera-
tion immigrants, early possibilities for full economic and political participation in a soci-
ety are of key importance when provided to the first generation. Integration can be 
promoted by safeguarding human rights on the basis of equality, although the magni-
tude of the issue supersedes easily defined remedies. Also, according to a study is-
sued by the Prime Minister’s Office of Finland, family reunification has positive impli-
cations for the integration of immigrants105.  
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3 New technologies 
New technologies produce tools, platforms and phenomena, which pose new ques-
tions concerning their potential and regulation. The rapid advance of technology influ-
ence human life on so many levels that it has already been declared to have its own 
“technology megatrends”106, including, among others, the rise of AI, automatisation, 
additive manufacturing (often referred as 3D printing), platform economy and the ever 
multiplying ways in which we are interacting with technology. The Internet of Things 
(IoT) will fundamentally change industries, such as health care, where the human di-
mension involves human interaction in potentially vulnerable situations.  
The potential of new technologies is often considered to be Janus-faced. For exam-
ple, technological innovations are showing great promise for tackling environmental 
issues. At the same time, the application of new technologies may cause further envi-
ronmental problems (see chapter 1). Technological progress can provide people with 
better services, health care improvements and better access to political participation, 
but the same technologies present new threats to both state and non-state actors 
alike. Ethical issues, threats to the right to privacy and freedom of speech and ques-
tions of cyber security are pivotal to modern societies. Technology offers new ways 
hate speech and fake news can be fabricated and disseminated with unprecedented 
speed. In international relations the status and sovereignty of the states is challenged 
in and by the digital domain. Cyber security has become central part of foreign, secu-
rity and defense policies. An example of this is foreign interference in the democratic 
processes of other states, as was the case with Russian involvement in the US elec-
tions in 2016107.  
Accordingly, the human rights impacts of new technologies include new innovations, 
which may promote human rights, but also challenge them. Examples of these are the 
right to privacy and the right to work. Privacy rights have taken different courses of de-
velopment regionally, including differences between developments in the US and Eu-
rope. The problematic side of social media is, in turn, often at odds with the freedom 
of expression, which is also another example of contextual differences between the 
US and Europe108. On the other hand, a developing internet provides opportunities for 
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human rights defenders and technological innovations can also help in reaching 
SDGs.  
The states are engaging in the development of new technologies through investments 
in innovation, research and development, as clients of technology companies and pro-
viders of digitalised services. The business actors, and even NGOs to some extent, 
also develop and produce products and services and create their own digital identi-
ties. The states have due diligence responsibility to ensure that non-state actors do 
not weaken human rights standards under their jurisdictions. In recent years, more 
detailed guidelines and principles for a human rights based approach to business 
models have gained ground and have become increasingly sophisticated109 (see 
chapter 7.2). Incorporating a human rights approach into the use of new technologies 
requires the engaging of technical expertise with human rights expertise and a multi-
stakeholder approach due to the leading role of non-state actors in driving technologi-
cal innovation. 
3.1 The two faces of technology 
New technologies and digitalisation provide new tools and platforms. When seen 
through this instrumental perspective, the technology in itself is neutral and without 
valuative content. This instrumentalist perspective is especially common in social sci-
ences, where technology is often seen as subservient to values established in other 
social spheres, like culture or politics. Often instrumentalists see technology as a tool 
to benefit for mankind by maximising efficiency and human potential. This kind of 
thinking pits technological advancement against other values, such as environmental 
or ethical goals: the realisation of the latter can limit the technological sphere, but the 
price is paid in reduced efficiency.  
The substantive perspective challenges this view of technology as a sum of neutral 
tools. According to this perspective, technology has an autonomous cultural power 
that restructures the entire social world. The origins of substantive theory are in pessi-
mistic views of technology as an all-encompassing power overtaking modern societies 
where human aspects of culture are subsumed to technological progress110. And yet, 
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it is also possible to view technology in a more positive substantive light: it can pro-
duce new kinds of communities and agencies that can empower vulnerable groups111. 
This Janus-faced nature of technological progress is especially present when consid-
ering its possible implications to human rights. In western societies, where the access 
to the Internet is rapidly becoming ubiquitous, technological innovations offer the pos-
sibility of better access to services for all. However, dependence on vulnerable tech-
nology creates new threats for human rights. As digital interconnectivity increases, the 
risk of one element crashing and severely impacting others grows. The human dimen-
sion of technological vulnerability does not only concern minor irritations, such as dys-
functional phones or laptops, but situations where people are unable to book doctor’s 
appointments, where their personal data out is of reach when they need to be medi-
cated or they are unable to reach authorities through email or phones. 
New technologies have also opened up new forms of security issues, which interface 
with human rights (see chapter 4 on the concept of the changing security paradigm). 
Technical development has affected forms of warfare: cyberwar, cyber threats, fake 
news and influencing via cyberspace-related methods offer new tools for state and 
non-state actors alike to influence and attack other states and societies and have 
blurred the line between peace and war112. Human rights issues connected to this 
nexus include the interplay of hate speech and the freedom of expression in these 
new situations, which threatens both state security and the security of individuals. 
New technologies may promote participatory possibilities, but they may also create 
severe inequalities. First of all, countries with less access to technological advances 
are at risk of falling behind. The competition over investments in, and the develop-
ment and use of, the latest technological innovations requires resources in broad 
sense. A further source of increasing inequality is biased data, which is a result of the 
fact that human biases and stereotypes are translated into technology as well. This 
results in maintained and amplified gender biases, for example. The use of new tech-
nologies hence (re)produces and upholds inclusions and exclusions. Those with 
means to acquire and apply these technologies are able to benefit from their use, 
while others, who lack the finances, access or assistance, are left without this benefit. 
For example, new technologies could help the elderly live longer and better lives with 
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advanced robotics and neurosciences and they could increase the ability of individu-
als with disabilities, as well as the elderly, to live as autonomously as possible. Yet, 
these technologies would most likely be expensive and available only for the more 
privileged, at least initially.  
The interplay between exclusion and inclusion also concerns access to information. 
The freedom of expression includes the right to access to information, but from the 
technological perspective, this includes only those who have means and tools to ac-
cess information and are able to use it. NGOs, such as Open Knowledge Interna-
tional113 and its local offices114 seek to utilise the technological opportunities of the 
digital age for a more open government, the responsible use of personal data and 
more evenly and openly distributed information. The issue of openness in the field of 
academic research has been coded into the EU Research and Innovation programme 
Horizon 2020115. Yet, the topic remains disputed in politics. The questions of open-
ness and transparency, even in democratic regimes, are not as easily answered in 
practice as a principle.  
Therefore, it is important to highlight the fact that new technologies, as such, do not 
result in more democratic or egalitarian societies, policies or platforms. From the in-
strumentalist perspective of technology, then, the big question concerns the regulation 
of the development of new technologies: what is the right balance between control 
and freedom that ensures the application of human rights without completely smother-
ing innovation. On the other hand, if we take the substantive perspective, we have to 
consider the whole technological progress. If new technologies are to be used to pro-
mote gender equality, for example, they have to be actively designed to do so. In this 
view, technology has the potential to enhance human rights for all, but only if the pro-
cesses that lead from investment to design to application and, finally, to active use are 
carefully designed. 
3.2 New technologies and human rights in the 
UN  
In September 2018, the UN Secretary General launched an internal UN strategy to 
“define how the United Nations system will support the use of new technologies like 
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artificial intelligence, biotechnology, blockchain, and robotics”116. The Strategy on new 
technologies, as the document is called, aims “to accelerate the achievement of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to facilitate their alignment with the 
values enshrined in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the norms and standards of International Laws.”117 Examples of how to achieve this 
include working to “reconcile interests, especially in the areas of privacy and human 
rights, ethics, equality and equity, sovereignty and responsibility, and transparency 
and accountability”118. The outlined principles and commitments point out that, while 
the work is based on the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
it seeks to build on the existing Charter and implement existing mandates, without 
creating new ones. The strategy is stated to be a part of the “transformation of the or-
ganisation” and includes close cooperation with businesses and civil society actors - 
with the recognition that the potential and threats of new technologies need to be 
dealt with through multilateral cooperation119.  
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Individuals´ digital 
footprints are grow-
ing quickly and re-
cent debates have 
often concerned the 
use of personal data 
and the right to pri-
vacy. States and 
business enterprises 
collect data related 
to private lives. Per-
sonal computers, 
smartphones, smart-
watches, fitness 
trackers and other 
wearables produce 
data, which includes, 
among other things, 
device identifiers, 
email addresses and 
phone numbers, bio-
metric, health and fi-
nancial data and be-
havioral patterns. 
Much of this data 
gathering happens 
without the 
knowledge of the 
persons concerned 
and without mean-
ingful consent. Both 
states and business 
enterprises ex-
change and fuse 
personal data from 
various sources and databases. As a result, individuals might find themselves in a po-
sition where it is very difficult to keep track of who holds information about them and 
how it is used. This has sparked a growing discussion of digital rights of individuals 
that has been led by NGO’s. Lately, the movement has grown global in scale. For ex-
What are the digital rights? 
The definition of digital rights have evolved with the tech-
nology that has created a need for them. In the early 
2000s, the digital rights were lindek to intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) and the discussion was led by business 
acors. The widening reach of Internet and the emergence 
of social media changed the debate. Civil society actors 
were especially active to move the digital rights discussion 
more towards human rights approach, but latey public 
government actors have followed suit.  
The definition of digital rights still differ depending on the 
actor. Some still include IPRs, others emphasise right to 
privacy online. Cities for Digital Rights (https://citiesfordigi-
talrights.org/), coalition of cities working together with UN-
Habitat, has formulated five useful and evolving principles 
of digital rights:  
1. Universal and equal access to the Internet, and 
digital literacy; 
2. Privacy, data protection and security  
3. Transparency, accountability, and non-discrimina-
tion of data, content and algorithms; 
4. Participatory democracy, diversity and inclusion; 
5. Open and ethical digital service standards. 
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ample, newly formed MyData Global Organisation is a non-profit movement for de-
signing and promoting a human-centered view on personal data management120. The 
problem is often that individuals are not sufficiently aware of their rights or the poten-
tial violations of their privacy that may result from the use of combined data. The data 
debate is an example of a reactive process for correcting negative human rights im-
pacts that have only been realised after the damage has been done, rather than hav-
ing a thorough assessment of potential human rights issues beforehand - even if 
partly speculative.  
UN bodies have been active in the debates about digital rights as well. According to 
the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly, the right to pri-
vacy is central to the enjoyment and exercise of human rights, both online and offline, 
ranging from the freedom of expression121 and freedom of association and assem-
bly122 to the prohibition of discrimination and more. OHCHR advocates for the right to 
privacy in the digital age123. United Nations Special Rapporteur for freedom of opinion 
and expression serves an important role in ensuring digital rights and have, for exam-
ple, concluded that disconnecting people from the internet violates these rights124. 
The problem is immense from the point of view of everyday life: individuals use digital 
tools to take care of common issues regarding, for example, personal health, finance 
or politics. Concern over the right to privacy in the context of increasing digitalisation 
has also been investigated by the High Commissioner for Human Rights in a Mandate 
from the General Assembly (Resolution 68/167)125. The recent scandals of the usage 
of people’s Facebook data for political influence were examples of the deliberate mis-
use of data. In Europe, data protection is recognised in the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights (article 8) as a distinct right126. Currently, there are two main instruments of 
data protection: the ePrivacy Directive (Directive on Privacy and Electronic communi-
cations127), and the General Data Protection Regulation GDPR128..  
                                                     
 
120 For more information, see website mydata.org 
121 UNGA 2013: see A/HRC/23/40 and A/HRC/29/32, para. 15 
122 UNHRC 2016c: A/HRC/31/66, paras. 73–78 and A/72/135, paras. 47–50 
123 OHCHR: The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Digital-
Age/Pages/DigitalAgeIndex.aspx 
124 UNHCR 2011: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue. https://www2.ohchr.org/eng-
lish/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf  
125 OCHCR 2014: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Sess-
ion27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf 
126 See Section III, Article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights in EUR-Lex: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012P/TXT 
127 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriS-
erv.do?uri=CONSLEG:2002L0058:20091219:EN:HTML 
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Most data use does not harm individuals´ rights. However, some states appear to en-
gage in secret mass surveillance and communications interception, collecting, storing 
and analysing data from a broad range of communication methods. Even when states 
claim that mass surveillance is necessary to protect national security, this practice is 
“not permissible under international human rights law, as an individualised necessity 
and proportionality analysis would not be possible in the context of such measures”, 
as the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights notes129. In 
his report on the use of AI and human rights (2018)130, the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to the freedom of opinion and expression makes 
a particular note on the need for “the HRC and the states to draw connections be-
tween privacy interference and freedom of expression”, which, in the form of specific 
types of interferences (overboard requests for user data and third party retention of 
such data), may pose a risk to the freedom of expression. In these cases, the report 
claims, the “[S]tates should ensure that surveillance is authorised by an independent, 
impartial and judicial authority that the request is necessary and proportionate to pro-
tect a legitimate aim”131. Yet, the case formed by AI and human rights is still an un-
folding theme that touches on the right to freedom of opinion, the freedom of expres-
sion, privacy, and the obligation of non-discrimination132. Hence, the issue should be 
pursued and its possibilities urgently investigated at global, regional and national lev-
els.  
3.3 The changing world of work  
The “world of work” is greatly influenced by major global trends. In the global frame-
work, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has appointed a Global Commission 
on the Future of Work to study what kind of challenges and transformations should be 
expected. The work of the Commission will be “organised around four ‘centenary con-
versations’”: work and society, decent jobs for all, the organisation of work and pro-
duction and the governance of work133. As a more local example, the Finnish Innova-
tion Fund Sitra has stated that “rethinking work” is anticipated to be one of the three 
main megatrends also affecting the Nordic model of society134, along with the need to 
                                                     
 
129 UNHRC 2016a: A/HRC/33/29, para. 58 
130 UNGA 2018: available at https://undocs.org/A/73/348 
131 See online summary of the report: OHCHR 2018e: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Free-
domOpinion/Pages/ReportGA73.aspx 
132 UNGA 2018: These are all dealt with in the report, see the report in its entirety https://un-
docs.org/A/73/348 
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dex.htm 
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invest in strengthening democracy and participation and promoting economic and sus-
tainable growth.135  
The global trends discussed earlier in this report have implications for the world of 
work. Environmental change, demography and urbanisation (see chapter 1) affect 
work through the movement of labour force, aging populations and environmental 
changes. The changing job markets are disrupting traditional ways of working every-
where. For example, the agricultural industry and the lives of people working in the 
agricultural sector are changing: there is less work due to the decrease of arable land. 
The supply of food and clean water is threatened by these changes and the rise of 
food prices impacts consumerism. Urbanisation, in turn, is both a result of, and a con-
tributor to, factors like the forms of service sector jobs and the development of work-
related infrastructure. 
Migration (see chapter 2) affects the whole world of work because of the changing 
conditions of work. The rights of migrant workers or, depending on the context, labour 
migrants, are crucial for the promotion of the equal realisation of human rights. Work 
is one of the key drivers behind international migration. Migrant workers and their fam-
ilies are in a vulnerable position, a fact also recognised in the UN International Con-
vention on the Protection of rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families (1990)136.  
Still, the most influential megatrend for the world of work is the rapid technological 
progress. It not only changes the tools, ways and places of work, but also changes 
how work and its meaning is conceived in modern societies. According to one esti-
mate, almost half of the all activities people are paid for in the global economy have 
the potential to be automated using robotics, AI and machine learning. Less than 5 
percent of all occupations can be completely automated, but in about 60 percent of 
occupations, at least 30 percent of activities can be done more effectively through au-
tomation. Most occupations will not disappear, but almost all are transformed in one 
way or another137. This increases both the risk of creating severe inequalities and the 
                                                     
 
135 Sitra (2018) has also initiated the IHAN-project for supporting the development of a hu-
man-centred data-ecosystem and rules for “a fair data economy” in Europe, available at 
https://www.sitra.fi/aiheet/ihmislahtoinen-datatalous/#mista-on-kyse  
136 Available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CMW.aspx 
137 Maynika et. al. 2017: A Future That Works: Automation, Employment and Productivity. 
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need to influence technological advancement and its repercussions in ways that se-
cure human rights for workers as well as those who are displaced by the technological 
advances. 
3.3.1 New Technologies Shaping the Working Life – 
UN and EU responses 
Historically, technologies have changed the forms of work and labour markets when-
ever a new era of rapid advancement has come around. At present, the development 
of new technologies and digital environments is, however, challenging national, re-
gional and global cooperation and governance in unprecedented ways. New technolo-
gies create new jobs with a demand for new kinds of skills and impact the education 
market. They also render some old occupations obsolete, thus shaping industries in 
significant ways. Strengthening the human rights responsibilities of business actors 
(discussed in more detail in chapter 7.2) aims at accounting for the changing world of 
work and its human rights implications, in addition to the problems already estab-
lished.  
The UN (DESA) World Economic and social survey 2018 was subtitled Frontier tech-
nologies for sustainable development138. Framed in reference to Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDGs; see chapter 5 in this report). One of the highlighted points in the 
report is “the future of work and inequality”139 and the adjustment of labour markets to 
rapidly advancing technologies. The report noted difficulties in fulfilling particular 
SDGs (3–5, 8, 10140). They include advances in automation, machine learning and AI, 
which seem to pose similar kinds of policy challenges. New technologies will increase 
productivity, but will simultaneously lead to inevitable job losses. Therefore, one of the 
targets under SDG 8 (Promote full and productive employment and decent work for 
all) is going to be more difficult to achieve. Decreasing the share of income flowing to 
labour may lead to growing income and wealth inequality without effective policies re-
distributing the gains from automation141. 
On the other hand, online technology platforms, as well as new social media platforms 
and developing blockchain technology, will create new business opportunities. They 
                                                     
 
138 UN DESA 2018: World Economic and Social Survey 2018. Available for download from 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/world-economic-and-social-survey-
2018.html 
139 UN DESA 2018: p. 3, 46–55 
140 For a guide to the content of SDGs see UN Sustainable Development website https://sus-
tainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300  
141 UN DESA 2018: p. 2 
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will provide great opportunities for SDGs 3 (Ensure healthy lives and promote well-be-
ing for all at all ages) and 4 (Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education), as well 
as SDG 5 (Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls). At the same 
time, however, they are blurring distinctions between employers and employees and 
raising concerns regarding social protection142. 
This change in the world of work implicates different human rights issues in different 
contexts. In Western countries, fewer people of working age are available in the la-
bour market and the competition for highly skilled workers and migrants intensifies143. 
The changing world of work in Europe is a regional example of the combination of a 
mobile labour force and a changing labour market. In Europe, there is a political drive 
by the EU to compete with other regions in the development of a competitive AI mar-
ket. A fairly recent project introduces the idea of AI “made in Europe”, designed by the 
European Commission together with the member states144. In one of the Communica-
tions from May 2018, just before the launch of the General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), the European Commission suggests that EU has the potential to be in the 
leading the development and use of AI, particularly if it is true to the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights145 and sustainability146. In April 2019, the Ethics guidelines for 
trustworthy AI was presented by the High-Level Expert Group on AI for the European 
Commission147.  
While the EU strives to build on AI in order to realise its benefits within its jurisdiction, 
the changing world of work serves as a window to a range of dimensions of human 
life that AI and its derivative technologies influence. As the cited Communications 
from the European Commission note, it is essential to mitigate the socioeconomic 
changes that will occur due to the changing labour markets. According to the Com-
mission, there are three main challenges for the EU in this: “[t]o prepare the society as 
a whole” by “helping all Europeans to develop basic digital skills, as well as skills 
which are complementary to and cannot be replaced by any machine such as critical 
                                                     
 
142 UN DESA 2018: p. 3 
143 Oommen 2015: South Asia–Gulf migratory corridor: Emerging patterns, prospects and chal-
lenges. Migration and Development, 5(3):394–412. Available at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2015.1010705 ; IOM 2017, p. 60 
144 European Union 2018: “Member States and the Commission to work together to boost ar-
tificial intelligence ‘made in Europe’”, 7 December 2018 https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/member-states-and-commission-work-together-boost-artificial-intelligence-
made-europe 
145 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012P/TXT 
146 European Commission 2018: Artificial Intelligence for Europe. Available at https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/communication-artificial-intelligence-europe 
147 The guidelines are available for download from https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-mar-
ket/en/news/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai 
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thinking, creativity or management”. Furthermore, it is also essential to focus on help-
ing workers whose jobs are likely to disappear by “ensuring access for all citizens, in-
cluding workers and the self-employed, to social protection, in line with the European 
Pillar of Social Rights”; and, finally, to train specialists and attract “more talent from 
abroad”.148 Importantly, the Commission then recognises not only the need to mitigate 
the negative impacts of the changing labour markets by highlighting equal access to 
social rights, but also the fact that the framework for addressing these is in place and 
connected to the development of AI.  
Considering that the EU has the potential and, at least seemingly, the drive to develop 
AI with the human rights angle in mind, it could be strengthened by the data resources 
that the many EU-related databases are producing on the realisation of the Social Pil-
lar and the European labour market149.  
3.3.2 Workers´ Rights and Gender Equality 
Several rights are of special importance for workers. Technological progress and the 
changes it induces in the world of work challenge many of these rights but can also 
help realise some of them. However, human rights concern all aspects of work and go 
beyond the questions raised by technology. First question is the rights of labour mi-
grants. Workers of migrant background are easily exploited in the job market. A sec-
ond essential topic is safe and healthy working conditions. Next, it is important that 
the worker is properly rewarded for their work. Remuneration should be equal and 
sufficient to afford a living. If a worker can no longer work due to contingencies like 
medical care, sickness, unemployment, old age, employment injury, family, maternity 
or invalidity and, therefore, has insufficient means of subsistence, adequate social se-
curity should apply.150 Finally, it is also imperative for workers to be able to organise 
themselves in trade unions; they need political rights. The Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration stresses the importance of labour rights. In Objective 6 
on fair and ethical recruitment and conditions that ensure decent work, the importance 
of labour rights in relevant international instruments is stated and states are called 
upon to implement national laws that sanction labour rights violations, especially in 
cases of forced labour and child labour.151 
The gender pay gap is one of the inequality problems that exists in the job markets. 
Women all over the world are more likely than men to work in low-paying jobs. This is 
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a human rights problem because of several reasons. Firstly, for some women, the 
possibility of finding only low-paying jobs leads to poverty. This is particularly the case 
for many single parents, which means that their children also live in poverty. Sec-
ondly, for women who are in a relationship, a low income might make them dependent 
on their husbands or partners and place them into a vulnerable position in a relation-
ship. Thirdly, the situation in which a woman is paid less than a man for the same or 
equally demanding job is unequal and regulated as illegal by international human 
rights law. The legislation is somewhat effective in addressing inequalities inside com-
panies, which can be sued if they do not pay equally for equal work done by men and 
women. However, the undervalued position of some occupations and sectors domi-
nated by women is a lingering problem that cannot be addressed with only the current 
legislation.  
Occupational gender segregation partly explains the gender pay gap. The pay is 
lower in many female dominated sectors and professions and, across different sec-
tors, there are still fewer women working in higher positions, or as managers. In addi-
tion to facilitating the undervaluation of women’s work, occupational gender segrega-
tion is problematic because it narrows employment choices, reinforces gender stereo-
types, limits women’s access to higher level jobs and might mean that there is a scar-
city of jobs where it is possible to combine work and family responsibilities152. From a 
human rights perspective, the under-valuation of some female dominant occupations 
should be addressed, and women should have equal possibilities to enter higher pay-
ing jobs as well. 
Research on the causes of occupational gender segregation can be used to find bet-
ter solutions to mitigate gender segregation. Occupational gender segregation is 
caused by various factors. On the demand side, discriminatory career practices, re-
cruitment practices153 and the lack of possibilities to combine work and family respon-
sibilities are factors that contribute to gender segregation. On the supply side, the 
gender stereotypes associated with different professions and professionals are one 
reason that affects the on educational and occupational choices of men and women. 
The most well-known form of labour migration in the context of the EU is the free 
movement of EU citizens and their family members within the territory of the EU. This 
ensures the right to work in other member states and equal treatment on the grounds 
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of nationality in employment conditions and in social provisions.154 EU member states 
have been reluctant to transfer discretion to the EU level and member states still have 
more discretion in labour law than in other forms of migration. In general, it is no 
longer contested that migrant workers should be eligible for equal treatment in the 
fields of labour and social participation155. The central contemporary questions are, 
firstly, whether – and to what extent – labour rights for migrant workers can be re-
stricted, and, secondly, what rights are to be granted to irregular migrant workers.156 
Especially on EU and CoE levels, the rights of regular migrants are well protected, but 
the protection of irregular workers remains rather minimal.  
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4 The changing security paradigm  
Environmental change, migration and new technologies have, on their part, brought 
new elements to security agendas. With these and other issues challenging the con-
cept of security today, the European Commission foresight for policymaking even 
names the changing security paradigm as one of the megatrends157. Environmental 
security, integration and stability as well as cyber security broaden the scope of secu-
rity to include new questions, such as poverty and welfare158. For example, security 
can be interpreted to include the dimensions of social and political integration, inclu-
sion and the promotion of a sense of belonging. This has brought new perspectives to 
the security discussions alongside of the more traditional ways of understanding the 
national security even if many of these issues have a long history in the context of na-
tional states.159  
This change in security paradigm has been conceptualised as human security in con-
trast to national security. A landmark for a broader conceptualisation of human secu-
rity was the Human Development Report (UNDP 1994), aimed at turning the focus of 
the security framework from the state to the individual160. The rise of human security 
has brought new concepts into policy debates in national and international forums, 
most notably the principle of the responsibility to protect (R2P).161 
In national security, the object is the state, its sovereignty and freedom to act as it 
pleases. Human security changes the viewpoint to the individual and the freedom 
from want, fear and oppression. This creates a tension between the two security para-
digms (though human security does not necessarily, and in every case, conflict with 
state-centric national security).162 The vertical relationship between the state (public 
power) and individuals is primarily protected by the international human rights norms 
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(including state obligations to respect, protect and fulfill). In many states, threats to in-
dividuals emanate from the state or other public officials resorting to violence against 
individuals. 
Yet, states are not only a source of security threats - instead, they are needed and 
obliged to protect individuals and their rights. The state obligation to ensure that hu-
man rights are also respected in private relationships (due diligence) has been in-
creasingly specified. Human rights norms protect the individual against the arbitrary 
rule of the states, but also against security threats that come from non-state actors 
(other individuals or business actors, for instance). For example, violence in private 
relationships and violence against women is commonplace in most countries, includ-
ing Finland. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women163 (The CEDAW Convention) is the most important globally applicable inter-
national human rights treaty, whose implementation review has addressed violence 
against women since 1992. Regionally adopted legally binding instruments in Europe 
(Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women 
and domestic violence164), the Americas and Africa provide important additional tools 
to address the problem. Another example is the question of violence at work that has 
been raised, for example, in ILO, which published an extensive report on the preven-
tion of violence at work in 2018165. ILO is currently in the process of hosting negotia-
tions for a global pact against violence at work and harassment at workplaces. The 
theme will be on the table in June, and, at the time of writing, news on the issue indi-
cate that the greatest disagreements concern the inclusion of LGBTI people as a vul-
nerable group in the treaty and the definition of harassment166. ILO and UN Women 
have recently published a Handbook: Addressing violence and harassment against 
women in the world of work167. 
In recent years, a new security paradigm, resilience, has been on the rise. In aca-
demic research, resilience has been dubbed “post-liberal” and it offers a new way of 
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thinking about security - one that distances itself from “the liberal internationalist fram-
ings of security practices in the 1990s as reactive post hoc interventions.”168 In this 
sense it moves beyond the dichotomy of national security versus human security. If 
resilience is conceptualised in the right way, it also offers a possibility to integrate hu-
man rights thinking deeper into the security discussions. 
4.1 Securitisation 
The tension between national security and the human security approach is made clear 
in the theory of securitisation, created by the Copenhagen School of security studies 
in the 1990s.169 It describes how any issue can be constructed as a security threat 
that requires exceptional actions. Thus the scope of national security can be widened 
and there is no fixed list of issues. Rather, the threats to national security are con-
structed in social processes that occur within particular institutional and political con-
texts.170 
Since its inception in the late 1990s the theory of securitisation has been utilised in 
many different empirical case studies and the concepts of the theory itself have also 
been developed further.171 Despite significant debate on the intricacies of the theory, 
there is a general agreement on the core elements of securitisation: a securitising ac-
tor frames an issue as an existential threat to a referent object through a speech act 
directed at an intended audience that accepts (or rejects) this securitisation move.172 
The type of actor or audience is not predetermined, but most often the theory is ap-
plied to states as actors in a securitisation move.  
In the act of securitisation, an issue is framed as an existential threat to the referent 
object. This is done in a speech act, where the issue is labelled as ‘dangerous’, ‘men-
acing’, ‘threatening’ or ‘alarming’ by the securitising actor. An issue becomes secu-
ritised when an audience collectively agrees on the nature of the threat and supports 
taking extraordinary measures. This allows the actor to remove the issue from the 
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realm of “normal” politics into the realm of security that allows bypassing usual demo-
cratic decision-making.173 
Securitisation theory has been critical of the consequences of the securitisation act, 
ever since the inception of the theory. The Copenhagen School promotes the idea of 
desecuritisation, where an issue is brought back to the democratic decision-making 
process. This is motivated by the idea that securitising an issue can lead to the imple-
mentation of anti-democratic emergency measures that are injurious to human rights, 
civil liberties, and other social values. Thus, the framework of securitisation has per-
haps most frequently been deployed as a way to critique securitisation processes and 
highlight the potential dangers of treating an issue as a security threat.174 Lately, the 
research has evolved to identify different kinds of securitisations and that the concept 
of security itself also can change its meaning when it has been applied to new areas. 
This has found to happen especially with the new security issues such as the environ-
mental security. 175 The question then, is not necessarily about how to avoid securiti-
sation or desecuritise issues, but more about what kind of secuiritsaiton is used and 
how security is conceived when talking about new issues in the security framework. 
Still, recent examples of securitisation and its consequences in migration and cyber-
space emphasise the problems it can create for human rights. Framing migration pri-
marily as a security issue has allowed states to use more restrictive measures in con-
trolling their borders. The securitisation of migration has been responsible for restrict-
ing access to asylum, diluting rights and entitlements to refugee protection and pun-
ishing those who arrive in the EU without valid passports.176 On the other hand, cyber-
space has in many ways and occasions been successfully securitised, dating back to 
Y2K speech at the turn of the millennium177. Talk of cyber warfare and the institution-
alisation of cyber security178 during the first decades of the 21st century has allowed 
governments and intelligence agencies all over the world to restrict private space and 
gain access to personal information of the citizens without their consent. In Finland, 
proposed changes to legislation regulating civilian and military intelligence gathering 
and the discussion surrounding it is a recent example of the securitisation of cyber 
                                                     
 
173 Erukhmanoff 2018: Securitisation theory: An Introduction, E-International Relations Stu-
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175 Lähde 2017: Mitä ympäristöturvallisuus voisi tarkoittaa? BIOS Research Unit blog, 8.8.2017. 
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178 Hansen & Nissenbaum 2009: Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School, 
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space. Framing the issue as an urgent matter of national security united legislators on 
each side of the government-opposition divide to agree in early 2019 on giving wider 
access to personal information for security officials without much, if any, debate on 
the negative consequences it had for the right to privacy179. 
4.2 Security and human rights in UN 
Security issues are somewhat differentiated in the international human rights fo-
rums180. In UN, security is tied up with human rights thinking through its institutions 
and the origins of the international human rights system. Different security issues 
have, however, been fragmented into different functions of the organization.  
The most important organ of UN in security question is the UN Security Council. It has 
also been key actor in cases when human rights issues have penetrated to security 
agenda in the UN. For example, the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 was the 
landmark resolution on Women, Peace and Security181. In 2016, the Security Council 
it published a research report182, which was declared to be the first of its kind for the 
Security Council. The report examined “the relationship between peace and security 
and human rights, and the role human rights have played in the thinking and action of 
the Security Council when it has been addressing conflicts worldwide”, as well as the 
relationship between the Security Council and the UNHRC and OHCHR183. The report 
notes the importance of the dynamics of the Security Council for the possibilities of 
accepting a strong human rights point of view. Human rights have been a sensitive is-
sue and while human rights language has entered the Security Council’s resolutions 
to some extent, China and Russia, as permanent members, have been eager to veto 
some of the most explicitly formulated ones.  
                                                     
 
179 At the time of writing, the bills are withdrawn from the Parliament because of the possible 
constitutional problems and their fate is unknown. See Yle 13.2.2019: Surveillance bills de-
layed as parliamentary term winds down. Available at https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/sur-
veillance_bills_delayed_as_parliamentary_term_winds_down/10644478  
180 OSCE has the security of state as an essential part of the mandate. The security of individu-
als and groups, i.e. human security, has emerged and developed more recently. The Council of 
Europe has the military issues of states excluded from its mandates. 
181 UNSC 2000: Resolution 1325 (2000). Available at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement 
182 UNSC 2016: Human Rights and the Security Council—An Evolving Role. Available at 
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183 UNSC 2016: Human Rights and the Security Council. 
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However, the report also suggests that some degree of engagement in the human 
rights issues has been seen over the years on behalf of these members. The report 
cites resolutions that show how human rights have made it to the agenda of the Secu-
rity Council with increasing frequency.184 According to the report, human rights issues 
have become an important part of the Security Council’s work since the 1980s and in-
creasingly since the 1990s, first in the context of internal conflicts, where human rights 
violations may signal an emerging conflict, and lately in the context counter-terror-
ism.185 The conclusion is that “there is probably quite a high degree of unrealised po-
tential within the Security Council for having a significant impact on human rights con-
ditions in specific situations around the world”, considering that UN organisations are 
increasingly including and prioritising human rights in their work186.  
4.3 Resilience and human rights: a new 
security paradigm 
The concept of resilience has been around for decades, but in recent years it has 
emerged as the new catchword in both contemporary policy practice and academic 
debate.187 In disaster relief, combating climate change and development policies, re-
silience has, for quite some time, been an important approach to address the com-
plexity inherent in socio-ecological systems188. Lately, resilience has also made its 
way to the heart of national security discussions. It has especially been called upon to 
counter the new threats (often created through securitisation move) emerging in the 
global era189: terrorism, cyber warfare and hybrid warfare, just to name a few190. In the 
                                                     
 
184 UNSC 2016: Human rights and the Security Council, p. 30.  
185 UNSC 2016: Human rights and the Security Council, p. 1–2. 
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190 For example, Juntunen (2014) notes that the British National Security Strategy of 2010 calls 
for the nation to be resilient against threats of terrorism, cyber warfare, international military 
crises and natural disasters (see https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/up-
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zens).  
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NATO Warsaw Summit of 2016, heads of member states declared a joint commitment 
to enhancing resilience191. 
There has been an increasing interest in the role of human rights in resilience192. The 
current High Commissioner for Human Rights has referred to the potential of human 
rights in building up resilience in societies193. It remains to be seen if resilience, which 
reaches across policy sectors and from personal resilience to state-level politics, be-
comes more explicitly linked to human rights discourse through the efforts of the High 
Commissioner. In any case, resilience offers the possibility for a new security para-
digm - one which could entail human rights further within the security framework as 
additional issues and dimensions of human life across policy sectors have been incor-
porated into security discourse.  
Widening the scope of security carries an inherent risk of securitisation and moving 
the new issues beyond a democratic decision-making process. If the concept of resili-
ence is defined properly, it can be used to ensure better ways of securitising of new 
areas of societies, since democracy and a rights based approach are an integral part 
of resilient societies. Also, resilience itself needs to avoid securitisation, where the na-
tional security sides of the concept overshadow the sides of human security. Resili-
ence needs to be defined in a way that incorporates diverse actors in its construction 
and doesn't leave it solely in the hands of the state security officials. 
Inclusive definition that could be adopted to discussions of resilience and human 
rights can be found in a recent report for the Prime Minister's Office of Finland, where 
Hyvönen et. al. use the concept of comprehensive resilience. It refers to the “ability of 
political systems, communities and individuals to continue functioning in disruptive 
and crisis situations and reform through democratic channels.” Crisis and shocks can 
be internal or external. What makes comprehensive resilience especially useful is that 
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191 NATO 2016: Commitment to enhance resilience, Issued by the Heads of State and Govern-
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rights.org/blog/high-commissioner-speaks-on-human-rights-resilience-and-prevention/ 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2019:50 
 
70 
 
 
in the report Hyvönen et. al. present a framework to analyse and evaluate resilience in 
societies.194 
Comprehensive resilience incorporates different levels found in the resilience dis-
course. Hyvönen et. al. recognise four levels of resilience in society: individual, com-
munity, institutional and international interdependence. Yet, as the authors note, this 
differentiation is analytical and in reality it is impossible to separate the levels from 
each other. They are closely linked together and the linkages also work both ways, 
not just top-down or bottom-up. The resilience of communities cannot be reduced to 
the resilience of the individuals forming the community, but resilient institutions and 
communities support individuals in preparing for, and coping with, crisis and shocks. 
Sources of resilience also vary between different levels. As the authors note, “resili-
ence doesn’t refer to exactly the same qualities in the individual and societal lev-
els.”195  
The report includes indicators to evaluate each level of resilience individually and 
comprehensive resilience is the result of all of the different levels. These indicators 
make it possible to explore the potential of human rights for comprehensive resilience. 
The report is so recent, that this kind of research haven’t been done yet. Still, earlier 
research has indicated, that the human rights based approach increase resilience on 
all levels identified in comprehensive resilience. 
On individual level, Christipolos looks at resilience and it’s meaning in the activities of 
the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency Sida. The building of re-
silience has been part of many of Sida’s development programs, but the agency have 
been looking at it strictly within a development framework and a general attention to 
risks. This approach did not take into account the individual’s perspective: who are the 
most vulnerable and how they would be able to access disaster relief. Christipolos 
calls for a human rights based approach to resilience that “could stimulate reflection 
on how, due to unequal access to scarce resources, resilience (and vulnerability) 
means different things to different sets of rights holders, for example for men and 
women, for wealthy and poor, and for people with different abilities and livelihoods.”196 
Ensor also calls for bringing the understanding of the social dimension to resilience 
through a human rights based approach. His work on the Timor-Leste case suggests 
                                                     
 
194 Hyvönen et. al. 2019: Kokonaisresilienssi ja turvallisuus: tasot, prosessit ja arviointi, Valtio-
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distaa itseään demokraattisia kanavia käyttäen.” Translation by author. 
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that resilience alone does not equip policymakers or practitioners with the conceptual 
or practical tools necessary to address the cultural, political and social context within 
which hazards become disasters. According to Ensor, augmenting resilience with 
rights based thinking can situate resilience practice in a way that it responds to the 
complexity of social arrangements, reducing risk and social conflict.197 
Da Costa notes that the observance of human rights by states enhances individuals’ 
resilience to cope with natural disasters. The human rights based approach gives indi-
viduals a sense of ownership in community efforts, building resilience and enhancing 
participation. It should also lead to a decrease in discrimination, combined with an in-
crease of available and effective accountability mechanisms. She also notes the posi-
tive effect that respect for human rights has for communal resilience: 
 “It seems that a general climate of respect for human rights by states en-
hances the resilience of communities to cope with natural disasters. Con-
versely, the lack of human rights protection may lead to governmental negli-
gence in providing minimum standards of relief and recovery assistance to 
disaster-affected people.”198 
She concludes that there is a need for both a top-down approach by legislation and 
also a bottom-up approach through community building and non-state actors. The arti-
cle suggests that looking at natural disasters through the lens of human rights leads to 
a win-win situation, for both states and individuals.199 
On an institutional level, Frigerio and Kassenova look at crises, mostly internal vio-
lence, in Central Asian states. The resilience of the system in former Soviet states is 
not built around formal institutions, inclusiveness or the rule of law, but is based on 
personalized "princely" power and demonstrative use of violence. Societies are orga-
nized on informal and ever-changing rules. Frigerio and Kassenova conclude that 
such a system can provide stability in the short and medium term, notwithstanding 
outbreaks of violence, while the general equilibrium maintains this spontaneous order. 
However, it also generates instability that can result in the degradation of the system 
into disorder.200 In the short term, institutions can be made more resilient with restric-
tive and violent measures, but, in the long term, they make the society more fragile. 
To build truly resilient institutions, a human rights based approach is needed.  
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On international level, shared respect for human rights will reduce the possibility of a 
conflict between states. Caprioli and Trumbone show that states that discriminate 
against minorities or women and violate personal integrity rights are more likely to be 
involved in militarized international disputes.201 Peterson and Graham observe that 
shared human rights norms make conflicts less likely between states.202 
Resilience as a new security paradigm may offer a change to move beyond the divi-
sion of national security versus human security. Yet, a new paradigm does not mean 
that the old ones are obsolete. Cavelty et. al note that “like all security rationalities be-
fore and after it – resilience is not the only paradigm with security relevance today. It 
is interwoven with other forms of security governance, especially technologies of risk, 
insurance, and preparedness203.” The nature of resilience as a cross-cutting theme 
through different policy sectors may offer a tool for human rights advocates to bring 
human rights into new discussions. For example, if resilience is seen as an important 
building block of national security, as it is in many modern national security strategies, 
and human rights are an integral part of resilience, then human rights should be inte-
grated deeper into national security discussions. 
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Part II: Political shifts and human 
rights actors  
Summary  
Part II discusses the current political shifts and balance between human rights actors. 
These primarily include the states, who have the responsibility to respect, protect and 
fulfill human rights. Non-state actors can be civil society actors (non-governmental or-
ganisations and human rights defenders), public actors other than states (cities) and 
business actors (including both private business and those involving states). Two po-
litical undercurrents are raised as particular points of discrepancy that affect the pro-
motion of human rights: in relation to state actors, populism has become a prominent 
feature of party politics, influencing international cooperation in key questions, such as 
immigration and climate change. Driven by movements and NGOs, anti-gender move-
ments and countermovements implicate the promotion of gender equality and the 
rights of women and girls through well-organised campaigns. The potential of social 
media to intensify these undercurrents and also serve as a platform for challenging 
this through new forms of human rights communication is briefly discussed as the final 
point.  
1. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development Goals in 
2015 has become a global framework, also in the promotion of human rights. 
● SDGs are an asset for human rights promotion due to their inclusive-
ness: they are widely accepted, inclusive towards the support of hu-
man rights by business actors and they have served as a tool for in-
troducing human rights related principles with sustainable develop-
ment also in authoritarian, anti-democratic states.  
● The problematic point of using SDGs to promote human rights is the 
fear that they are not robust enough for human rights implementation. 
A partial recognition of human rights and efforts to work around them 
using alternative discourses may lead to disputes over the essentiali-
ties in the promotion of human rights, but may also offer opportunities 
for incremental turns towards their more extensive recognition.  
● Gender equality is thoroughly included in the sustainable develop-
ment goals, with one of the goals specifically targeting gender equal-
ity and several others including a particular point on its promotion. 
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2. In world politics, the trend of state actors to emphasise sovereignty over the 
engagement to global order through multilateral institutions has continued to 
gain ground.  
● The problems in the UN monitoring system continue, as the system 
is overburdened with insufficient resources. The effective participation 
of NGOs and human rights defenders in the monitoring process has 
also been obstructed by states who have no interest in taking part in 
these functions.  
● The Human Rights Council remains a key forum for debating human 
rights. Similar to the current general global order and the UN, the Hu-
man Rights Council has also grown in multivocality. With the US with-
drawing from human rights cooperation as well, the EU could be ex-
pected to take an active role, but tensions between EU member 
states over issues like migration are complicating this. China is now 
actively driving its agenda and, for example, seeking to control the UN 
human rights mechanisms through budgetary means.  
● On the other hand, new alliances and roles have also become more 
visible. It has been noted that, after the US withdrew from HRC, the 
Latin American members have the opportunity to take on more re-
sponsibilities related to the issues concerning the Americas, allowing 
them to pass resolutions which might not have been supported if the 
US had been in the lead. 
● In the sources, populism was systematically named as a threat to the 
functioning of the international human rights system, causing polarisa-
tion and creating strongly oppositional stands and divisions, as well 
as promoting racist and xenophobic agendas. 
3. The role of Non-state actors as human rights actors is growing as coopera-
tion in multilateral organisations is stalled by political discrepancies and em-
phasised sovereignty.  
● Non-state actors are mainly independent of the state in their decision-
making, although possibly only in a partial fashion: the state can, for 
example, be involved in business activities through corporate govern-
ance or as shareholders and empower and finance cities as adminis-
trative units. 
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● Because of continuing urbanisation, cities are becoming increasingly 
important as environments for organising democratic processes and 
everyday services for healthcare, housing, food, and education. Par-
ticipatory rights, personal security and the spectrum of economic, so-
cial and cultural rights are all at play when cities are considered as 
human rights actors who, through municipal executive power, bear re-
sponsibility for organising extensive infrastructure.  
● Business actors play an increasingly important role in the interna-
tional human rights system. Demands for more extensive and explicit 
regulation has intensified recently, but responsibility is also gaining 
ground in companies that recognise the benefits of sound and clear 
standards for ensuring stable conditions for business.  
● There is a global trend of states introducing new laws to restrict the 
basic freedoms of civil societies. Non-governmental organisations 
are more frequently facing restrictions on their actions through the 
control of resources, restricting the freedom of association and arbi-
trary interference. The number of attacks on Human rights defend-
ers has also increased.  
● Journalists and researchers have been targeted with hate cam-
paigns, and their activities have been made difficult by states who 
have tightened control over the national media, or obstructed the work 
of universities, or specific research programmes (especially on gen-
der) also in Europe.  
● Resistance to gender equality through well-organised anti-gender 
movements has become increasingly influential over the past five 
years. Together with populist politics, these movements are a cause 
of concern for the promotion of women’s rights and LGBTI rights. A 
common point for both populist and anti-gender movements is their 
use of social media as a platform and tool for their cause. This has 
now inspired alternative campaigns for seeking new ways to com-
municate human rights as rights for increasing the personal security 
of all individuals to the general public.  
To some extent, populist strategies and anti-gender campaigns seek to undermine the 
legitimacy of the international human rights system, even if the system is not consid-
ered straightforwardly illegitimate in the sense that it should be replaced. One of the 
challenges resulting from these strategies and campaigns to those who wish to sup-
port the international human rights system may be how to explain the way human 
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rights protect individuals when they are not in immediate danger of being subjected to 
the arbitrary rule of the state. In any case, the international human rights system is go-
ing through a shift in the balance of power, which will make the concerns of the Global 
South and developing countries increasingly important in the global arena. The EU, 
with its strong agenda on economic, social and cultural rights, has the potential to re-
spond to these concerns in this respect. However, as global trends continue to create 
severe problems, the role of civil and political rights needs to be kept on the agenda to 
ensure diverse and multi-stakeholder participation in addressing negative human 
rights impacts.  
Introduction  
The development of the UN-based international human rights system in the aftermath 
of the second World War has been shaped by political shifts from Cold War to the 
9/11 attacks in 2001. The discourse and practices of actively adopting human rights 
reforms on domestic levels in the 1990s was turned into a tendency to limit the rights 
of individuals (including the right to privacy, freedom of movement etc.), following the 
new dominance of state security principles after the attacks. This shift towards an em-
phasis on the security of the states has now been complemented with new elements 
of protectionism, the erosion of democracy and a sharpened discourse on state sover-
eignty. As 2010s unfolds, agreeing on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
and Sustainable Development Goals and partnering with business actors to address 
global problems and challenges (e.g. unsustainability) has become increasingly signif-
icant to human rights work.  
Since the international human rights system was established, the number of sover-
eign states has grown. As a result, the number of states engaging with the interna-
tional human rights system has also grown in the post-colonial and post-Cold War 
world. Therefore, the selection of political systems and voices has also diversified and 
the dynamics of the debate have grown to include new dynamics in the UN - both the 
general conference and the HRC. Since the international human rights system has 
many levels, the states are involved with the community not only through their political 
elites, but also through the third sector and private sector actors. While the founding 
member states of the UN have a structurally secured position in the organisation 
through the Security Council, there is no consensual core to claim hegemony over UN 
policies. As a result, alternative interpretations of human rights norms are gaining 
ground, especially with China’s growing economic and political power. In the UN Gen-
eral Assembly, the increasing diversity of views, including the contestation of human 
rights implementation, has become evident.  
With the political shifts and challenges of global trends, it is important to ask to what 
extent global problems can be solved within the human rights framework and, on the 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2019:50 
 
77 
 
 
other hand, what kind of issues require reaching over to other sectors and systems. 
The negotiations for, and the creation of, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment in 2015 was an immense UN based global effort to bring together different policy 
sectors and actors. The targets introduced as means to reach these goals are coin-
cide largely with human rights elements204. So far, the effort seems to be paying off, 
as the SDG framework has yielded opportunities to promote issues which are im-
portant to the promotion of human rights, such as forming new allegiances between 
the private and third sectors.  
Political interests and agency over prioritising one human rights goal instead of an-
other are integral part of the international human rights system, as are national inter-
ests and domestic politics. At the European level, national political parties are fitted 
into EU level demarcations and cooperative groups and policymakers all have their 
own visions of which topics should rule the agenda. This nurtures transnational agen-
das and aims, which have the potential to also echo on the global level. The move-
ments affiliated with the actors in the international human rights system hence have 
influence on vocabularies and alliances within the system, even if their main objective 
rests on domestic politics or agendas beyond human rights work. Currently, some 
negative examples of movements that threat human rights from the European per-
spective include the anti-gender and anti-choice movements and radical-right populist 
movements. The anti-gender lobby is an influential transnational movement that has 
political allies, but the number of parties willing to explicitly campaign with their 
agenda is not (yet, at least) substantial. The radical-right populist agendas have been 
adopted and explicitly promoted by major political parties across Europe, while being 
supported by transnational movements as well.  
The sovereign states continue to be the key agents in the implementation of human 
rights through their legal systems and policies. Other stakeholders – the civil society, 
the private sector or media, for example – may support (or hinder) the implementation 
according to their interests. While the civic space in many countries has been shrink-
ing recently, the role of the private sector has been strengthening. Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals have become an important tool for engaging the private sector more 
firmly with questions of responsibility. Working with SDGs has also brought the private 
sector business actors and NGOs together in new ways.  
In part II, the focus is on actors of the international human rights system. The 2030 
Agenda has brought about new possibilities to include human rights principles into de-
velopment agendas and engage human rights actors in new ways. In part II, the role 
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of SDGs in the current human rights discourse is briefly discussed. This is followed by 
the current political dynamics between states in the international human rights system 
and two influential political movements, which have greatly influenced international 
cooperation: resistance to gender equality and populism, which challenges multilater-
alism. Finally, the current state of civil society actors, such as the human rights de-
fenders and NGOs, and the rise of business actors are included in the analysis.  
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5 Sustainable development goals 
In 2015, the UN Member States adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment, which includes the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) steering the promo-
tion of sustainable development during the span of 2016–2030. Since 2015, the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs) have provided a framework for the promotion of 
human rights globally205. The objective of the SDGs is to combine social, environmen-
tal and economic perspectives. The primary target of the SDGs is global and univer-
sally applicable development. They include 17 general Sustainable Development 
Goals, which are applied by each government separately, but guided by the global 
level of ambition. The state decides how the global targets will be incorporated in na-
tional policies and strategies. The SDGs are interlinked and each of them can be con-
nected with another goal (or more). However, there are some recognisable patterns. 
SDGs 1–5 are targeted at basic needs and basic rights (like food, health, education, 
and equality) while SDGs 6–12 include objectives related to basic infrastructure and 
the economy (like sanitation, energy, economic growth, employment, innovation and 
consumption). Strongly overlapping with the previously mentioned SDGs, goals 11–15 
are specifically targeted at environmentally sustainable development. Goals 16 and 
17 are more institutional than others and their focus is inlaid in societies and partner-
ships. However, all SDGs form a body of interconnected and, in that sense, insepara-
ble parts.206  
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development apply to all countries. States are pri-
marily responsible for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda. However, reaching the 
goals requires wide participation from local government, business actors, the civil so-
ciety and citizens, too. To make sustainability a more reachable goal, the 2030 
Agenda addresses the private sector actors, including big global companies, to en-
gage with SDGs. To entice mutual recognition for, and from, actors on different sides 
of the table, SDGs refrain from juxtaposing ecological goals with economic ones and 
instead stress that there is a common interest to consider them together. Integrated in 
the 2030 Agenda are the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (see 
chapter 7.2) that apply the “Do No Harm” principle to businesses, while still holding 
the state as the main party responsible. The Guiding Principles have become an influ-
ential document that gives concreteness to the human rights responsibilities of the 
business actors. Through Agenda 2030, they are further established as important 
                                                     
 
205 Winkler & Williams 2017: The Sustainable Development Goals and human rights: a critical 
early review. The International Journal of Human Rights, 21:8,1023–1028, 
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pieces of human rights work. While SDGs 8, 9 and 12 are directly targeted at eco-
nomic growth, employment and sustainable production, many other SDGs need to be 
taken into account as well. The 2030 Agenda is used for developing Corporate Social 
Responsibility (see chapter 7.2) in the private sector. Sustainable development takes 
environmental issues into account and should include human rights principles with the 
“leave no one behind” -principle, but it also forms a political discourse and a plan of 
action on its own terms. The SDGs and targets are integrated, indivisible, global in na-
ture and universally applicable, accounting for different national realities, capacities 
and levels of development and respecting national policies and priorities.  
From the human rights perspective, it should be realised that even if human rights and 
development are different concepts, they are mutually reinforcing207. From separate 
discourses to important tools for discussing environment, democracy and economy to-
gether to fight poverty, the background interviews suggest that the relationship be-
tween SDGs and human rights seems to raise both excitement and frustration among 
those involved in their implementation. The main problem indicated in the interviews is 
the ambivalence experienced over the issue of primacy. Since SDGs do not include 
human rights principles as such even though they are highly convergent208, scarcity of 
resources and politically difficult themes result in the primacy of SDGs too often, dilut-
ing human rights. On the other hand, SDGs can also be seen as useful tools to imple-
ment human rights principles, as long as the “leave no-one behind” principle is read 
as a claim for non-discrimination and equality. To realise these claims, then, necessi-
tates careful recognition of the groups in danger of falling behind. Therefore, the 
widely accepted SDGs are one way to accommodate diverse voices for tackling envi-
ronmental degradation, global warming and economic and social inequality. Agenda 
2030 has a strong potential for bringing together human rights with environmental and 
economic development. The concept of sustainability refers to all of these dimensions 
simultaneously, which can be considered a notable asset when negotiating with a va-
riety of political and economic interests.  
Gender equality is thoroughly embedded in the sustainable development goals. There 
is one specific goal on gender equality and, in addition, the other goals are relevant 
from a gender equality perspective and include targets that specifically aim to promote 
gender equality. The specific goal for gender equality is the Sustainable Development 
Goal 5, the objective of which is to “achieve gender equality and empower all women 
and girls”. The goal consists of nine more specific targets that address, for instance, 
                                                     
 
207 Ulvin 2007: From the right to development to the rights-based approach: how ‘human 
rights’ entered development. Development in Practice, 17: 4–5, 597–606, DOI: 
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gender-based discrimination, violence against women and access to sexual and re-
productive health and rights. One of the targets is to ensure women’s full and effective 
participation and equal opportunities for leadership on all levels of decision-making in 
political, economic and public life. The targets address issues related to economic and 
social rights as well, including the need to recognise and value unpaid care work and 
domestic work and the need to undertake reforms in order to give women equal rights 
to economic resources, as well as access to ownership of different properties. In addi-
tion to the specific gender equality goal, goal number 5, the other sustainable devel-
opment goals are similarly relevant from the gender equality perspective and also in-
clude targets specifically constructed to promote gender equality. The spectrum of 
gender equality issues included in the SDGs is sizeable, including almost all of the 
topics covered in the Beijing Platform for Action209, which can still be used as a good 
guideline for different gender equality issues that should be covered in human rights 
work. 
In general, the SDGs address issues of human dignity and equality. Despite not being 
a part of international human rights law, the SDGs aim at a more equal, peaceful and 
sustainable world and they apply to all countries. The SDGs are the result of political 
negotiations and several compromises, which means that they are far from perfect. 
However, they brought a global and universal focus to inequalities in contemporary 
development goals and point out development targets for different actors on several 
levels of decision-making. Therefore the SDGs create a common and recognised 
framework for improving human rights210 
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https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13642987.2017.1348695?needAccess=true  
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2019:50 
 
82 
 
 
6 World politics, multilateral forums 
and state actors  
As part of the United Nations framework, the international human rights system was 
built to presuppose a democratic regime211. The desire for balance between sover-
eignty, voluntary limitations to independence through multilateral governance and a 
free civil society is interwoven into the ideals of the liberal world order. A recent study 
by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (2019) points out that an international 
order may be understood as having a dual relationship with state power: “[a] dominant 
international order is firstly a reflection of global power structures in that it reflects the 
vision of the just order held by the leading powers”, but also something that is, to an 
extent, “independent of the power of their immediate authors” and functions in support 
of the power of its promoters “and hence the liberal world order naturally strengthens 
the role of the Western world”212.  
The study summarises that, while political contestation of the current world order is 
notable, it is unlikely that the liberal world order was significantly overturned by the on-
going developments. This is due to the high degree of institutionalisation, which 
makes it more likely that, instead of an overturn, the future is labelled by the pluralisa-
tion of agency. Another factor supporting this is widespread liberal democracy that is 
now “deeply rooted in the global system”.213 Pluralist agency is dominated by the rise 
of non-Western states and particularly China, which means that there will also be a 
world order that listens carefully to the concerns of developing states and highlights 
sovereignty and security. In this world, alliances and hegemonies become pluralistic, 
instead of fixed blocs. This also highlights the importance of regionalism, “which may 
both complement and fragment the international system”.214 
One of the arenas of current political quarrel is international trade. The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), that was later replaced by World Trade Or-
ganization, was founded to aid recovery from war and to avoid a repetition of the de-
structive trade tensions that existed before the Second World War. Free trade has 
shown its power in terms of economic growth, innovation, improving productivity and 
                                                     
 
211 For an introduction of the triad human rights – rule of law – democracy, see OHCHR 2019, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/Pages/Democracy.aspx  
212 Creutz, et al. 2019: The changing global order and its implications for the EU. Finnish Insti-
tute of International Affairs, p. 12. Available at https://storage.googleapis.com/upi-
live/2019/03/report59_changing_global_order_and_eu.pdf 
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preserving peace between trading nations, especially in Europe215. An integrated 
world economy with global value chains drives economic growth and reduces poverty 
both locally and globally. Despite this, the US government seems to be turning to-
wards a more protectionist approach, even if it leads to falling economic output, a de-
crease in labour productivity and to rising unemployment levels and greater inequality. 
Protectionism has direct negative impacts on international trade as well as indirect 
negative impacts on employment and the living conditions of large numbers of people 
globally. It may therefore lead to political instability and to further deterioration of hu-
man rights.216 
Pining over the fate of the liberal world order, now considered endangered (for good 
reasons), is an important part of the narrative on the shifting balance of power in world 
politics. Importantly, this is part of the crisis-centered way of framing political situa-
tions, which tends to overlook long-term historical and global perspectives. “Crisis” is 
closely linked with populist politics (chapter 6.2.2), where crisis may both prompt the 
emergence of populism and be rhetorically produced and upheld with populist strate-
gies217. Lately, there has been a growing refusal to refer to the situation of the global 
order, or the contestation of its prevailing institutions, as a crisis. This is due to the ar-
gument that the rise of crisis-talk is partly connected to the rise of populism. Naming 
something as a crisis is a method used to legitimate drastic political actions and to 
find scapegoats. Stepping out of this framework may help with identifying chances of 
cooperation and new points in the agenda. 
6.1 Impacts of political shifts to the 
international human rights system  
UN (with its special agencies) is the only global forum to address human rights. In Eu-
rope, the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the institutions of the European Union (EU) address human rights 
questions. The Organization of the American States (OAS) and African Union (AU) 
                                                     
 
215 World Trade Organization 2018. Available at https://www.wto.org/eng-
lish/news_e/news18_e/if_05oct18_e.htm  
216 World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/03/why-tariffs-spell-
trouble-for-economic-growth/ 
217 For a summary of this logic, see Palonen 2019: Puhkeaako demokratian kupla? In Aunes-
luoma & Kansikas (eds.): Euroopan villit kortit ja mustat joutsenet, p. 15. Available at 
https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/lakiensaataminen/valiokunnat/tulevaisuusvaliokunta/julka-
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work for regional integration and development from their respective angles, also in co-
operation with the UN. The UN Human Rights Council remains central for promoting 
human rights globally, also for the European Union as a human rights actor as well as 
its individual member states.  
6.1.1 The changing roles of global players 
Interpretations of democratic governance as sovereignty of the people with freely 
elected governing bodies have remained strongly linked to human rights claims, even 
though the international human rights system has since invited engagement from au-
thoritarian regimes as well. Growing interdependence and its implications for both the 
external and internal independence of decolonised and growing state powers has 
brought about new interpretations of justice and sovereignty218. The multilateral sys-
tem now includes regimes with differing models of governance and democratic ele-
ments and any activity in it is conditioned by adjusting to the variety of regimes.  
Arguably, democracy and “soft power”, advocated predominantly by the Western 
countries as part of this narrative, is ever decreasingly backed up by military “hard 
power”, political unity and superior economic power and has become less attrac-
tive.219 Furthermore, the liberal order has undoubtedly had its failings. One way to 
summarise them is to argue that resorting to an overly narrow ideological self-image - 
be it neoliberalism leading to severe inequalities or a self-righteous claim of inevitable 
“progress” toward a Western-promoted value-system - has made it difficult for the ad-
vocates of the liberal order to respond to the economic and political rise of the East, 
most notably China220.  
Firm support of the UN based human rights system has been mentioned as one of the 
building blocks of EU’s identity as a human rights actor221 - a role which is now as im-
portant as ever, as the US has left the HRC. The US has a long history with human 
rights forums, and over the years it has shown ambiguous commitment to the promo-
tion of human rights norms, using them also as political tools back home and 
abroad222. Although the US withdrawal from the UNHRC in 2018 may have been the 
                                                     
 
218 See e.g. Watson 1997: The Limits of Independence. Relations between states in the mod-
ern world. pp. 92–94. 
219 de Wijk 2016: Power politics. p. 11 
220 Vogt 2018: Liberaalin maailmanjärjestyksen kohtalosta. Kosmopolis, 1-2 2018, 59–66 
221 Tuominen 2018: Euroopan unionin ihmisoikeusrooli: Tapaustutkimus YK:n ihmisoikeusneu-
vostosta. Kosmopolis 1-2 2018, 6–22. 
222 For an overview of the role of the US as part of the Liberal Order, see Rose, G. 2019: "The 
Fourth Founding: The United States and the Liberal Order." Foreign Affairs, Jan.-Feb. 2019, 
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rather unsurprising outcome of formerly expressed criticism toward the council, the 
question of how the US will position itself in human rights questions in the long run 
nevertheless remains. The US has now also opted out of the possibility to influence 
the council’s agenda from within223.  
As an example of a cross-regional cooperation, the HRC recently (September 2018) 
adopted a resolution on Venezuela. In a Joint Statement led by Peru224, a Latin Amer-
ican state in the council, the signing parties addressed the severe human rights viola-
tions and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, which has led to extensive migration to 
nearby states. It has been noted that, post the US resignation, the Latin American 
members have the opportunity to take on more responsibilities over the issues con-
cerning the Americas. It was suspected that the wide support of 53 countries of the 
Joint Statement might not have gained such extensive backing if the US had been the 
one leading it225. 
The political and economic power shift towards Asia has made the continent, most no-
tably China, a noteworthy actor in human rights discourse. The activities of China in 
the UN have changed from the former strategy of not striving for resolutions or pro-
voking major confrontations to introducing its own interpretation of human rights. In 
the background interviews, the most commonly mentioned signifier of this turn was 
agenda-setting: it was stressed that China is aggressive on points it wishes to make 
and displays a strategic and ambitious policy of protecting its interests226. The other 
side of the coin is that China is now also engaging more in the human rights dis-
course, employing expressions it has been avoiding before. Thus, rather than striving 
for a drastic change or replacement of the international human rights system, China 
seeks to engage with the existing one more on their own terms227.  
                                                     
 
223 Tuominen 2018: Yhdysvaltojen lähtö YK:n ihmisoikeusneuvostosta ei ole yllätys. https://po-
litiikasta.fi/yhdysvaltojen-lahto-ykn-ihmisoikeusneuvostosta-ei-ole-yllatys/ 
224 UNHCR 2018c: Promotion and protection of human rights in the Bolivarian Republic of Ven-
ezuela http://undocs.org/A/HRC/39/L.1/Rev.1 
225 On these points, see “Conclusion and analysis” in Universal Rights Group 2018: 
https://www.universal-rights.org/urg-human-rights-council-reports/report-on-the-38th-ses-
sion-of-the-human-rights-council/ . These points were also brought up in the background in-
terviews. 
226 For a recent analysis, see Creutz 2019: China’s challenge to human rights. Increased proac-
tivity may weaken the human rights system. FIIA Briefing paper 261. Available for download 
from https://www.fiia.fi/julkaisu/chinas-challenge-to-human-rights 
227 Okano-Heijmans & van der Putten 2018: A United Nations with Chinese characteristics? 
Clingendael Report, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-
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It seems that one of the key issues in promoting human rights through UN is increas-
ingly the control of funding. An example of the Chinese influence within the UN sys-
tem, as indicated in the background interviews, is the way it has become a major ac-
tor in the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee). China has at-
tempted to use budget cuts as means to restrict the work of OHCHR228. Chinese influ-
ence has also increased in world politics due to the effort it has put into investing in 
the African continent since the turn of the Millennium. The quest for natural resources, 
construction and other investment projects, as well as “no-strings-attached financial 
and technical aid to the most needy in Africa”229 set off a still-emerging path of influ-
ence.  
As global power has shifted away from the Western powers and the UN system grows 
more multivocal, the share of non-democratic regimes has strengthened. This empha-
sises state sovereignty over multilateral governance230 and the emphasis of sover-
eignty is further reinforced by the young democracies in Europe. Importantly, this is 
happening simultaneously with a countering trend, namely the diffusion of power to 
non-state actors, which moves power away from the state activity sphere231. Adopting 
the framework of Agenda 2030 and the implementation of sustainable development 
goals has proved to be a way to engage with the human rights issues in new ways, 
not only for China, but for other Asian states also, as the interviews suggested. Partial 
recognition of human rights and working around them using alternative discourses 
may lead to disputes over the essentialities of the promotion of human rights, but it 
may also offer opportunities for incremental turns towards their more extensive recog-
nition.  
6.1.2 The continuing concerns over the human 
rights monitoring system  
International human rights instruments on the global level include two types of mecha-
nisms. There are bodies, whose legal basis lies in the UN Charter and therefore they 
involve all states. The most important ones are the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) 
in Geneva, created by the UN General Assembly in 2006, and placed directly under 
the UN General Assembly, and its mechanisms, such as the Universal Periodic Re-
view (UPR). The UN HRC provides a forum for the thematic discussion on all human 
rights. Additionally, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
                                                     
 
228 Dwarkin & Leonard 2018. Can Europe Save the World Order? Policy Brief. Available at 
https://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/can_europe_save_the_world_order p.11 
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is in this group carrying out tasks assigned to it by other bodies of the UN. On top of 
the abovementioned, there are also other human rights monitoring mechanisms 
based on particular human rights treaties that are not directly on the UN Charter232. In 
2014 the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/268 on Strengthening and en-
hancing the effective functioning of the human rights treaty body system233. This in-
cludes two review mechanisms: A biennial report by the UN Secretary-General on the 
state of the treaty body system and an overall review of the effectiveness of the 
measures taken pursuant to resolution 68/268 no later than 2020. Resolution 
73/162234 was adopted in December 2018, and the UN Secretary-General will submit 
their third review on the process in 2020 accordingly. 
Recent reports show that China is working on controlling the human rights mechanism 
in the UN in many ways, including attempts to obstruct the work NGOs and harass 
members of civil society, who try to participate in human rights monitoring235. The rise 
of non-democratic regimes and their tendency to restrict the possibilities of NGOs and 
other civil society actors to participate and realise their basic and human rights has 
been a significant, albeit not the sole, contributor to the dysfunction of the UN-based 
monitoring system. 
The international human rights treaties set legal obligations on states to respect, pro-
tect and fulfill human rights on the national level. The implementation of the 9 core hu-
man rights conventions is monitored by an international committee of independent ex-
perts236 reviewing the reports by the state parties. Additionally, some states include 
                                                     
 
232 Lhotský 2017: Human Rights Treaty Body Review 2020. Towards an integrated treaty body 
system. 
https://repository.gchumanrights.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11825/675/Lhot-
sky_EMA_aw.th.2016-17.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y 
233 The resolution is available at https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?sym-
bol=A/RES/68/268 
234 Available at https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/162 
235 Creutz et al 2019: The changing global order and its implications for the EU. Finnish Insti-
tute of International Affairs, p. 59. Available from https://storage.googleapis.com/upi-
live/2019/03/report59_changing_global_order_and_eu.pdf;  
The Costs of International Advocacy. China’s Interference in United Nations. Human Rights 
Mechanisms. Human Rights Watch Report 2017. https://www.hrw.org/re-
port/2017/09/05/costs-international-advocacy/chinas-interference-united-nations-human-
rights 
236 The implementation of the human rights treaties is monitored by ten committees: 1. The 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 2. The Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, 3. The Human Rights Committee 4. The Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, 5. The Committee against Torture, 6. The Subcommittee on 
Prevention of Torture, 7. The Committee on the Rights of the Child 8. The Committee on Mi-
grant Workers, 9. The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and 10. The Com-
mittee on Enforced Disappearances.  
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comments and criticism from NGOs in their reports, while some states submit their re-
ports to parliamentary scrutiny before submitting them to the relevant treaty body.237 
The states engaging with the international human rights system have developed moni-
toring practices, including the consideration of states´ reports, individual complaints 
procedures and inquiries covering a broad range of rights and issues. The treaty bod-
ies have also contributed to the interpretation of international human rights law. How-
ever, while treaty bodies have become an integral part of the UN’s human rights sys-
tem, they face challenges in terms of their efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy. 
Currently, the recognised problems of the UN monitoring system have grown notewor-
thy. These include late reporting and non-reporting by states, backlog of the treaty 
bodies, a high reporting burden on states, diverging interpretations of same issues by 
different treaty bodies, a low awareness of the system, and insufficient funding in rela-
tion to the growth of the system238. As one of the structural challenges to treaty bod-
ies, it has been pointed out that they need to deal with complex expectations from the 
states and civil society organisations in the UN system239.  
The insufficient funding in relation to the growth of the system also delays activities. 
Another major problem is the low authority of decisions on communications – the 
states’ compliance rate with regard to communications is considered to be very low.240 
6.2 Political dynamics in the European Union 
While the US reorients its international cooperation and alliances, the EU is not only 
struggling with the political consequences of Brexit, but also other tensions between 
member states. The implications of Brexit for both EU and the UN in general concern 
questions of diplomacy in issues, such as security, development and human rights241. 
Yet the regimes in such EU member states as Hungary or Poland pose challenges to 
the EU from within and the Hungarian stand on migration is problematic for many EU 
member states. Albeit that Hungary may once have been seen as a textbook example 
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of an institutional and political turn to constitutional democracy, with Viktor Orbán it 
has become a loud example of the power of right-wing populist politics242. Fidesz has 
also arguably played up nationalist politics through basic political rights by campaign-
ing for an ethnic conceptualisation of citizenship for a diaspora and granting voting 
rights to non-domicile dual citizens with relative success in winning their votes243. The 
Visegrád Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) oppose the 
EU’s migration policies and the “Old Europe”.  
These internal power struggles challenge traditional political and economic institutions 
and elites and shake power structures. Hence, they also provide states with opportu-
nities to influence other states and their politics in ways that serve their interests. Ob-
viously, these interests may include contributing to the political stabilisation of the re-
gion. Yet, in many cases states seek to utilise the political and military instability to in-
crease their political influence locally. One example of this in contemporary politics is 
Russia, whose interpretation of geopolitics now seems to translate into eagerness to 
become an actor in conflicts, also through military input. In other words, it uses con-
flicts in an opportunistic manner by turning itself into a solid party involved in conflict 
resolution, while pushing its own agenda. It is also possible that Russia will keep ap-
plying its strategy of taking advantage of divisions between linguistic and ethnic 
groups in the future, as it already did in Ukraine and Georgia244. The Nord Stream 2 
pipeline has been opposed by Poland and the Baltics and potential Russian influence 
and signs of irredentism after Crimea raise concerns in Eastern European coun-
tries245. Russia’s continuing “internal mobilisation” and the utilisation of the crisis 
mode both in domestic and foreign policy246 contribute to the tension. In the Council of 
Europe, the quarrel over Russia’s suspended voting rights and its subsequent refusal 
of payments is still ongoing in June 2019.  
6.2.1 Challenges to the rule of Law in Europe 
The rule of law is essential for the realisation of human rights norms. The UN descrip-
tion of this relationship is characterised by stating that “the rule of law and human 
                                                     
 
242 See for example Palonen 2018: Performing the nation: the Janus-faced populist founda-
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rights are two sides of the same principle, the freedom to live in dignity”247. The hu-
man rights norms are protected and promoted through the rule of law in differing con-
texts. Since rule of law is one of the core values of the EU, the way it, and the free-
dom of expression alongside with respect for human rights in general, has been chal-
lenged globally, makes them vulnerable within the Union as well. Safeguarding and 
strengthening the Union from within by institutionally and politically supporting these 
values is a crucial task for the pro-EU parties and states248. Respecting the rule of law 
is one of the conditions for membership in the EU yet challenging the actions of the 
states who stretch this principle, or even seek to violate it, has appeared relatively 
mild249.  
The most notable examples of European states challenging the rule of law include 
Hungary and Poland, targeting also the freedom of expression. In Hungary, Fidesz 
has come to rule to the point where, as was noted in the Final report by OSCE Limited 
Election Observation Mission, the latest parliamentary elections in April 2018 “were 
characterised by a pervasive overlap between state and ruling party resources, under-
mining contestants’ ability to compete on an equal basis”250. Over the years, Fidesz 
has managed to limit the public space through control over media and independent 
research institutes, efficient employment of xenophobic rhetoric, and activation of out-
of-the-country votes of the supportive diasporas abroad. In Poland, the ruling party 
Law and Justice has sought to gain political control over the national judicial system 
by passing controversial legislative reforms, beginning in 2015 with the law on the 
functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal251. The European Court of Justice has since 
ruled that the judges of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court 
who were forced to retire due to a related judicial reform should be reinstated, and the 
European Commission has demanded better protection of judges from the state 
                                                     
 
247 For this summary the relationship between these two, see UN 2019, ”Rule of Law and Hu-
man Rights”, https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-human-rights/ 
248 Creutz et. al. 2019: p. 59  
249 Kochenov & Bard 2018: Rule of Law Crisis in the New Member States of the EU: The Pitfalls 
of Overemphasising Enforcement. Available: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3221240 
250 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 2018: Hungary. Parliamentary 
elections 8 April 2018. ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report, p. 1. Availa-
ble at https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/hungary/385959?download=true 
251 For a commentary of the developments, see e.g. Grzeszczak & Karolewski2018: “The Rule 
of Law Crisis in Poland: A New Chapter”. Verfassungsblog-on matters constitutional, 8 August 
2018. https://verfassungsblog.de/the-rule-of-law-crisis-in-poland-a-new-chapter/ 
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rule252. As long as the regimes in Hungary and Poland can rely on their mutual sup-
port in vetoing against enforcement of Article 7253 in the EU, and with a strong domes-
tic support for the parties, they are however able to pursue their respective political 
agendas back home.  
The European election in May 2019 strengthened the presence of right-wing populist 
parties in the EU Parliament, although the result was not the sweep that was ex-
pected: Locally, the right-wing populists won in Italy, France and Hungary, with Fidesz 
led by Viktor Orbán getting more than a half of the vote in Hungary. On the other 
hand, the pro-EU parties from the green-liberal movements gained more seats, with 
the center losing theirs to these opposite poles. In Hungary, the democratic-liberal op-
position parties gained 8 out of 21 seats in the EP, which does not give Fidesz the 
majority support of two-thirds of the seats, aimed at by Orbán. Law and Justice, the 
ruling conservative party in Poland, gained more than 45 percent of the vote and will 
occupy 26 out 50 seats in the EP254. The Five Stars Movement and the radical-right 
Lega255, and the Austrian conservative-populist forces of the Austrian People’s Party 
and the Freedom Party256 are among those who will strengthen the right-wing populist 
vote in the EP. Furthermore, the political development in Romania signals the that 
there may be more challenges on the way, although this time from the political left257. 
With such results, and since the question of the rule of law among the EU member 
states is politically entangled with the question of national sovereignty, the respect for 
the rule of law will likely be on the newly formed EP’s agenda.  
                                                     
 
252 European Commission 2019: “Rule of Law: European Commission launches infringement 
procedure to protect judges in Poland from political control”, press release 3 April 2019.  
253 Treaty on European Union, Article 7, in EU-Lex (English): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M007 
254 For the results of the European election in 2019, see European Parliament: 2019 European 
Election results – website https://election-results.eu/. The national results for Hungary, see 
https://election-results.eu/national-results/hungary/2019-2024/. The national results for Po-
land, see https://election-results.eu/national-results/poland/2019-2024/ 
255 The Italian results: https://election-results.eu/national-results/italy/2019-2024/ 
256 the Austrian results: https://election-results.eu/national-results/austria/2019-2024/ 
257 The Romanian results: https://election-results.eu/national-results/romania/2019-2024/. 
For the resolution of the EP on the rule of law in Romania from 13 November 2018 (English), 
see http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2018-0446_EN.html. Since then, 
Romania was last warned by the Commission in 13 May 2019 that its Schengen rights might be 
in danger if the regime does not back out on the erosion of the rule of law in Romania. For a 
summarising piece of news, see https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/romanias-
schengen-perspective-in-jeopardy-over-rule-of-law/ 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2019:50 
 
92 
 
 
6.2.2 The problem of populism 
A common disclaimer in any analysis of populism today is to acknowledge the variety 
of parties, agendas and movements that use it as a strategy for strengthening their 
political power. In academic research, populism is increasingly referred to both as a 
kind of movement and a type of rhetoric, which is open for use across the political 
spectrum and a variety of definitions258. The point here is not to discuss the variation 
in populist strategies case by case, although it should be noted that populism is with-
out question a major trend across Europe and in the US, to say the least. The parties, 
which are commonly linked under the hypernym “populist”, also resemble each other 
in their rhetoric, while they differ in histories and frames of reference.  
Whatever the label on the left-right axis, the main thing that makes populism so prob-
lematic for democracy is its logic of creating strongly oppositional stands and divi-
sions259. For the purposes of this report, however, the point to be raised concerns the 
type of populist politics that stresses the rights of native citizens in comparison to 
those of other. In the background interviews, these types of political actors, who also, 
to some extent at least, foster the racist and xenophobic reactions and advocates they 
inspire (radical-right populism), were rather systematically mentioned as a severe 
threat to human rights and the work of the international human rights system. Another 
frequently mentioned feature of these actors was the conservative gender roles they 
implicitly or explicitly promote (on organised movements with explicit anti-gender 
agendas and resistance to gender equality, see chapter 7.4).  
Populist politics, played out in various versions and different forms across regions, 
gain ground partly because the liberal world order is not conceived as all that liberal or 
fair historically, but responsible for creating further inequality. However, it also directly 
harvests anti-Western sentiments in some of the formerly colonialised states, where 
some states see the international human rights system descending from Western-
driven colonialism without equal recognition of new powers and voices. In the East 
and the Global South, the international human rights system has partly been seen as 
an imported framework of Western-driven international norms and policies, although 
decolonialised states played an important role in the shaping of the international hu-
man rights system already in the 1950s and 1960s260. Hence the system has not been 
                                                     
 
258 For an overview of various cases and the intersectional approach to populism, see Kovala, 
Palonen, Ruotsalainen & Saresma (Eds.) 2018: Populism on the loose. Nykykulttuurin tutkimus-
keskus, Jyväskylän yliopisto. Available at https://populismontheloose.wordpress.com/ 
259 On this thematic, see Palonen 2019: p. 14–18  
260 For an overview of the development of the international human rights system from this 
perspective, see Jensen 2016: The Making of International Human Rights.The 1960s, Decoloni-
zation, and the Reconstruction of Global Values.  
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wholeheartedly cherished, but seen as a way to engage with the global multilateral 
system through regional interpretations. For example, the strong links between de-
mocratisation and human rights are not in the interests of authoritarian regimes, yet 
their engagement with the system is organised in different ways. Furthermore, it is 
clear that the Western states are not living up to the standards of human rights norms 
in all respects, with demoralising consequences. While the political consequences of 
Brexit to human rights diplomacy are also yet to be realised, the claims of national 
sovereignty associated with the campaign and its outcome send a message of decline 
in the alliances of old. Hence, there is the issue of legitimacy and the problem of find-
ing new ways to address the benefits of international cooperation and strong human 
rights implementation that should not be overlooked.  
The changing operational context is making the international human rights system vul-
nerable in the face of domestic politics and populist agendas. It is sometimes claimed 
that, since people across countries are starting to forget the great wars of the 20th 
century, the roots and aims of the international human rights system have also be-
come devoid of meaning. This development has partly been intensified by the com-
mon practice of memory politics, or history politics, in which historical events and nar-
ratives are used to legitimate a political message. Memory politics can be played out 
in many ways, but in regards to the international human rights system, this tool has 
been used to derogate the basic narratives of the so called liberal world order by bol-
stering nationalistic interpretations of history or dismissing the atrocities of the holo-
caust. Distorted and counterfactual uses of history aside, the point of forgetting the 
basics over time is valid, to an extent: The international human rights system has 
evolved and developed over time from one political context to another. 
From another perspective, however, the fading of historical experience and the lack of 
remembrance fall short as an explanation for the decline of political will to take action 
for the international human rights system. The recontextualisation of the international 
human rights system into the changing realities and experiences of citizens, espe-
cially across the Western states, has been inadequate. Economic globalisation has 
produced wellbeing, but also great gaps of wellbeing between groups. As promises of 
development, globalisation and economic growth have seized to be realised, it has 
become more difficult for the leaders to explain why international organisations should 
be funded and who they are for. On the other hand, it is also a commonplace for na-
tional leaders to use the international system as a scapegoat for regional and local 
problems in their politics. The image of human rights as something that is motivated 
by the protection of faraway lands and their citizens, instead of citizens “back home”, 
has become a burden for outward bound politics and claims of solidarity.  
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6.2.3 Disputed issues and populist party politics: 
immigration, gender roles and the environment 
The thing to note about radical-right populism is that, in the case of Europe, it has a 
long-standing history that reaches back to anti-semitism, nationalism and exclusion. In 
the US the take is different, but the logic of having some groups of citizens and others 
opposed to the majority or other minorities bears resemblance. From another tem-
poral perspective, it should also not be assumed that the latest wave of radical-right 
populism is temporary261 . A recent (MPI 2019) report summarises the main contribu-
tion of radical-right populism and parties as an influence on the established parties’ 
policies and rhetoric, rather than actual immigration agendas, at least broadly speak-
ing. Hence there are certain discourses and even paradigms that the radical-right 
populist parties have managed to shape.262  
As far as policies go, the problematic and most polemic policy area for radical-right 
populism over the years has been immigration. While migration as a concept refers to 
cross-border movement, including both emigration and immigration, the focus of the 
radical-right populist parties is on the impact of immigration on the policies, social or-
der and culture of the welcoming state. In the present context, the political debates 
over migration are heavily influenced by the question of the root cause of emigration. 
This is understandable, as different laws apply to different groups of migrants or, as 
the phrase goes in the EU policy, migrants and refugees. Hence a discussion over 
which kind of measures should be applied to the notably heterogeneous group of mi-
grating individuals easily spins into a debate over the primacy of the root cause. As 
part of the narrative of right-wing populist politics, human rights (such as the freedom 
of speech) are typically constructed as the privilege of “the other” (i.e. migrants or lib-
erals); as something that needs to be reclaimed from the perspective of “the peo-
ple”263. Hence, while it has been noted that democracy is rather inconceivable without 
recognising and securing human rights264, they are often contrasted with security and 
posed as a problem for democracy in right-wing populist discourses.  
A common feature of these agendas is the view of immigration as a threat with pre-
dominantly negative effects. Depending on the speaking party, so called economic mi-
gration may be seen as acceptable, but this is predominantly considered to be desira-
ble only with high-skilled migrants. And, since these agendas have in their latest form 
                                                     
 
261 Schein 2018: Shifting tides. Radical Right Populism and Immigration Policy in Europe and 
the US. Washington D.C: Migration Policy Institute.  
262 Schein 2018. 
263 Kivistö & Haapala 2017: https://politiikasta.fi/demokratian-ja-ihmisoikeuksien-paradoksit/ 
264 Bobbio 1991: Age of rights. 
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been a part of regional level politics in Europe for the past ten years or so, and be-
cause they have gained so much space in the media, politics and research alike, 
these features have become commonplaces in most debates on migration. They are 
anticipated talking points in any negotiations concerning immigration policy - an ex-
pectation which is visible in the latest global effort to mobilise effective international 
coordination of migration, namely the UN Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Or-
derly Migration (see also chapter 2.1). The effort was questioned recently with some 
European countries and the US withdrawing from it at the last minute. Their main 
point of contention was that the GCM would interfere with their national sovereignty by 
limiting their power to rule over their national immigration policy to some extent. An-
other claim was that the document misleadingly mixes up different categories of mi-
grants without adequate clarity. With the exception of Hungary, the states in question 
had participated in the negotiations for the Compact during the summer of 2018. 
Framing migration as a problem and a threat and having migrant’s cases represented 
in public only by second-hand witnesses is a global problem, which should be ad-
dressed by making their positive roles in the communities more visible265. In GCM, 
this is referred to as the need to “provide all our citizens with access to objective, evi-
dence-based, clear information about the benefits and challenges of migration, with a 
view to dispelling misleading narratives that generate negative perceptions of mi-
grants”266.  
Populism is generally fueled by the opposition between “the people” and “the elite”. In 
radical-right populism, “the people” is considered culturally, and often also ethnically, 
exclusive. From a gender perspective, radical-right populism implies traditional gender 
roles through (Western) conservative the articulation of family values267. Furthermore, 
the Nordic versions of radical-right populism also tend to pose the gender-equal eth-
nic majorities in opposition to the unequal migrant cultures268. Social media, and the 
digitalised communication environment more generally, are important platforms for 
populist strategies and research is increasingly paying attention to the ways in which 
                                                     
 
265 See e.g. https://www.eapn.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/EAPN-2015-EAPN-migration-
report-899.pdf 
266 Global Compact on Migration 2018: p.3 
267 E.g. Norocel 2013: Our People a Tight-knit Family under the Same Protective Roof : A Criti-
cal Study of Gendered Conceptual Metaphors at Work in Radical Right Populism, available at 
https://helda.helsinki.fi/handle/10138/42162 
268 Norocel 2017: Åkesson at Almedalen. Intersectional Tensions and Normalization of Populist 
Radical Right Discourse in Sweden, NORA - Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender Research, 
25:2, available at https://doi.org/10.1080/08038740.2017.1349834  
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these strategies are antifeminist269, or utilise gender to reinforce their message270. Re-
searchers are more frequently paying attention to the role of gender in (European) 
populism - and being targeted themselves for discussing the issue.  
Immigration may have been a prominent feature in populist politics over the years but, 
as for example the latest elections in Finland and Europe have shown, environmental 
change has also become a highly contested issue on agendas. The arguments rally 
around whether it is the shared responsibility of the states to engage with robust envi-
ronmental policies or to ensure that the individuals’ choices are not increasingly lim-
ited271. Roughly speaking this is logical, since green and leftist parties who are often 
promoting green politics have also highlighted human rights and open migration poli-
cies as their spearheads in policymaking. Sceptics of climate change have managed 
to pursue politics maintaining that environmental policies are targeting ways of life in a 
way that will be extremely harmful for the non-elites. It is also true that there are chal-
lenges in making the drastic actions that environmental change will require in a sus-
tainable manner and sensitive to the disadvantaged. Combatting climate change is, 
then, a challenge to democratic systems in many ways, including as fuel for populist 
politics and as a question of cooperative governance. Broadly speaking, the issues, 
which are in grave need of rethinking and problem-solving, are also those that divide 
political parties and even states in their policies.  
                                                     
 
269 E.g. Saresma 2018: Gender populism: three cases of Finns party actors’ traditionalist anti-
feminism. In Kovala, Palonen, Ruotsalainen & Saresma (eds.) 2018: Populism on the Loose. 
Nykykulttuurin tutkimuskeskus, University of Jyväskylä Press. Available at 
http://urn.fi/URN:ISBN:978-951-39-7401-5; Norocel, Cristian 2017: Antifeminist and “Truly Lib-
erated”: Conservative Performances of Gender by Women Politicians in Hungary and Romania. 
Politics and Governance 2018, 6:3, p. 43–54. Available at DOI: 10.17645/pag.v6i3.1417  
270 E.g. Parkkinen 2017: Naispopulistien politiikkaa. Politiikasta, 6.9.2017. https://politii-
kasta.fi/naispopulistien-politiikkaa/ 
271 For introductions to this thematic, see Rogers & Reeve 2018: Climate change, populism and 
national security. Oxford Research Group report, available at https://www.oxfor-
dresearchgroup.org.uk/climate-change-populism-and-national-security; Schaller & Carius 
2019: Convenient truths. Mapping climate agendas of right-wing populist parties in Europe. 
Adelphi Consult report. Available at https://www.adelphi.de/en/publication/convenient-
truths. 
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7 The current roles and status of non-
state actors in human rights 
The states are the primary subjects of international law and their activities, including 
adopting regulations, directly or indirectly influence the operational conditions of non-
state actors who also contribute to the international human rights system. Non-state 
actors in this report include civil society actors (non-governmental organisations and 
human rights defenders), regional public actors (cities) and business actors (including 
both private business and those involving states). The situation of journalists and re-
searchers is briefly noted. Many non-state actors are mainly independent of the state 
in their decision-making, although this can also be only partial: the state can, for ex-
ample, be involved in business activities through corporate governance or as share-
holders and empower and finance cities as administrative units. Out of other adminis-
trative levels, such as non-sovereign state governments or municipalities, the chapter 
highlights cities. Other levels are important, but authors decided to concentrate on cit-
ies because, from the perspective of human rights, global trend of urbanisation (see 
chapter 1.2) is turning them into increasingly influential actors and spaces globally. 
They are practically facilitating the implementation of many human rights norms and 
face new challenges as regional differences continue to grow. 
Non-state actors differ in roles, types of power and their relationship to the state. How-
ever, they are all potential objects of the state’s activities and have their own activities 
conditioned by the state in matters of human rights. Their own activities, in turn, may 
support or hinder the realisation of human rights standards from the grassroots level 
to the level of multilateral governance and international trade. The potential of non-
state actors to help in mitigating the negative human rights impacts of global trends 
and political power shifts is, therefore, considerable. Because the dichotomy of global 
versus local is largely channeled through, and shaped by, non-state actors, their po-
tential can also be used to support positive human rights impacts in the current situa-
tion. 
As a case of influential movements largely organised through NGOs, this chapter dis-
cusses anti-gender movements and resistance to gender equality. In the background 
interviews, this type of conservatism and dissensus over the role of gender equality 
and women’s rights as political aims were named as considerable threats to the reali-
sation and promotion of human rights. The aim of this discussion is to show what 
kinds actors and activities are present to resist gender equality in Europe. In relation 
to this, the chapter finishes with a note on the role of social media as a forum and tool 
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for both promoting and resisting human rights issues, as the interviews also sug-
gested finding new ways to talk about human rights as everyday rights for all individu-
als.  
7.1 Cities  
Because of the continuing urbanisation (see chapter 1.2), cities are becoming increas-
ingly important as environments for organising democratic processes, everyday ser-
vices for healthcare, housing, food and education. From the human rights perspective, 
this development should be based on the principle of equality and non-discrimination, 
making cities secure spaces for everyone, at a minimum. Participatory rights, per-
sonal security and the spectrum of economic, social and cultural rights are all at play 
when cities are considered as human rights actors who, through municipal executive 
power, bear the responsibility of organising extensive infrastructure.  
The municipal executive powers differ between states, but the role of cities as im-
portant political players has already been established through international and multi-
lateral networking and recognition: United Cities and Global Governments (UCGL)272 
is firmly linked with the United Nations bodies and Europe has hosted two major net-
works for cities across its member states for decades (Council of European Municipal-
ities and Regions since 1951273 and Eurocities since 1986274). Other regions have 
also established their own networks for cooperation. The power shift in the current 
global order suggests a move towards strong regions (see Introduction in this report), 
which might stress the influence of major cities as the local representatives of these 
regions.  
It has been claimed that cities are gradually challenging the nation state framework as 
a global actor, as cities are more efficient in finding solutions to global problems 
caused by global trends275. The potential of cities as promoters of SDGs and the prin-
ciples of the Paris Agreement, is now recognised276. Of the named global trends, cit-
ies also have great potential to influence integration of migrants (see chapter 2.3) and 
apply new technologies to provide better services (see chapter 3). This is also closely 
linked with the role of cities as enhancing human security through planning and 
                                                     
 
272 More information: https://www.uclg.org/ 
273 More information: https://europeanmovement.eu/member/council-of-european-munici-
palities-and-regions-cemr/ 
274 More information http://www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/home  
275 Curtis (ed.) 2014: The Power of Cities in International Relations. 
276 See e.g. Brandi 2018: The role of cities: Implementing the 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agree-
ment. In Sustainable Cities 13 (23), 56–85. 
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providing of services, which could support building up comprehensive resilience (see 
chapter 4).  
The global networking of cities and their growing interests that may well differ from 
those of their respective home states are sites of activities, where the cooperation be-
tween public and private sectors has become prominent277. Therefore, cities have 
their own hegemony beyond and across the limits of state power, where cooperation, 
influence and transit ideas play their parts.  
7.2 Business and human rights  
In global markets, businesses operate with national legal systems, subjecting their ac-
tivities to national jurisdictions. Hence business actors may find it appealing to locate 
their activities into areas and states where judicial regulation favors their interests. 
States also have various means to attract foreign investment, ranging from taxation to 
minimal regulation of social matters, including human rights. Corporate responsibility 
for human rights has been stipulated in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights278 which set expectations for business corporations to respect human 
rights. Business actors are closely entangled with technological development, climate 
change, security issues and the rights of workers and labour migrants, for example. 
Regulation of private business is currently lagging behind in comparison to the power 
of its negative implications to the environment or its negative impacts on human 
rights. Using the power of private business for good in terms of human rights princi-
ples and protecting the environment, thusly, makes sense from the perspective of 
sustainability. Updating the legislative framework is essential in order to promote posi-
tive development, but the creation of international guidelines, standards and codes of 
conduct also support this. 
Business actors play an increasingly important role as players in the international hu-
man rights system. States have engaged with regulatory activities through such or-
ganisations as the OECD279 and ILO since the 1970s. During recent years, the UN 
                                                     
 
277 Käkönen 2019: “Kaupungit kansainvälisinä toimijoina”. Politiikasta 12 March 2019. 
https://politiikasta.fi/kaupungit-kansainvalisina-toimijoina/ 
278 OHCHR 2011: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf 
279 See e.g. Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/ 
and OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct 
https://www.oecd.org/investment/due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-business-con-
duct.htm  
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and the EU have stepped up in the field. The interpretations of Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility (CSR) vary between EU member states, but generally it is linked to sus-
tainability, competitiveness and innovation. Demands for more extensive and explicit 
regulation have intensified recently, but responsibility is also gaining ground in compa-
nies that recognise the benefits of sound and clear standards for ensuring stable con-
ditions for business. Not only are some of the business actors bearing and promoting 
human rights responsibilities as part of their operation, a recent debate suggests that 
there could also be more legally binding rules for regulating companies. The debate 
was on the table again in Geneva in October 2018, in the framework of the UN Forum 
for Business and Human Rights, guided and chaired by The Working Group on the is-
sue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises280.  
The UN Global Compact addressing business activities is one tool for supporting sus-
tainability and UN goals on a voluntary basis, aiming “to align strategies and opera-
tions with universal principles on human rights, labour, environment and anti-corrup-
tion, and take actions that advance societal goals”281. Also, Human Rights Council 
adopted guiding principles on business and human rights in 2011282. In 2016, the UN 
Working Group issued the final version of its Guidance on National Action Plans283 on 
business and human rights as part of the state responsibility to disseminate and im-
plement the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, adopted by the 
UNHRC in 2011284. The recognition of the significance of including the private sector 
more wholeheartedly into the human rights discourse is nevertheless there: at the na-
tional level, legislation for regulating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been 
strengthened, for instance, in the UK, France and the Netherlands. In Finland, a cam-
paign has called for a national level legal reform.285 
While the SDGs have contributed to positive exchanges of expertise and local 
knowledge between these actors, there continues to be tension between private busi-
ness and civil society organisations, including HRDs. This often culminates in the 
                                                     
 
280 OHCHR 2018a: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Forum/Pages/2018Fo-
rumBHR.aspx;  
OHCHR 2018c: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WGHRandtransna-
tionalcorporationsandotherbusiness.aspx  
281 United Nations Global Compact 2018: https://www.unglobalcompact.org/  
282 OHCHR 2011: Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_eN.pdf 
283 OHCHR 2018d: https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/business/pages/nationalactionplans.aspx 
284 https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; Fin-
land produced the National Action Plan in October 2014, see https://tem.fi/docu-
ments/1410877/3084000/National%20action%20plan%20for%20the%20implementa-
tion%20of%20the%20UN%20guiding%20pronciples%20on%20business%20and%20hu-
man%20rights/1bc35feb-d35a-438f-af56-aec16adfcbae 
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question of corporate responsibility, on the rights of indigenous peoples or the right to 
land, most notably286. Reports suggest that HRDs who challenge corporations are be-
ing killed, assaulted, harassed and suppressed in growing numbers287. It is often the 
case that the governing regime takes part in this activity as a contributor, or by ne-
glecting its obligations to protect people against corporate human rights abuses. After 
all, for a non-democratic regime, the different objectives of activism are often inter-
linked, as is the case with democratisation and active concern for the environment: ef-
fective environmental policy requires an active and well informed civil society that pro-
vides knowledge, mediates between interests and vocalises local environmental con-
cerns. This has been shown to have been the case in Eastern Europe, for example, 
where the state of the environment activated social movements early on and contrib-
uted to the collapse of the socialist regime.288 
The responsibility of private corporations usually has three dimensions: economic, en-
vironmental and social. Environmental responsibility has developed the furthest and it 
is generally still common to consider these responsibilities as separate, rather than 
mutually constitutive.289 Importantly, the contexts and roles of private businesses in 
supporting and challenging human rights are diverse. There are local and cultural var-
iations in the ways the economic and political elites are connected together, in busi-
ness culture and the level of locality versus transnationality, in industries and in histor-
ically shaped legal and institutional frameworks. Business uses natural resources, pol-
lutes, changes the environment (both rural and urban) and has control over housing. 
Private sector may also contribute to the local environment in more positive ways 
through the construction of infrastructure (e.g. schools) and introduce locally suited 
new forms of housing, which serve a more versatile demography. It can also create a 
market for new and better services and investments. 
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7.3 NGOs and human rights defenders  
NGOs are constitutive to the international human rights system from the organisa-
tional point of view with a consultative status in regard to the United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of NGOs within the UN system. The status is 
granted and renewed by the UN Committee for Non-Governmental Organisations. 
United Nations Associations (UNAs) are national civil society organisations coordi-
nated at the international level by the World Federation of United Nations Associa-
tions290. For the European Union, promoting democracy and human rights also in 
close cooperation with the civil society is a part of its external relations. The EU funds 
“(mainly) civil society actors promoting human rights and democracy” through the Eu-
ropean Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)291. In general, the EU 
links support for democratisation to human rights work explicitly in its external rela-
tions, for example, by putting emphasis on observing elections as supportive means 
to ensure the implementation of civil and political rights.  
A free civil society is a prominent part of liberal democratic regimes. NGOs and HRDs 
monitor and communicate human rights violations and thus help combat unjust struc-
tures by also providing legal assistance, shelter or other resources. A functioning civil 
society increases societal and political transparency by resisting political and eco-
nomic corruption. One of the ways to improve the recognition of minorities and to ne-
gotiate the relationship between majorities and minorities is to a support freely func-
tioning civil society. Several studies show how, in conflict situations for example, eve-
ryday connections, grassroots activities and informal networks support conflict resolu-
tion292. Furthermore, the distress and human rights violations of minorities, such as in-
digenous peoples, are often brought into public attention through civil society activists.  
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A recent Amnesty International report argues that there is a global trend of states in-
troducing new laws to restrict the basic freedoms of civil societies. According to the 
report, civil society organisa-
tions are facing increasing 
restrictions of their actions 
through the control of re-
sources, restriction of the 
freedom of association and 
arbitrary interference293. In 
2016, at least 281 HRDs 
were killed in 22 countries, 
including HRDs who chal-
lenged entrenched eco-
nomic interests, protected 
the environment, defended 
minorities or opposed tradi-
tional barriers to women and 
LGBTI rights.294 According 
to Front Line Defenders, out 
of the 312 murders of hu-
man rights defenders in 
2017, 80% took place Brazil, 
Colombia, Mexico and the 
Philippines. 67% of them 
were actively defending 
land, environmental and in-
digenous peoples’ rights, 
most often in the context of 
mega projects, extractive in-
dustry and big business. 
The same report also indi-
cated that the state security 
forces were either directly 
                                                     
 
293 Amnesty International 2019: Laws designed to silence. The global crackdown on 
civil society organizations. Amnesty International Ltd, Peter Benenson House: London 
294 https://www.amnesty.nl/content/uploads/2017/05/HRD-briefing-26-April-2017-FI-
NAL.pdf?x18276; https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/human-rights-defenders-who-
challenge-corporations-at-growing-risk-article-analyses-resource-centres-database-of-attacks 
Professional groups under attack: 
journalists and researchers 
As an additional note on the current political cli-
mate and human rights themes, two professional 
groups should be mentioned as an excursion: 
journalists and researchers. Both professional 
groups are in key positions to support the promo-
tion of human rights and have began to experi-
ence the effects of new technologies and radical-
right populism in their work and status. According 
to Hyvönen (2018), the states have also played 
their part in this development: a lot of pressure 
has been put on academic actors in Turkey, for 
example, and the academia has been under at-
tack in Hungary as well. In general, researchers 
are now being attacked for discussing human 
rights and gender equality across Europe. While 
their difficulties seem to be largely the combined 
result of an anti-academic atmosphere and anti-
gender and anti-immigration agendas, journalists 
have been attacked for the more traditional rea-
sons of writing about corruption or reporting hu-
man rights violations. Control over the media and 
its manifold channels is fuelled by competing 
“truths”, well-funded and organised trolling cam-
paigns and divisions into camps and bubbles.  
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responsible for the killings or failed to prevent them295.  
The gradual attempts by the states to suffocate the civil society are also troubling 
signs for human rights work in Europe296. Poland has tested the flexibility of the ideal 
of European liberal democracy by meddling with the national broadcasting company 
and the judicial system to favour its conservative politics, for example by linking gen-
der and women’s rights with historically demonised Marxism297. According to Human 
Rights Watch, the Russian government has violated the human rights of individuals 
working with civil society organisations extensively as part of its policy of internal mo-
bilisation and the government continued to support “separatists” in eastern Ukraine, 
who committed abuses in areas under their control298. With Russia growing its power 
over its borders, the background interviews suggest that there are new concerns over 
the influence it has on states whose regimes are seeking to undermine representative 
democracy for their own benefit. Hence, while the space to maneuver for civil society 
in Russia has been tight for a considerable period of time, it now seems to be shrink-
ing in other Eastern European states.  
7.4 Non-state actors against human rights 
Non-state actors and civil society are most often seen as important partners to 
strengthen human rights and work against state actors violating them. Yet, some non-
state actors also work against implementation of human rights. Many NGOs and other 
non-state actors have strong anti-human rights platforms on their agenda. They often 
try to influence public opinion or lobby politicians and other governmental actors to 
adopt policies that violate human rights or stop implementation of new ones. These 
actors differ in size from local to national to global, but often they form international 
movements that work against specific human right or rights. Combating these move-
ments and their anti-rights agenda require different approach and tools compared to 
engaging with states. Therefore, it is important to recognise where the resistance to 
human rights appear: is it on the state or non-state level.  
An example of largely non-state driven resistance against human rights is the growing 
anti-gender movement. Many states engage in anti-gender activities and anti-gender 
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views are plentiful within many public governance bodies and state apparatuses as 
well. But anti-gender movements are not as clearly integrated with political move-
ments as, for instance, anti-migration movements. For this reason, they are discussed 
as non-state actors even though they influence inside governments, too. An example 
of this interplay between state and non-state actors is the abortion legislation in Po-
land, where the right-wing government has tried to make the already draconian abor-
tion law even tighter to effectively ban abortion299. There has been strong non-state 
actors like the Catholic Church lobbying for the ban. According to a news report, the 
law was drafted by conservative lawyers from globally connected and well-funded ul-
tra-conservative organisation called Ordo Iuris.300  
The last five years have been turbulent times to promote gender equality. There has 
been a growing number of vocal resistance campaigns against gender equality, as 
well as a slowdown in political action for the promotion of gender equality on the EU 
level301. The anti-gender movements are international and have a global reach, but 
this chapter focuses particularly on Europe. 
7.4.1 Anti-gender movements in Europe 
One of the key negative changes for gender equality in Europe has been the rise of 
anti-gender and anti-choice movements. Particularly since 2012, anti-gender move-
ments have mobilised in many European countries and are trying to influence both 
national policies and EU policies. The anti-gender movements oppose almost all work 
towards gender equality. The anti-choice movements are a part of the anti-gender 
movement, but focus on opposing work for sexual and reproductive health and rights 
(SRHR). In addition, the same actors oppose LGBTI rights (rights of lesbian, gay, bi-
sexual, transgender and intersexed people). 
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The anti-gender movement 
means actors who oppose the 
so called “gender ideology” or 
“gender theory” and the re-
forms they connect to these 
terms. “Gender ideology, or 
“gender theory”, is a concept 
that represents the opposition 
in the anti-gender movements’ 
rhetoric. One example is a 
claim that “gender ideology” 
means gender and sex can be 
chosen freely, that women 
should be like men and that 
women can choose to be gay 
in order to escape patriar-
chy302. Of course, gender 
studies do not make these 
kinds of claims and neither do 
human rights activists who are 
working to promote gender 
equality through the UN and 
the EU. On the contrary, most 
human rights activists argue 
that LGBTI rights are im-
portant, because sexual orien-
tation and gender cannot be 
chosen based on the will of an individual to be or not to be something. The anti-gen-
der movement has created the “gender ideology” rhetoric in order to oppose women’s 
rights and the rights of sexual and gender minorities. The rhetoric varies in different 
countries and situations, but some of the core elements, such as arguing for more tra-
ditional gender roles, are similar. 
The anti-gender rhetoric and movement was elaborated by the Vatican in the mid-
1990s as a response to the recognition of sexual and reproductive rights in the UN 
rights system at the 1994 UN conference on Population and Development in Cairo 
and the 1995 Beijing conference on Women. The Holy See attempted to oppose the 
                                                     
 
302 See, for example, a Youtube video by Profesionales por la Ética, 2016. The video presents 
“gender ideology” as a foreign ideology that is spreading through the UN and EU, and that citi-
zens should oppose this. Profesionales por la Ética is a Mardid-based organisation, which also 
works with parliamentarians. 
Anti-gender movement goals 
According to Paternotte and Kuhar (2018), anti-
gender movements impact work for human rights 
and gender equality negatively. Depending on the 
country, the aim of the actors in support of anti-gen-
der movements is to: 
• oppose reproductive rights (the anti-choice 
movements) 
• oppose sex and gender education in schools 
• oppose the rights of sexual and gender minori-
ties 
• oppose almost all work for gender equality and 
virtually anything that has gender in it, such as 
gender studies departments in universities, 
gender mainstreaming as a strategy to promote 
gender equality in the public sector and the 
fight against gender-based violence 
• defend “religious freedom” and denounce rising 
“christianophobia” in Europe 
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notion of gender, because it feared that it would become a vehicle for the international 
recognition of abortion and a legitimisation of homosexuality303. However, the anti-
choice and anti-gender movements have not only gained ground in the hands of the 
Vatican. Currently, many of the new anti-choice actors can be associated with the 
“New Christian Right” tied to the US Republican Party304. The anti-gender campaigns 
also include Russian campaigns engineered by the Kremlin305. The aim of the cam-
paigns might simply be to divide opinions and thus make Europe weaker. 
The current rise of anti-gender movements has links to legislative changes in Europe. 
For example, before same-sex marriage was legalised in France in 2013, there was a 
massive French mobilisation against legalisation. Although the movement opposing 
the legal change lost that particular battle, it has had a significant impact on policy-
making in issues related to gender and sexuality in France306. After 2012, similar mo-
bilisations spread to other countries, such as Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia and Slo-
vakia307. In Finland, the organisation Aito avioliitto (True marriage) uses the same 
rhetoric and a similar logo. 
In addition to influencing policymaking in different European countries, the anti-gender 
actors have mobilised to influence EU policy by, for example, advocating for the ex-
clusion of language that is supportive of sexual and reproductive rights and women’s 
rights from European parliament resolutions and Council conclusions308. In order to 
lobby the European Parliament, several anti-gender organisations have their offices in 
Brussels. The anti-gender lobbying organisations in Brussels include, for instance, 
ADF International, which is the advocacy branch of the US based Alliance Defending 
Freedom and one of the largest conservative Christian legal advocacy organisations 
in the world. One of the themes of ADF International is the fundamental right to the 
freedom of conscience. In this case, conscience means protecting the freedom to ho-
mophobic religious speech, religiously rooted discrimination and conscientious objec-
tion by professionals against, e.g., performing abortion. For example, in April 2016, 
ADF launched a “Declaration on the Importance of Strengthening the Fundamental 
Right to Freedom of Conscience”, which is signed by 21 MEPs in the European Par-
liament309. 
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Another example of a lobbying organisation is the European Dignity Watch. According 
to their website, they defend “fundamental freedoms and responsibility, marriage and 
the family, and the protection of life from conception to natural death”310. An example 
of their influential work is the fact that they provided background research of specific 
allocations of EU funding to pro-SRHR initiatives in the developing world in order to 
deny this funding in the future311. The European Dignity Watch presents itself as a 
professional lobbying organisation, as well. They provide training in areas, such as 
campaign management, strategic communications and organisational strategy. As ev-
idenced by these examples, the lobbying parties behind the anti-gender movements 
are quite influential organisations. In addition, they are not small religious grassroots 
organisations, even though they often like to present themselves as such. 
The anti-choice movements are a part of anti-gender movements. The anti-choice 
movements often claim that they focus on reducing the number of abortions. How-
ever, they get their “anti-choice” name based on the fact that they focus on opposing 
work for sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and on limiting the choice 
of women to use contraception, not just the choice of having an abortion. While reduc-
ing the number of abortions is a positive thing from the perspective of women’s rights 
as well, limiting access to sexual and reproductive health and rights is not. In fact, 
providing sexual and reproductive health services is also one of the best ways to re-
duce the number of abortions. 
As a consequence of increased presence in the European public and policy debate, 
the anti-choice actors have occasionally managed to divide opinions within and be-
tween political groups in the European Parliament efficiently enough to water down 
and even block statements and policies in support of SRHR. In the European Union, 
the anti-choice movement has gained particular support in Croatia, France, Germany, 
Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain.312 
Another development has been the discussion around sexual harassment by mi-
grants, which has been taken up as a topic for various reasons and by various parties. 
There are also Me Too related movements, which actually use the movement in 
spreading xenophobic and racist messages313. For example, in Germany there is a 
“120 decibel” campaign that claims to be the “real Me Too”. The campaign was 
launched by Martin Sellner, the leader of an Austrian right-wing nationalist and new 
right organisation, and it takes its name from a personal pocket alarm that is sold as a 
safety device for women to deter sexual harassment. The standard sound level of the 
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device is 120 decibels. The campaign includes the video “The real outcry: break the 
silence and start acting”, in which white women quote news on sexual violence com-
mitted by migrants and refugees. The video is trying to convey that, instead of dis-
cussing all sexual violence, we should focus only on the sexual violence committed by 
migrants and that the real answer to ending sexual violence is found in migration poli-
tics. While migration and integration politics matter, it is problematic to shift the con-
versation away from violence against women. In addition, the argumentation can trig-
ger violence towards migrant men, women and children. 
Similar arguments can also be found in Finnish conversations. In December 2018, the 
media discussed three child abuse cases that were committed by migrant men in 
Oulu314. This discussion then continued when more cases were reported to police and 
the police informed the media. One of the underaged girls that was raped was also re-
ported to have died315. These cases have raised a lot of anger and fear and an outcry 
over the threat of sexual abuse of minors using social media. Analytically, moving the 
debate away from the rights of women and girls over to immigration policy works simi-
larly to the news stories used in the 120 decibel campaign. The international anti-im-
migration movements and Finnish anti-immigration movements seem to use very simi-
lar arguments. It might therefore be very useful to also discuss solutions internation-
ally.  
7.4.2 Other resistance to gender equality  
In addition to anti-gender movements, there is other resistance to gender equality. 
The content of gender equality work is always negotiated, and these negotiations face 
varying degrees of resistance. Due to the negotiations, the meaning of gender equal-
ity can, for instance, be reduced or its meaning can shift towards some other goal, 
such as supporting economic goals316. The resistance to gender equality and work for 
promoting gender equality is a growing area of research317. New research on re-
sistance focuses more on the structural settings of resistance, instead of simply identi-
fying strategies of resistance. 
Challenges faced in the work of promoting gender equality are linked, for instance, to 
the decline of democracy, a reduction in government power, an increased marketisa-
tion of politics and public services, a serious reduction of the political space for civil 
society, intensifying political hierarchies and polarisations, growing political surveil-
lance and violence and renewed attempts at controlling and restricting sexual and 
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bodily autonomy. Verloo argues that these structural changes present a new oppor-
tunity to resist gender equality for the bureaucratic gatekeepers and new actors, such 
as anti-gender organisations and populist radical right parties.318 
In the context of the European Union, there has been a shift in terminology from 
women’s equal opportunities through gender equality to unconscious bias. The shift in 
language shows how gender equality needs to be talked about in different times in or-
der to get it on the agenda. The shift does not merely concern language, but also 
changes actual practices. According to Pető, talk of unconscious bias turns attention 
away from the structures towards individuals who have biases.319 It would be im-
portant to focus both on the structures as well as to talk about unconscious biases 
that prevent promotion of gender equality.  
One of the strategies for promoting gender equality while facing resistance is vague-
ness. With unspecific rhetoric, the language of gender equality can be changed in or-
der to get the message accepted320. An example of this is that actors promoting gen-
der equality do not define certain concepts in detail, because this could possibly 
cause other actors to pick on them, and, as a consequence, the rights gained would 
be jeopardised. The downside of the vagueness strategy is that unclear measures are 
more difficult to pursue. 
One form of resistance is non-doings and non-happenings, instead of active opposi-
tion321. Non-doings are fueled by the organisation culture that does not value gender 
equality and does not encourage individuals to learn how gender equality could be 
promoted. In some ministries and in some working groups, persons working in equal-
ity projects receive more support from the ministry and their colleagues than in oth-
ers322. In some ministries, persons working in equality projects receive more support 
from the ministry and their colleagues than in the other ministries323. A holistic ap-
proach and cross-branch coordination are important for the effective promotion of 
gender equality: gender equality projects focus on different areas of gender equality in 
different ministries and in different policy areas. For instance, domestic gender equal-
ity politics have a different emphasis than gender equality politics in foreign affairs. 
While this is not necessarily a problem, the subsequent incoherence needs to be un-
derstood in equality work. Discussions and negotiations between different parties in 
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the ministry, including equality workers, can also help personnel and the organisation 
commit to improving equality.324  
7.5 Polarisation and human rights 
communication  
The role of social media in shaping, and sometimes polarisasing, discussions is ex-
amined here. While social media is helpful for social organising, the polarisation of 
discussions around certain concepts, such as gender, is one of the threats promi-
nently present in social media. Polarisation means that, in part, public conversation 
takes place only within filter bubbles and echo chambers that do not communicate 
with each other. Instead of focusing on cooperation and finding common goals, the 
conversation focuses on fighting between the opposites. If the one polar opposite is 
not present, it is typical that those without an actual extreme view are portrayed as if 
they were extreme as well. 
Big multinational companies providing social media platforms do not have a legal re-
sponsibility equal to that of the traditional mass media, such as newspapers, in which 
the editors are, for example, responsible for confirming sources of their information. 
Digital business of multinational corporate giants transcends national borders and the 
jurisdictions of national laws, which poses challenges for human rights. A company 
can function under the legislation of its country of origin which might be different from 
the country where the business activities take place. In addition, the most influential 
messages causing emotions in readers are the messages most shared in social me-
dia. This means that particularly surprising and exaggerated messages spread more 
efficiently. Famous cases of manipulation in social media include Russian influence in 
Ukraine and in the US presidential elections325. Recent positive changes related to so-
cial media include some of the consequences of the Me Too movement (or #MeToo 
movement). The movement has created a positive change that has forced people 
across societies and industries to take sexual harassment seriously. Attempts to hold 
platforms accountable for their published content, especially hate speech, include 
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Germany’s Network Enforcement Act326 (known as NetzDG) passed in 2017. The re-
form has raised concerns327 over limitations of the freedom of speech, while it has 
been adopted as a reference point for similar legislative propositions in other states as 
well328.  
Anti-gender movements and radical-right populism are partly associated with the way 
the international human rights system is considered to be experiencing turbulence. 
There are many ways to interpret the usage of word “crisis” as a political concept and 
historically there have indeed been wonderfully rich examples of this329. However, 
harvesting its potential to an overly large extent has also made it an empty concept, 
which should, perhaps, be avoided, even if lacking a better word. For example, while 
it is important to recognise that there are global challenges that need better conceptu-
alisation that currently put pressure on the international human rights system, the 
uniqueness of the situation should not be overemphasised. As a political project, the 
international human rights system is an ever-evolving process, which has historical 
and political tensions, compromises and disputes coded into its DNA. As a legal pro-
ject, on the other hand, it has established rules and norms, which need to be rein-
forced through performance and engagement that claim autonomy and independence 
from politics.  
The sense that the international human rights system is being threatened is increas-
ingly stirring a debate to tackle what, in essence, seems to be a legitimacy issue. A 
recurring theme in the background interviews was the consideration of finding new 
ways to discuss human rights issues and to communicate the impact of human rights 
norms in ways that would stress their meaning to all individuals. For example, the rep-
resentation of refugees and asylum seekers in the media has been criticised for nar-
rowing their roles to either a threat requiring military intervention or victims requiring 
management.  
A European example of an active agenda to push for new narratives is the European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, which has come to explicitly recognise that the 
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strengths and advantages of subscribing to human rights norms should be better for-
mulated into a public message. Since 2017, the FRA has pushed for projects, work-
shops and campaigns for discussing ways to address the general public to widen sup-
port for human rights agendas and work. The core idea in the initial talks was that pol-
iticians and the media are responsive to the public sentiment, which is why the gen-
eral public should come first as an audience. It was also pointed out that institutions 
should reconsider their communications channels and methods and “acquire qualities 
of speed, agility, flexibility, imagination and novelty, and experiment boldly with new 
approaches, especially in the rapidly evolving sphere of social media”330.  
In an effort to communicate human rights issues, raise awareness and frame them as 
more inclusive and concrete, the FRA published a toolkit for public use331. The 10 
keys to effectively communicating human rights, published in September 2018, aims 
at giving examples of the ways communication raises emotional reactions in others. 
The FRA has worked toward the publication of the toolkit, for example, by hosting a 
Human Rights Communicators’ Leadership Seminar in January 2018 in cooperation 
with other stakeholders, such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights332. The ini-
tiative is based on a stated “failure to communicate human rights messages in a way 
that makes people listen and that changes lives”333 and it invited experts of different 
academic and organisational backgrounds to address the issue.  
Projects like these seek to address the issue of the legitimacy of the international hu-
man rights system, even if the system is not considered straightforwardly illegitimate 
in the sense that it should be replaced. Rather, the aim seems to be to bring human 
rights and their role as protection for all individuals closer to those who do not (need 
to) actively claim these rights in their everyday lives. One of the challenges of this en-
deavour may be to find a way to explain how human rights protect individuals when 
they are not in immediate danger of being subjected to the arbitrary rule of the state. If 
reasonably applied, the expansion of the concept of security toward human security 
and comprehensive resilience (see chapter 4) can, perhaps, address this issue by 
                                                     
 
330 A recent example is a conference from January 2019, organised by FRA: ”Re-energising hu-
man rights in the digital age” https://fra.europa.eu/en/event/2019/re-energising-human-
rights-digital-age 
331 FRA 2018a: http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/10-keys-effectively-communicating-
human-rights 
332 FRA 2018b: http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/human-rights-communicators-lea-
dership-seminar-summary-report-and-outlook 
333 FRA 2017: “Addressing the failure of meaningful human rights communications”,   
https://fra.europa.eu/en/news/2017/addressing-failure-meaningful-human-rights-communi-
cations (25 February 2019) 
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contextualising human rights and the human rights bodies into contemporary chal-
lenges.  
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Part III: Finland and the changing 
operational environment: 
Developments and 
recommendations 
Since the publication of the latest Government of Finland Human Rights Report in 
2014334, the operational environment has continued to change for Finland. Tackling 
the negative effects of well-recognised global trends, such as those addressed in this 
report, has become a prominent element of human rights contexts. A major effect of 
the global trends is that the capability of the international human rights system to deal 
with the human rights impacts of these trends needs to be evaluated. Partly the ques-
tion of capability is also a question of well-functioning cooperation in the international 
human rights forums.  
The international human rights system is embedded in the idea of liberal world order, 
which has its ideological roots in the rise of the Western nation states. Liberal world 
order is now largely considered to be in a crisis (see chapter 6 in this report), resulting 
from the political power shifts and global trends. Shifting political power means that 
the origins of the international human rights system need to be recontextualised to fit 
the current situation. Currently, global trends impact the living conditions of humans 
globally and where states have strong interpretations of national sovereignty, prioritis-
ing certain of human rights norms over others and legitimacy of the monitoring mech-
anisms.  
The named global trends differ in their human rights impacts and contextual implica-
tions, but also as resources and objects of politics. For example, migration invites po-
larised politics and debates, while environmental change is still dismissed as unim-
portant by some (see chapter 6.2.3). The use and impact of new technologies are far 
less controversial topics, despite their close connections to large amounts of capital 
and rivalries between states in terms of promoting innovations and inviting invest-
ments through minimal regulation of business actors. As a result, tackling the negative 
human rights implications of these trends and supporting the positive ones also re-
quires different approaches and consideration. It is also notable that the quality and 
degree of politicisation of these trends varies over time and across forums, which 
makes it difficult to have fixed strategies for handling their consequences. Currently, 
                                                     
 
334 Available at https://um.fi/publications/-/asset_publisher/TVOLgBmLyZvu/content/govern-
ment-of-finland-human-rights-report-2014 
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emphasising sovereignty and the lack of engagement of business actors, for example, 
are problematic for issues which require local commitment with global perspective, 
such as environmental change, migration, application of new technologies or the re-
sulting security challenges.  
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8 Previous themes and orientations 
of Finland and the changing 
operational environment  
Finland promotes its human rights policy nationally in bilateral relations and on inter-
national forums. The EU is the most important context for Finland as an actor in inter-
national forums, also those of particular significance for human rights exchanges, 
where Finland is seeking to strengthen the unity of the EU as an actor in world poli-
tics. The EU promotes human rights through its participation in multilateral forums, 
such as the UN General Assembly and its Third Committee charged with human 
rights questions, the UN Human Rights Council, the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. The Union also actively pro-
motes international justice, for instance through its support for the International Crimi-
nal Court. In the UN, Finland participates in the work of the UN General Assembly and 
its Third Committee. For Finland, the EU provides a potentially influential frame of ref-
erence for human rights work within the UN framework, depending on the level of 
agreement between the member states. Joint Nordic Resolutions work as manifestos 
of the continuing cooperation between the Nordic Countries in the UN General As-
sembly and, when necessary, Finland may also promote its human rights goals 
through bilateral relations. Interest in the Nordic Model has increased, as the model 
has come to be seen as a way to be competitive, while promoting equality and social 
justice. The articulated goals for Finland’s activities in the UN include the involvement 
of NGOs in UN human rights activities and that UN agencies and organisations follow 
a human rights based approach in all of their internal activities and mutual collabora-
tion335.  
Finland is also part of the Arctic Council, which has, up to the present, been con-
ceived as more of an environmental body. The recent failure to come up with a joint 
resolution on the future strategy for the Arctic, however, was considered to be a shift 
towards a security framed and power political approach336. At the time of writing, fore-
casting on the development of this shift is still too dependent on speculation. Yet, as 
environmental change is becoming increasingly contested as a political topic, this shift 
may be worth noting from the human rights perspective as well. At least it displays the 
political tensions between Russia, the US and China, whose proactive attitude toward 
                                                     
 
335 https://um.fi/finnish-human-rights-policy-within-international-organisations#UN 
336 https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10770977  
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human rights governance337 and steady increase in hegemony may influence the bal-
ance in the Arctic Council as well.  
8.1 Reference points: The Government of 
Finland human rights report 2014 
As an introduction to the policy recommendations for Finland in the current opera-
tional context, the report at hand uses the latest Government of Finland Human 
Rights Report (2014)338 as a reference point. This anchor was agreed on with the 
steering group already in the original setting of the report, and the objective is to use 
the formerly prevailing points of emphasis in the Finnish human rights policy as a 
backdrop to the current recommendations. This illustrates what kind of continuums 
are there to build on and in which cases it is necessary to introduce new elements into 
the agenda. For this purpose, this chapter highlights similarities and differences in the 
2014 report and report at hand. Hence, from now on in this chapter, the Government 
of Finland Human Rights Report (2014) is referred as “2014 report” and the report at 
hand is referred as “2019 report”.  The inclusion of a comprehensive list of ongoing 
projects, policy developments and processes concerning the Finnish human rights 
policy is out of scope of this 2019 report. The human rights report 2014 also included 
policy guidelines, or recommendations, which are not systematically assessed here, 
but referred to when necessary.  
In 2014, the human rights report made a note of the increasing multipolarity and multi-
vocality of the international human rights system, a familiar feature of the current re-
port as well. The reference in 2014 was the development of regional human rights 
systems in the Americas (the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) and Af-
rica (the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights). The report recognised 
the efforts of these actors and also the member states of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) for their work, although it remained hesitant about their re-
sults339.  
                                                     
 
337Creutz 2019: China’s challenge to human rights. Increased proactivity may weaken the UN 
human rights system. FIIA Briefing Paper May 2019 / 261. Available at https://www.fiia.fi/wp-
content/uploads/2019/04/bp261_chinas_challenge_to_human_rights.pdf 
338 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2014): Government of Finland Human Rights Report. 
Available at https://um.fi/documents/35732/48132/government_of_finland_hu-
man_rights_report_2014/9d777ec6-8977-d2f2-fec3-1d48a60a40e9?t=1525859806149  
339 Government of Finland Human Rights Report, p. 16. 
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As another featured topic, the 2014 report also noted the problems of the monitoring 
systems resulting from, e.g., the extension of “the monitoring mechanisms to cover 
new human rights, more detailed requirements concerning the contents of periodical 
reporting, and greater awareness about the complaints procedures”340. Support was 
expressed for the special procedures in the UN Human Rights Council with recogni-
tion of the rising level of awareness of individuals concerning their rights and the ac-
tive reporting of human rights violations. The report also acknowledged the im-
portance of NGOs and the civil society for making effective human rights claims, re-
sulting in revisions of national laws, even at the level of adopting constitutions. Such 
strengthening of the rule of law, especially in developing countries, was considered to 
be on Finland’s agenda in the future as well341. In relation to the 2019 report at hand, 
defending and supporting human rights defenders are noted also in 2014, as a cross-
cutting theme which strengthens the outlined policy guidelines (2014 report) and goals 
(2019 report)342. The role of business actors is not widely recognized in 2014 report, 
although the preparation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
is mentionedl343. Strengthening the rule of law, and the challenges to it in the contem-
porary Europe, also resonate with the current 2019 report.  
The rise of “extreme views” in the context of violence against civilians and strong sov-
ereignty over multilateral cooperation was already a concern in 2014. Accordingly, the 
2014 report considers it problematic for international cooperation that the questioning 
of the universal nature of human rights and the equality of all population groups has 
been increasing. In accordance with the views presented in this 2019 report, the 2014 
report also recognised the ongoing problems of coming up with a unified position on 
issues concerning women’s and girls’ sexual rights and the rights of indigenous peo-
ples. The growing multipolarity was reflected on from the perspective of increasing 
views that were predicted to further question the “established ideas of human rights”, 
in addition to being seen as opportunities to engage with diverse forms of cooperation 
between states. This was regarded as a good opportunity for Finland to seek new 
partners. Overall, the report emphasised Finland as an all-court player with estab-
lished cooperative structures with the Nordic Countries and as an EU member state 
and the potential to work well through bilateral partnerships in international rela-
tions344. There is no need to challenge this view currently, although to succeed in 
such a role requires an identifiable and strong human rights agenda with cross-cutting 
coherence.  
                                                     
 
340 Government of Finland Human Rights Report, p. 17. 
341 Government of Finland Human Rights Report, p. 17–23. 
342 E.g. Government of Finland Human Rights Report, p. 31, 65; and chapter 7.3 in this report.  
343 Government of Finland Human Rights Report, p. 6, 20 . 
344 Government of Finland Human Rights Report, p. 18–23. 
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According to the 2014 report, Finland not only systematically kept non-discrimination 
on the agenda throughout its human rights activities, but also paid particular attention 
to the prevention of discrimination on multiple grounds. The rights of indigenous peo-
ples was particularly mentioned, as well as those of women, sexual and gender mi-
norities, children, young people and people with disabilities. It was also emphasised 
that the Roma were (and are) still facing discrimination across Europe345. In the 2019 
report at hand and its recommendations, non-discrimination and the eradication of 
discrimination on multiple grounds are recognized, too, since the human rights im-
pacts of global trends are highly context-bound and affect different groups in different 
ways. Because of its focus on the global trends, 2019 report does not discuss vulner-
able groups extensively as separate texts. Rather, the recognition of people and 
groups in particularly vulnerable should take place in a more limited analytical context 
than was the case in this 2019 report.  
However, there are exceptions: This 2019 report has, as a rather cross-cutting theme, 
indicated gendered impacts of global trends and contemporary political undercurrents, 
as well as highlighted the issue of women’s rights and the rights of the LGBTI people. 
The specific point has been raised in 2019 report that, it is not enough to assess the 
state of gender equality with different statistics. Instead, the analysis of the state of 
gender equality, and agreements on the ways of promoting gender equality should be 
the main focus. This might or might not include the usage of statistics, indicators and 
indexes that provide estimates of the state of gender equality in different contexts but 
only providing statistics is not a sufficient action. 
To ease the road, women’s rights and gender equality have been prominent features 
on the state’s official agenda already before, and there are notable resources of re-
search, institutional history and expertise in Finland to use for support. The 2014 re-
port includes three recommendations for promoting gender equality. The recommen-
dations are named as policy guidelines346. The first one (policy guideline 4) actually 
consists of six goals for promoting gender equality347, which include the sexual and 
reproductive health and rights of women and girls, their right to education, combating 
violence against women, women’s possibilities for political and economic activity and 
women’s role in resolving armed conflicts. All six goals include the prevention of dis-
crimination on multiple grounds. 
Corporate social responsibility for human rights is noted as an increasing demand by 
the civil society to regulate the business actors abroad348. As noted, the report at hand 
                                                     
 
345 Government of Finland Human Rights Report, p. 23–26. 
346 Government of Finland Human Rights Report, p. 27–30. 
347 Government of Finland Human Rights Report, p. 29. 
348 Government of Finland Human Rights Report, p. 20. 
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emphasises the rise of the role of business actors as potential partners in protecting 
human rights. In general, the 2014 report highlights Finland’s aspiration to promote 
transparency and the civil society as a part of its human rights activities. It was con-
sidered a particular strength that Finland promotes “open interaction between the au-
thorities and NGOs, for example in the context of drawing up and discussing reports 
to be submitted to international treaty monitoring bodies”349. Transparency is not ex-
plicitly emphasised in the analyses of the 2019 report at hand, but it is an important 
principle to follow if the meaning of the international human rights system and, the 
support for multilateral governance is to be promoted. Increasing trust in democratic 
processes and even social integration, for example, require insistence of transpar-
ency.  
According to the 2014 report, the promotion of economic, social and cultural (ESC) 
rights was based on the insight that ”prerequisites for a life with human dignity include 
the right to water and food, subsistence and protection, and education and health 
care”350. ESCs rights were considered to be important for reducing poverty and pro-
moting women’s and girls’ sexual and reproductive health and rights. Furthermore, the 
right to water and sanitation was noted to be an essential part of sustainable develop-
ment. In this 2019 report, human rights impacts are not discussed as grouped under 
ESCs or civil and political rights but referred to individually where necessary. To 
tackle the contemporary challenges of global trends requires that ESCs are actively 
promoted. Environmental issues, implications of migration, realisation of the potential 
of new technologies and support of comprehensive resilience all benefit notably from 
active advocation of ESCs. But the importance of civil and political rights are equally 
important for mitigating the negative effects of global trends, considering that the ac-
tive political and participation, or access to information for example, are key factors in 
this.  
The 2014 human rights report paid particular attention to four human rights focus ar-
eas, regarded as emerging at the time. These were areas of international and national 
significance where new provisions, international recommendations or international 
discussion and decision-making related to human rights policy were informing national 
fundamental and human rights activities in a new way. The focus themes included the 
freedom of expression and hate speech, with special focus on hate speech directed at 
children and young people351. It was also recognised that girls as well as children and 
young people belonging to minority groups are frequently targeted. Without extensive 
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specification of implicated groups, the need to raise the issue of hate speech and 
freedom of expression is also evident in 2019 report at hand.  
A particular focus group in the 2014 report was the rights of persons belonging to sex-
ual and gender minorities (LGBTI), who are still experiencing major shortcomings in 
the realisation of their rights in various countries. Another focus group was persons 
with disabilities, who experience discrimination on multiple grounds352. The rights of 
the LGBTI people are also explicated in the 2019 report repor, yet without a clear 
structure for analysing the situation of vulnerable groups systematically here, the re-
port at hand is not raising particular groups into focus. It should be clear, though, that 
to keep non-discrimination and the eradication of discrimination on multiple grounds 
as a cross-cutting principle in any policy evaluation, the most implicated groups are 
also considered. Finally, the promotion of ESCs as a binding set of rights was in the 
2014 report noted to be of particular importance for Finland. ESCs were considered to 
support the capacity to realise one’s rights to full effect and it was claimed that they 
should not be forgotten, even during times of economic crisis353.  
Importantly, the 2014 human rights report also discussed the issue of legitimacy in the 
EU context. The report drew attention to the need to inform which kind of rights the 
Union guarantees for its residents and citizens on an everyday basis. The report also 
stressed the need to raise the profile of fundamental rights and their role in the Un-
ion’s activities through discussions on thematic topics in the European Council. Other 
suggestions for profile building were also made, including the strengthening of the role 
of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and supporting the EU’s ac-
cession to the European Convention of Human Rights. The report indicated that, in 
practice, finding a unified position for the EU in their international human rights activi-
ties has been easier in the case of CP rights than in ESCs. A transparent dialogue 
over human rights problems within the EU member states was also called for354. This 
is in line with the current report, where the claims for improving human rights commu-
nication for strengthening its legitimacy in the eyes of EU citizens and residents are 
presented as one of the findings.  
Hence many of the topics raised in this 2019 report fall in line with Finland’s previous 
points of emphases. The major differences between 2014 and 2019 regard the 
themes of environmental change and new technologies, and the changing security 
paradigm. Furthermore, migration and immigration were not largely considered in 
2014. The role of business actors was also recognised to lesser extent than here. The 
ongoing and anticipated strengthening of regional power and focus, including the rise 
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of cities as global actors, are also key factors in 2019 and also more explicitly ad-
dressed, albeit the consequences of multipolarity were also recognised in 2014. One 
of the main differences regards the naming of focus groups – a choice of which has 
been explained above. 
8.2 Reference points: Outlined goals for 
Finland’s presidencies in the Council of 
Europe and the European Union  
The priorities for the Presidency of Finland for the Council of Europe (CoE) in 2018–
2019 have been 1) strengthening the system of human rights and the rule of law in 
Europe, 2) supporting equality and women’s rights and 3) openness and inclusion, as 
well as focusing on young people and the prevention of radicalisation355. Subthemes, 
such as the human rights impacts of the use of AI or support for vulnerable groups, 
have also been brought up356. The priorities and goals for Finland’s EU presidency 
are in formation at the time of writing and will be published in June 2019. A back-
ground paper prepared by the parliamentary groups in the Finnish Parliament in au-
tumn 2018 suggests priorities for the agenda, including the citizen’s perspective, im-
provements on the environmental policy and strengthening Europe as a whole, includ-
ing the Arctic perspective. Defending human rights and fundamental rights as well as 
promoting gender equality across policy sectors are mentioned as building blocks of 
the European Union, which Finland should also emphasise as part of their presidency, 
especially when representing the EU in dialogue with third parties 357.  
These recent formulations for the presidencies of the CoE and the EU fall in line with 
the recommendations presented in 2019 report at hand, although of course the 
themes of the presidency of the EU are still in formation in June 2019. While drafting a 
thematic human rights agenda should aim at overall coherence, it is nevertheless nec-
essary to adjust the agenda to suit the context of particular human rights forums. In 
the UN (including ILO) for example, the perspective is global with multiple national 
agendas and multipolarity. The formation of partnerships is dependent on the issue 
and several other factors, which makes it redundant for the report at hand to make 
                                                     
 
355 The Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Finland’s presidency”, https://um.fi/council-of-eu-
rope-finlands-presidency-2018-2019 
356 Ibid.  
357 Eduskuntaryhmien työryhmän raportti 2019: Eduskuntaryhmien näkemyksiä. Suomen EU-
puheenjohtajakauden ohjelma. Available in Finnish from https://www.eduskunta.fi/FI/tie-
toaeduskunnasta/julkaisut/aineistot/Documents/Eduskuntaryhmat_Suomen_EUpuheenjohta-
jakausi.pdf 
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suggestions of partnerships based on the contemporary reading of the situation. The 
Council of Europe has the promotion of human rights and democracy at its core. The 
security concepts of OSCE address the questions of human rights and right of minori-
ties also, by design, including the North American dimension. The EU has a common 
external human rights policy and the EU member states employ largely coordinated 
agendas in international forums (UN, OSCE, CoE). Compromising over joint positions 
has proven difficult in the past years. Compromising may also lead to mild positions, 
inadequate for member states at both ends of the debate. In the Arctic Council, Fin-
land has sought to promote SDGs as a framework for cooperation, especially during 
its presidency (2017–2019).  
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9 Conclusions and recommendations  
An influential human rights policy requires coherence and design beyond prioritising 
the selected human rights themes. It would be important to state clearly which kind of 
overall goals are targeted with the agenda. The human rights agenda itself, then, 
should be regarded as a means to realise those ends, rather than as an end in itself. 
From this perspective, choosing to emphasise ESC rights or particular groups is insuf-
ficiently translated into a coherent and decisive human rights agenda.  
Coherence in human rights policy is a working basis to improve human rights commu-
nication, as governmental actors may solidly refer to the actions of other governmen-
tal departments. Back home, explicating the link between basic rights and human 
rights may clarify the role of human rights as a prominent element in the everyday 
lives of individuals, rather than as a distant institutional framework. To increase intra-
governmental coherence and strengthen the role of human rights principles in govern-
ance they should be cross-cutting themes in internal activities of the Finnish govern-
ment as well. Therefore, this report makes recommendations on how to enhance hu-
man rights perspectives inside the Finnish government as well as what Finnish gov-
ernmental actors should do to promote human rights internationally.  
Especially since the role of business actors is on the rise, it is important to 
acknowledge that communicating human rights in dialogue between state actors has 
a different political tone than with business actors (albeit this, of course, is not always 
clear cut, e.g. when the political and economic elites are tightly interlinked). SDGs 
have been adopted by a growing number of businesses as guiding elements in their 
activities. For many of the larger companies, human rights are a natural part of their 
responsibility plan, but awareness and engagement should still be widened. In the 
Western states especially, consumers and NGOs have challenged businesses to take 
responsibility for the negative human rights impacts of their activities. In addition to 
the concept of (corporate social) responsibility, The SDGs provide useful tools to 
reach both disagreeing state parties and business actors, whose interests may differ 
from those of the states. On the other hand, the SDGs also serve as a common refer-
ence point for discussing the challenges of global trends that create shared issues for 
states and business actors alike. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights have also contributed to the widening of this discourse.  
The overall aim of the recommendations is to support a norm-based global order, 
which includes the international human rights system as an integral part. Key points 
for achieving this include addressing challenges for the international human rights 
system, which stem from within the system itself and the actors engaged with it. They 
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also include the challenge of global trends to the international human rights system, 
which should be included to agenda. 
The recommendations are means to achieve eight goals, which the report suggests 
Finland should address in its human rights policy. These eight goals are presented 
below. They are based on the final conclusions of this report. These conclusions 
cross-cut the report’s main themes and observations and summarise the main find-
ings.  
Goal 1. Develop the link between human rights and environmental 
change on all levels of governance.  
Environmental change concerns all people and is crucial for the realisation of human 
rights standards increasingly in the future. Its tendency to influence different groups 
unevenly, i.e. those who are disadvantaged also bear the most severe consequences, 
makes it pivotal in such issues as fighting poverty, protecting minority rights, and pro-
moting gender equality.  
From the anthropocentric perspective, climate change, loss of biodiversity and pollu-
tion already have severe consequences to individuals and communities. The indirect 
impacts to human life include job losses and food security, constraints due to the de-
crease of arable land, poverty due to land ownership questions and insecurity over 
community relations due to the of scarcity of resources. The direct consequences of 
pollution include health risks. 
Increasing urbanisation requires resources to be allocated to infrastructure, housing 
and health care. On the other hand, cities have become increasingly important in 
safeguarding human rights by providing channels for participation, access to infor-
mation, democratic innovations and support for free organisation of the civil society. 
Women and the environment was already one of the topics of the Beijing Platform of 
Action and its significance has increased now that the topic has gained ground. 
Women are more affected than men by climate change, environmental degradation 
and land ownership. Climate change also compromises the rights of girls, especially 
in developing countries, where they bear the consequences of gender inequality and 
multiple forms of discrimination made more severe by environmental degradation.  
As a global trend, environmental change transcends the local-global dichotomy in 
many ways. The reach of local action with environmental impacts may well carry re-
gional or even global influence, whereas organisations with global goals and mindsets 
can even often have severe regional or local impacts. On a global level, the link be-
tween human rights and environmental change is currently intensifying with increasing 
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interest in the normative development of the right to a safe, clean and healthy environ-
ment or the debates over the impacts of environmental change to non-discrimination, 
for example. At the regional level in Europe, a trend of using the human rights frame-
work to combat environmental issues has developed over the past years. 
Importantly, the UN level documentation shows that the current international human 
rights system has tools for addressing the negative effects of climate change or pollu-
tion and reinforcing the positive effects of urbanisation. The European level develop-
ments, in turn, make an interesting case of the potential of the human rights norms to 
serve as a framework for addressing environmental concerns through case law. Fin-
land is among the countries that included references to environmental rights and re-
sponsibilities in its constitution. For example, the report of the UN Special Rapporteur 
on human rights and environment, titled the Framework Principles for developing the 
enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, as a response to 
the growing influence of environment to the realisation of human rights, is an attempt 
to address multidimensional human rights impacts concretely. The innovative use of 
human rights norms through case law also has the potential to cover the complexity of 
the human rights impacts of environmental change to a large extent (see chapter 1). 
Different dimensions of environmental change are politically contested. Multiple hu-
man rights actors have a role to play in the inclusion of environmental change into 
global and regional agendas. The urgency of measures for combating climate change, 
for example, means that the measures are bound to be drastic and will require urgent 
changes of business models. Being politically accountable locally, while aiming at 
global sustainability is, in itself, a difficult task. The recent employment of environmen-
tal issues by populist parties across the political spectrum is currently nurturing the 
polarisation of debates.  
Recommendations:  
● Finland should be actively promoting the development of the right to a safe, 
clean and healthy environment in the UN. The Framework Principles provide 
a starting point and tools for the creation of a national group of experts to in-
vestigate the matter from the UN perspective.  
● In the European regional development, the developing case law and the po-
tential of the Finnish constitution should be reflected in light of the UN Frame-
work Principles in search of policy coherence. The endeavour should be a 
strong multi-stakeholder exercise with NGOs, researchers, state representa-
tives, representatives of the business sector and minorities.  
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● The impacts of environmental change and the due measures for its mitigation 
should be systematically assessed from the perspective of the groups most 
affected, including the gender perspective. The government parties should 
engage in a multisectoral approach with engagement from all relevant minis-
tries. At the parliamentary level, the committees dealing with environmental 
issues should incorporate a human rights perspective to their decision-making 
processes through the use of experts.  
Goal 2: The human rights of migrants should be promoted through 
international coordination. 
As the report shows, migration intersects with other global trends and raised political 
shifts: From environmental change to the changing world of work and security issues, 
to highlighting sovereignty and populism, human mobility is implied as a possible 
cause or effect. Human rights issues are at stake from the beginning of their journey 
throughout route to borders and to settlement in a host state. The effects of migration 
are context-bound, depending on the human (rights) impacts of a given issue. Fur-
thermore, migrants are not a homogenous group and the dimensions of migration, in-
cluding the processes for seeking asylum, are multiple. Human rights protect the indi-
viduals from the arbitrary power of the states, violence stemming from both state and 
non-state actors and from violence between individuals. Migration interlinks with envi-
ronmental change, including demography and urbanisation, which stresses the im-
portance of human rights implementation at both ends.  
As cities are becoming increasingly important actors for the implementation of human 
rights, organising their infrastructure to live up to the growing and diversifying commu-
nities. Also, work is one of the key drivers behind international migration. Because of 
the changing conditions of work, the rights of migrant workers, or depending on the 
context, labour migrants, is crucial for the promotion of equal realisation of human 
rights. Continuing urbanisation and the livelihood of rural areas are also fueling popu-
list politics in Europe at the moment, where internal emigration and immigration will be 
on the agenda in the future as well. From the human rights perspective, organisation 
of infrastructure is crucial for social, economic and political participation and the full 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. Importantly, integration should not 
be seen as a one-way street. There has been a tendency in continental Europe of 
shifting the responsibility for active integration from the host state to the immigrants 
themselves. Also, research shows that one of the tools for promoting integration is 
family reunification, while in Europe for example, the tendency has been to apply fur-
ther barriers to it in the form of income thresholds. This approach overlooks the im-
portance of providing safe spaces and channels for social, political and economic inte-
gration and participation. Furthermore, the approach to integration as a tool for pro-
moting the full enjoyment of human rights should include assessing the potential 
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cases for multiple discrimination and intersectionality. This ensures that the factors 
which stand in the way of, for example, full access to participation, are sufficiently rec-
ognised and the person is provided with the right service, if needed.  
The increase of international cooperation for coordinating global migration should aim 
at ensuring the realisation of human rights at all points, regardless of the legal status 
of that person. The Global Compact for Migration could serve as a starting point for 
promoting this, and the EU members states could be the drivers for its wider ac-
ceptance. As the GCM is designed to support achieving the migration-related SDGs, 
the document arguably has the potential to be widely accepted. However, considering 
that migration remains a highly politicised and controversial issue among the states, 
this possibility is not easily realised. To have the possibility to address the negative 
human rights impacts that the migrants potentially face and issues of sexual abuse 
and violence that are sometimes associated with conditions relating to migration, im-
migration needs to be de-demonised. The fact that international coordination is 
jammed by the polarised positions on immigration in Europe for example, is a threat to 
human security and the sustainable development of societies. 
Recommendations: 
• Finland should consistently seek to address migration as a perspective to un-
derlying trends rather than as an all-encompassing and deterministic phenom-
enon.  
• Finland should incorporate a human rights based approach to policy-making 
in a systematic way in this way, the rights of migrants are necessarily taken 
into account through the principle of non-discrimination.  
• The inclusion of persons with migrant background should be enabled through 
adequate resourcing of integration. This should include an idea of migrants as 
individuals and subjects, not objects of these policies. The issue of “old” and 
“new” minorities should be addressed with careful consideration in order to 
promote social integration in inter-group relations.  
• To ensure informed decision-making, diversity (including gender and sexual-
ity) sensitive representation should be taken into account at all levels of gov-
ernance as well as possible. This should be supported by a research-based 
approach and the consultation of civil society actors whenever possible.  
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Goal 3. Keep a human rights based approach to new technologies on 
the agenda. 
The application and development of new technologies changes contemporary socie-
ties and communities in unprecedented ways. The “megatrends of technology” affect 
various areas of human life. Assessing their collateral damage and advantages is diffi-
cult because of the great pace of development. 
The rapid development of new technologies affects the organisation of human labour, 
industries and the utilisation of environmental resources. It also means an opportunity 
to support the health and participatory opportunities of people with disabilities through 
technological assistance and has a significant impact on care in general. Technolo-
gies are used to support democratic processes in elections, as channels for exchang-
ing information and for resourcing research. At the same time, technologies are also 
used for controlling citizens, hate speech and hate campaigns sometimes resulting in 
physical violence, as well as restricting and manipulating information. Hence, the hu-
man rights implications of new technologies include, for example, the right to work, 
right to health, right to participation, right to education and the freedom of expression. 
Research has shown that the use of Artificial Intelligence duplicates the gendered and 
racialised stereotypes that originate from its designers and users, thus reinforcing, ra-
ther than reducing, discrimination. The use of new technologies also puts pressure on 
individuals who should be aware of their impacts, requires access to information and 
also discriminates against those who are disadvantaged by their lack of the latest 
technologies available. The question is, if there is sufficiently technological and face-
to-face support for using new technologies that ensures the realisation of basic rights. 
The most heated debates over the potential of new technologies are currently aimed 
at the tension between the freedom of expression and its limits, as well as the right to 
privacy and the collection and use of personal data. The global MyData movement 
claims that the individual should be the one who decides how, when and for what pur-
poses their data is collected and how it is used. The movement also calls for the right 
of the individual to be informed about their rights, the use of their data and the extent 
to which their personal information is gathered. In the end, the commercial and politi-
cal value of data lies in the using and combining of different datasets, which are 
largely used for profiling purposes. Attempts to reinforce the right to privacy have 
lately been made by the EU with their General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
The wide use of digitalised technology in everyday lives makes it difficult to regulate 
without restricting the potential to develop new technologies and innovations for us-
ers. The states are currently searching for solutions from international law for inter-
faces and possibilities for globally acknowledged guidelines and regulations, which 
would mitigate the differences of, for example, regional interpretations on the right to 
privacy in the US and the EU. The EU is currently a leading power in data protection 
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and is expected to take an active role in developing a responsible approach to the 
ethical use of AI. The Council of Europe is currently investing in the development of a 
human rights based approach to the development and use of new technologies. In the 
UN, the Special Rapporteur working on the freedom of expression is investigating the 
human rights issues of AI.  
The debate on new technologies is dominated by the understanding of new technolo-
gies as a double-edged sword with great promise and severe threats. It is simultane-
ously a great source of further democratisation, economic growth and well-being, as 
well as the cause of violations of privacy, for falling behind on the advantages of new 
technologies and the creation of inward-facing, exclusionary communities. A notable 
challenge of new technologies to policymaking is bringing together an adequate level 
of technical and human rights expertise. For example, e-health is a growing industry 
and engages actors from all sectors. A pressing political issue causing tension be-
tween states has been the influence of foreign states on democratic processes 
through the digitalised communication environment. The most famous case is the 
Russian trolling during the US elections, implicating the US citizens’ right to privacy, 
for example. Another human rights matter has been Chinese use of new technologies 
to control their citizens’ access to information and freedom of expression and the re-
lated extensive gathering of personal data. Recently, the Russian government intro-
duced a developed interpretation of their “sovereign internet”, through which it is pos-
sible to hand the control of communications channels firmly over to the central power. 
Recommendations:  
● Finland should continue its policy to keep new technologies on human rights 
agendas. Finland has a resource of technological expertise across sectors 
and industries, which can be utilised to formulate the human rights agenda for 
new technologies. This also supports the implementation of recommendations 
in goal 1., where new technologies and human rights are discussed in the 
frame of environmental change.  
● In policymaking and political decision-making, the administrative staff and law 
makers should have an adequate level of knowledge, through training if nec-
essary, of the development and the conditions of the use of the technology 
that they are discussing.  
● At the same time, human rights framework should be linked more strongly 
with the development stage of new technologies as early as possible without 
unnecessarily interfering with innovation. This should include encouraging di-
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versity among those who develop the technologies, involving also the educa-
tion of women and girls and various minorities more extensively in new tech-
nologies.  
● Applying new technologies should not leave anyone behind in terms of ac-
cess and potential biases should be systematically assessed. 
Goal 4. When new elements emerge in security agendas, include a 
human rights approach in the discussions. 
The concept of security is ever-widening and new issues, such as environmental 
change, migration and new technologies, bring new elements to security agendas. 
This has brought about a change in the security paradigm that has been conceptual-
ised as a human security. In human security approach, the referent object is the indi-
vidual in contrast to traditional state-centric national security and sovereignty. Never-
theless, the concept of national security is very much present today. The tensions in 
the global order and in the international human rights system have put increasing 
gravity on the role of the national security concept lately.  
The theory of securitisation offers an analytical framework to examine this tension be-
tween the national security and human security approach. When securitising an issue, 
an actor frames issues as an existential threat to the referent object, usually the na-
tion state, and moves it away from the realm of normal politics, allowing the imple-
mentation of anti-democratic emergency measures that are injurious to human rights, 
civil liberties, and other social values. Thus the framework of securitisation has been 
deployed as a way to critique securitisation processes and highlight the potential dan-
gers of treating an issue as a security threat. When new issues are adopted on the 
security agenda, it always carries an inherent risk of securitization, though it might 
also change the understanding of the concept of security itself.  
Despite the recent rise of national security, the changing security environment does 
not allow retreating back to the old ways and the new security paradigms are here to 
stay. In human rights forums, human security is widely recognised. Even in the UN 
Security Council, human rights have been on the agenda with growing frequency, de-
spite the willingness of Russia and China to veto resolutions involving the most ex-
plicit human security language. The human security approach should be kept on top 
of the security agenda in all of these forums. Groups that are more easily exposed to 
violence from state as well as non-state actors should receive extra attention when 
talking about security issues. It should also be noted that different groups can face dif-
ferent kinds of violence. For example, the forms of violence men and women suffer 
during, and after, armed conflicts and as refugees are often different.  
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As of late, resilience has emerged as a new security paradigm that has the potential 
to go beyond the national security versus human security divide. Resilience has made 
its way from disaster management to the heart of national security discussions. Resili-
ence has a lot of potential for human rights advocates: if defined in a way that makes 
democratic conventions and respect for human rights an integral part of resilient soci-
ety, it can act as a safeguard against securitisation and also open a way to include 
human rights in national security discussions across the entire policy spectrum. Par-
ticularly, the potential to support human rights promotion is the concept of comprehen-
sive resilience. 
Recommendations:  
● Finland should work on keeping human security on top of the agenda in all 
relevant international forums. Themes to bring forth include (but are not lim-
ited to): 
○ Ensure diversity when tackling security issues. For example, the role 
of women and young people in conflict resolution should be strength-
ened.  
○ Protect individuals against violence (including harassment etc.) from 
state actors or actors acting on behalf of the state, but also from non-
state actors (state due diligence responsibility). 
○ Threats to individuals’ security and privacy emanating from the use of 
technology. 
● After ratifying the Istanbul convention, Finland should implement the obliga-
tions internally as well as in the EU and to continue to keep the issue on 
agenda globally. 
● Finland should investigate the potential of using comprehensive resilience as 
a concept for promoting human rights in the security framework and as a way 
to reach over governmental silos to include human right principles to all rele-
vant policy areas. Diversity is the key when building resilience.  
Goal 5. Promote the gender equality actively at the time of resistance 
and anti-genderisms.  
The gender perspective is included in the report as a cross-cutting theme and the pro-
motion of gender equality concerns not only this specific goal on gender equality, but 
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all other goals presented here. One of the aims of the report has been to assess the 
current atmosphere to promote gender equality, and the anti-gender movements, 
which actively resist gender equality.  
The sources suggest that the discord over gender equality, women’s rights and the 
rights of gender and sexual minorities has indeed been intensifying over the years. In 
Europe, the internationally coordinated anti-gender movements have managed to 
lobby against gender equality with well-organised campaigns and a relatively small 
number of active supporters, and to weaken the capability of the European Union to 
form common positions in global forums. On the other hand, liberalising policy devel-
opments aimed at increasing gender equality and LGBTI rights on the EU level have 
been accepted and the promotion of gender equality has remained on the EU’s 
agenda. This has resulted in increased polarisation between European political par-
ties and regimes on women’s rights and even on the use of concept of “gender”. Dur-
ing these times, the promotion of gender equality requires specific sharpness and 
knowledge both on the movements that promote and on the movements that actively 
resist gender equality. 
As the promotion of gender equality extends to various dimensions, specific sub-goals 
should be identified for this work:  
a) Enhancing women’s possibilities of political activity and civil society activity 
continues to be an important goal. In addition, feminist political activity of both 
women and men is crucial. In times of anti-gender movements, the best way to pro-
mote gender equality is to build grassroot movements for advocating equality. This 
can be supported by strong civil society, and NGO’s which promote gender equality 
and human rights. One of the ways of supporting feminist activity and women’s activ-
ity is to fight against hate speech in different medias, since hate speech hinders 
particularly women’s freedom of expression and engagement in public. 
Recommendations:  
● The Finnish government should agree on an overall goal and definition for gen-
der equality. For example, in Sweden the overall goal is that “women and men 
are to have the same power to shape society and their own lives.” Finland should 
also insist on a clear and coherent definition of the content of gender equality in 
different contexts in order to make sure that the debating parties agree suffi-
ciently on its defining features.  
 
● Finland should encourage equal and active political and civil society participa-
tion. This can be supported by encouraging strong civil society, hearing the 
views of NGO’s which promote gender equality and human rights, developing 
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actions that aim for controlling hate speech, and through feminist political actions 
by women and men.  
b) Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) is a very important goal to 
keep on the agenda. During the last 5 years, work for this goal has become more diffi-
cult, which means that the goal is even more important than before. For instance, the 
anti-choice actors work on many levels to stop SRHR work or parts of it.  
Recommendation:  
● Sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) should be kept on the 
agenda. Finnish actors need to be aware of the arguments used by anti-
choice actors. This way, the agenda and argumentation can be adjusted to 
work well in different forums. People who do SRHR work in the field need to 
be protected and supported so that they can focus on doing their work. 
c) Economic gender equality is a significant goal that could be further strengthened. 
The goals could include: combating poverty (including a gender perspective, which 
means, for instance, not talking about poverty only on a household level), addressing 
the gender pay gap, promoting gender equality in working life (including entrepre-
neurship) and addressing gender equality in owning capital (land, properties, shares, 
monetary, etc.). The intersection of gender and age is important too, as well as the 
minority perspective. The recognition and value of unpaid care and domestic work 
can significantly improve women’s economic position. Valuing unpaid care is a very 
traditional Nordic goal but also a sustainable development goal SDG 5.4. In practice, 
it could mean improving public services, infrastructure and social protection policies, 
and sharing care responsibilities more equally. Sharing care responsibilities more 
equally between men and women has a value of its own as well. Men have a right to 
provide care, too, and to be equally involved in raising children. 
Recommendation:  
● Economic gender equality should be addressed by strengthening equal eco-
nomic independence, combating poverty, promoting gender equality in work-
ing life and education, and combating the gender pay gap.  
● Finland should focus on measures for recognising the value of unpaid care 
and domestic work. 
● Finland should promote men’s possibilities for meeting their care responsibili-
ties as fathers.  
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d) Gender minorities and sexual minorities’ rights need to be specifically ad-
dressed. Particularly, some of the LGBTI (lesbian, gay, bi, trans, intersex) people con-
tinue facing violence and discrimination in many areas of life. Also, anti-gender move-
ments are making it more difficult and dangerous to promote specifically the rights of 
LGBTI people. Human rights defenders need to be supported and defended. 
Transgender rights and the rights of intersex people also need to be addressed spe-
cifically and separately, not only as a part of the LGBTI acronym. Intersex people’s 
rights should be improved through eliminating the harmful practice of unnecessary 
"normalising" treatments of intersex persons. At the same time, intersex people need 
to have access to medical treatment when they need it.  
Recommendation:  
● Gender minorities and sexual minorities’ rights need to be specifically ad-
dressed. Human rights defenders, who promote LGBTI rights, need to be sup-
ported and defended when they face violence or thread. Transgender rights 
and the rights of intersex people need to be addressed specifically and sepa-
rately, not only as a part of the LGBTI acronym. 
Goal 6. Utilise and create new possibilities of cooperation across 
professional and political silos. 
The challenge of global trends to national and multilateral governance is that they 
force national, regional and global institutions to recognise new possibilities of both 
horizontal and vertical cooperation across professional and political silos. This in-
cludes state-, non-state – and business actors, bringing together professional and po-
litical expertise from various backgrounds. This development will call for forums that 
facilitate this expertise in ways which aim at a mutual understanding, rather than list-
ing the statements of interest groups. The incorporation of human rights perspective 
across policy areas supports coherence, but also tackling human rights impacts of 
global trends more effectively. 
A) The states are the subjects of international law and continue to hold power over 
regulation. It is the responsibility of the states to ensure that human rights are properly 
implemented and respected within their jurisdictions. The inconsistence in the treat-
ment of NGOs is currently leading to situations where organisations are forced to relo-
cate their operations into allowing states. At the same time, business actors may be 
inclined to invest and settle their operations within states with less regulation. 
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 Recommendations:  
● For national and multilateral governance, the task of mitigating the human 
rights impacts of global trends requires breaking the silos through better coor-
dination between policy areas. This can be supported by searching for con-
cepts that can be employed across the sectors. Examples of such concepts 
are resilience and sustainability. The fact that even commonly shared con-
cepts differ in emphasis, and even their interpretation, across policy areas can 
be utilised to widen the scope of the interpretation of those concepts.  
● The principles of equality and non-discrimination should be included and as-
sessed by default within ministries, working groups or parliamentary commit-
tees, for example, when actions concerning the environment, migration or 
new technologies are considered.  
● The Finnish government and politicians should recruit more people special-
ised in gender equality and human rights that could advise, for instance, min-
isters and other people who negotiate on human rights. 
● Gender equality and human rights goals should be acknowledged in every 
policy area in the foreign ministry and also in other ministries. This requires 
common goals and actions, as well as coming out of silos. 
B) Researchers have pointed out that, while states are becoming more occupied with 
sovereignty over solidarity, a simultaneous trend is shifting power away from state ac-
tors toward non-state actors, including privately owned businesses and public actors 
such as cities. Some states are reducing the operational space of NGOs through 
budgetary power, both nationally and in multilateral organisations. Yet, the NGOs 
have potential to bring attention to the human rights impacts of environmental degra-
dation or land ownership, racism and misogyny or insufficient access to technologies 
needed to access to basic services. There are also strong links between environmen-
tal movements, activism, such as the MyData Movement or NGOs providing legal as-
sistance for immigrants and democratisation. Thus, the expertise and networks of 
NGOs are highly beneficial for mitigating the negative impacts of these trends. 
Ensuring that the state supports an active and free civil society is crucial from the 
perspective of mitigating the human rights impacts of global trends. Supporting an ac-
tive civil society with strong grassroots movements would promote environmental 
awareness and the mitigation of the negative impacts of combating environmental 
change with the implicated groups. It also helps in identifying the most implicated 
groups in a context-sensitive way, by providing local expertise and experiences. 
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Working for inclusive participatory practices, providing information and expertise com-
bined with practical help, such as childcare or language tuition, facilitates working for 
the goal of supporting the integration of migrants in their receiving states. Yet NGOs 
also help migrants during their journeys by offering health care, legal assistance or 
food and shelter. Providing access to the digitalised communications environment, ed-
ucating the disadvantaged groups into using new technologies and providing infor-
mation on rights concerning personal data, for example, can be credited to NGOs and 
civil society actors along with the states and local governing bodies. And, finally, 
NGOs contribute to the infrastructure of human security by hosting safe houses for 
vulnerable people, such as victims of domestic violence, sexual abuse or less-advan-
taged children. As globalisation highlights the interconnectedness of phenomena and 
actors, channeling between the local, regional and global becomes increasingly im-
portant. Otherwise, the local impacts of global actions are only communicated by the 
most powerfully voiced actors. 
Recommendations:  
● Finland should keep the support of NGOs and free civil society on the 
agenda, not only via financial support and support for HRDs, but also by ac-
tively seeking their expertise in global issues as well.  
● Finland should support the building of strong grassroots movements, since 
they are best way to promote gender equality. This can be supported by a 
strong civil society and NGO’s that promote gender equality and human 
rights. 
● Human rights defenders face an increasing amount of violence and physical 
threats. The government needs to acknowledge this and defend people who 
work for human rights and gender equality (see Goal 5). 
● The government should be aware of anti-gender actors, both governmental 
and non-governmental organisations. It is crucial to know what their aims are 
and that there are international organisations behind the movements. The offi-
cials should be able to estimate whether some messages are actually coming 
from human rights NGOs, or whether they are coming from anti-gender NGOs 
(see goal 5). 
C) At the same time, business actors have become increasingly engaged with the 
human rights framework over the past decade. They involve the private sector and the 
state actors through ownership and involvement in all global trends described in this 
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report. The states are responsible for the regulation of business actors within their ju-
risdictions. Guidelines from the UN and the OECD, most notably, include the concrete 
articulation of the expected responsibilities and tools for managing the human rights 
impacts that companies have in the form of environmental issues or working condi-
tions, for example. The development of global and regional frameworks in the UN, 
and ILO and the OECD seeks to address these issues from the gender perspective as 
well.  
Encouraging business actors to engage more actively with human rights discourse is 
valid for, firstly, accessing expertise on technological innovations or, for instance, in-
formation on environmental impacts. It is important to incorporate the human rights 
perspective into business design as a premise at an early stage, not solely as an ef-
fective remedy. The actions of businesses implicate workers, communities, indige-
nous peoples, children and women and, especially, people with disabilities who may 
be provided with, or denied, an opportunity for work. The human rights implications in-
clude the right to work, the right to health, the right to privacy, cultural rights etc., not 
to mention the principle of non-discrimination. 
In the UN, the Open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corpo-
rations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights (IGWG) endeav-
ors to elaborate on the legally binding regulation of business activities in international 
human rights law. It is, important to keep in mind that the state responsibility to guar-
antee human rights nationally also includes the responsibility to protect human rights 
in relations between non-state actors. The principle of due diligence holds the states 
responsible for legally regulating the activities of non-state actors and ensuring the 
protection of human rights. 
Recommendations:  
● The aim should be to have sufficient regulation on all levels: in international 
law, EU law and national law. A combination of legally binding norms, interna-
tional guidelines and standards set up by the companies themselves provides 
a well-functioning basis for regulation. 
● Finland should actively seek international cooperation for regulating business 
actors. Particular attention should be paid to the actions of state-owned or 
controlled businesses and their practices.  
● Finland should actively consider the gaps in international regulation and be 
prepared to support international legally binding solutions for regulating busi-
ness activities in international law (and EU law). It should also promote the 
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wide application of the UN Guiding Principles and highlight the principle of 
due diligence in its activities.  
● Global trends influence the conditions and activities of businesses, which is 
why common ground should be sought where the interests of the states and 
business actors coincide. The minimum for business is the do no harm princi-
ple, but the aim should be to engage businesses to “do good”.  
● The SDGs framework including human rights elements is already widely ac-
cepted and familiar in the business world, which is why it should be actively 
promoted.”.  
● Finally, it is crucial to stress the primary responsibility of the states to respect, 
protect and fulfill their human rights obligations.  
Goal 7. Support the states’ commitment to the multilateralism by 
investing in activities that increase its legitimacy.  
A current topic within the international human rights systems is the lack of legitimacy 
in the Western states. One of the reasons for this is that human rights and the interna-
tional human rights system is not actively recognised as a meaningful and active part 
of modern societies. It is not only the fact that the system is based on normative 
agreements that limit the states’ sovereignty over the treatment of individuals. The 
problem is also that, for the “general public” in the West, human rights have become 
distant on an everyday level and are easily associated with the debates on immigra-
tion or minorities as the rights of “others”. One the one hand, this can be conceived as 
a positive signal on the success of the national and regional implementation of human 
rights. On the other hand, this development makes the international human rights sys-
tem vulnerable in the face of populist movements and politics that seek to increase 
their power through strong divisions of population groups. The aim of these groups is 
not to replace the existing multilateral system with new infrastructure and institutions, 
but to promote new interpretations of established agreements. 
The successful implementation of human rights is also a myth, often especially re-
garding ESCs, but also sometimes with CP rights, even in countries that do well ac-
cording to several indicators. In Finland, for example, the level of social protection is 
considered insufficient. Also, the implementation of participation rights in the form of 
access to information or equal treatment in the use of technologies in health care 
should be taken seriously. The legal system and the links between international law, 
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the EU law and national constitutions and legislations are often not commonly under-
stood. Hence, the role of international human rights law and its meaning for the lives 
of all citizens, not just particular groups of them, is left aside.  
Supporting claims-making and citizen’s active engagement with communities helps to 
make the meaning and benefits of the international human rights system concrete on 
a personal level. Some examples of defending and strengthening the international hu-
man rights system against the movements that undermine it have already been seen.  
While transparency, the openness of information, the fast travel of ideas and innova-
tions are beneficial to societies, the digitalised communication environment also bears 
grim tidings for such things as democratic institutions or well-functioning bureaucratic 
infrastructure. Complexity does not translate well into fast-tracking information chan-
nels, and, on the other hand, communicating with haste easily produces false infor-
mation. Well-crafted and thought out addresses take time and make the whole politi-
cal system seem slow and inefficient in the face of grave issues.  
On the other hand, reporting on violations and problems in the implementation of hu-
man rights should not be overshadowed by the positive developments either. At-
tempts for creating better ways to talk about the meaning of the international human 
rights system and fundamental rights are, however, evolving. For example, as a re-
sponse to the growing pressure of populism and anti-human rights agendas in Eu-
rope, the FRA has launched a campaign to reach the general public through the bet-
ter communication of human rights as rights protecting all individuals. 
Recommendations:  
● Finland should ensure that its human rights policy is coherent. Finland has 
been noted to have one of Europe’s worst records of racism against Muslims, 
and the problem of hate speech (both in racist and gendered forms) has been 
brought up even as a problem for democracy. These issues, which include vi-
olence against women, treatment of the elderly and the level of social protec-
tion, have direct links to the mitigation of the negative human rights impacts of 
global trends, and should be addressed as effectively as possible. 
● The coherence approach helps in building up a credible human rights agenda, 
also from the domestic perspective. It also serves the purpose of focusing re-
sources and the use of multi-stakeholder expert groups to gain in-depth 
knowledge and expertise on the topic. In the institutional sense, this approach 
should be applied vertically to all levels of governance and horizontally across 
all relevant policy areas. 
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● The discourse on developing better ways for human rights communication 
should be carefully followed. At the same time, the importance of respecting 
independence of media and journalists in their work should be kept on the 
agenda for tackling the negative developments of recent years also in Europe.  
Goal 8. Promote a broad concept of participation and the right to 
education to mitigate the negative impacts of global trends.  
Participation in political processes, the labour market, education and culture helps to 
consolidate and promote a human rights based approach in both the bottom-up and 
top-down sense. To secure the incorporation of human rights based activities in com-
munities, it is essential that these rights are not only designed by policymakers and 
active non-state and business actors, but also claimed by engaged local individuals 
and communities. On the other hand, states need to be held responsible for the insti-
tutionalisation and implementation of human rights, also by ensuring that the channels 
and opportunities for participation are properly secured and that the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination employed. 
The right to high-quality education is a significant goal in promoting equality and non-
discrimination. Everybody needs to have access to education on all levels (preschool, 
primary school, secondary and tertiary education, plus lifelong learning). Particularly 
within EU, gender segregation in education is seen today as a gender equality prob-
lem. The gender perspective as well as the minority perspective are important for 
identifying possible problems and inequalities and groups that do not have access to 
education. In addition to the formal possibilities for education, the outcome needs to 
be addressed: do girls and boys, women and men and people belonging to different 
minorities actually participate equally in education. For instance, girls and women who 
are pregnant or have children need to have access to education.  
 Recommendation:  
● Encouraging participation by supporting local institutions, secure spaces for 
participation also for women, girls and minorities and promoting an inclusive 
approach to decision-making should be included in Finland’s human rights ac-
tivities. In connection to this, access to information and transparency of gov-
ernance should be aimed at in any activity, excluding cases which put human 
rights defenders or other individuals in jeopardy. 
● The right to education should be kept on the agenda by highlighting its posi-
tive effects to local communities, industries and states. Mitigating gender seg-
regation in education could also be added as a goal on the Finnish agenda 
PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT´S ANALYSIS, ASSESSMENT AND RESEARCH ACTIVITIES 2019:50 
 
143 
 
 
(women’s participation in technical fields, men’s participation in the fields of 
health and education).  
● Education should be kept safe for everybody. Combating harassment and bul-
lying in schools and on the way to school is a thing that needs to be ad-
dressed. Particularly within EU, gender segregation in education is seen to-
day as a gender equality problem. Providing education on sexual and repro-
ductive health and rights should be is a crucial part of the right to education.  
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